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Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
Einleitung und Motivation 
Innovationen entstehen in zunehmendem Maße nicht mehr isoliert sondern 
durch die Kombination von Wissen verschiedener Unternehmen und Institutio-
nen. Immer kürzere Produktlebenszyklen und die Zunahme der Komplexität von 
Technologien und Produkten sind ein Grund dafür, dass immer weniger Unter-
nehmen das gesamte Wissen, das für die Entwicklung innovativer Produkte und 
Prozesse nötig ist, selbst besitzen. Um dennoch erfolgreich Innovationsaktivitä-
ten durchführen zu können, verschaffen sich die Unternehmen über verschiedene 
Kanäle Zugang zu externem Wissen, zum Beispiel durch die Analyse von frei 
zugänglichem Wissen oder durch Kooperationen mit anderen Unternehmen oder 
wissenschaftlichen Einrichtungen. Letztere Möglichkeit des Zugangs zu exter-
nem Wissen steht im Mittelpunkt dieser Arbeit.  
Viele empirische Arbeiten haben gezeigt, dass sich Kooperationen im Zusam-
menhang mit Innovationsaktivitäten, einschließlich Forschung und Entwick-
lung (FuE) positiv auf den Erfolg eines Unternehmens mit innovativen Produkten 
und Prozessen auswirken. Das Interesse der Unternehmen an dieser Form des 
Wissenstransfers ist somit verständlich. Die theoretische wissenschaftliche Lite-
ratur und hier insbesondere die sog. „Non-tournament“ Literatur hat zudem ge-
zeigt, dass FuE-Kooperationen helfen können das Marktversagen, das durch 
Wissensspillover im FuE-Prozess entsteht, zu korrigieren und die gesamtwirt-
schaftliche Wohlfahrt zu steigern. Nicht zuletzt deshalb hat auch die Politik ein 
Interesse an einer regen Kooperationstätigkeit der Unternehmen. Mit der umfang-
reichen Förderung von Kooperationen verfolgt die öffentliche Hand darüber hin-
aus das Ziel den Wissensfluss zwischen Universitäten und Unternehmen und den 
Unternehmen untereinander zu verbessern, um so die Innovationskraft eines 
Landes oder einer Region zu steigern. 
IV 
Wie aus diesen Ausführungen deutlich wird, sind FuE-Kooperationen und Wis-
senstransfer bzw. Wissensspillover eng miteinander verbunden. Eine ganze Reihe 
von wissenschaftlichen Studien hat in den vergangen Jahren empirische Belege 
für die Existenz dieses Zusammenhangs geliefert. Die vorliegende Dissertation 
schließt an diese Arbeiten an, indem sie sich mit der Analyse des Einflusses von 
Wissensspillovern auf die Kooperationsneigung von Unternehmen im Bereich 
FuE und Innovation beschäftigt. Sie geht in mehrfacher Hinsicht über die beste-
hende Literatur hinaus, insbesondere im Bezug auf die Abbildung von Wis-
sensspillovern im ökonometrischen Modell. Im Gegensatz zu den traditionellen 
empirischen Modellen in diesem Forschungsbereich wird (wie unten dargestellt) 
berücksichtigt, dass nicht das gesamte Wissen, das produziert wird, auch von 
allen Unternehmen genutzt werden kann. Bei der Konstruktion der Spilloverma-
ße wird daher einerseits der Tatsache Rechnung getragen, dass Wissen durch Pa-
tente und Geheimhaltung geschützt werden kann, und andererseits, dass ein Un-
ternehmen bestimmte Fähigkeiten („absorptive Fähigkeiten“- Cohen und Levin-
thal, 1989, 1990) besitzen muss, um externes Wissen nutzen zu können. Zudem 
werden Wissensspillover von Unternehmen aus der eigenen Branche, von denen 
aus Unternehmen anderer Branchen und wissenschaftlicher Einrichtungen unter-
schieden. Die beiden zentralen Hypothesen der Arbeit, die mit mikroökonometri-
schen Methoden überprüft werden, sind daher: 
1. Die Höhe der tatsächlich auftretenden Wissensspillover hat einen positiven 
Einfluss auf die Kooperationsneigung von Unternehmen im Bereich FuE 
und Innovation. 
2. Verschiedene Arten von tatsächlich aufgetretenen Wissensspillovern be-
einflussen die Kooperationsneigung von Unternehmen im Bereich FuE 
und Innovation in unterschiedlich. 
Die Arbeit gliedert sich in einen theoretischen Teil, der die empirische und the-
oretische Literatur zu dem Thema FuE-Kooperationen und Wissensspillover 
überblicksartig darstellt, und einen empirischen Teil, indem die oben erwähnten 
Spillovermaße generiert werden und der Einfluss dieser Spillovermaße auf die 
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Neigung eines Unternehmens FuE-Kooperationen einzugehen untersucht wird. 
Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse und Inhalte der einzelnen Kapitel werden im Fol-
genden zusammengefasst. 
Empirische und theoretische Literatur zum Thema Wissensspillover und 
FuE-Kooperationen 
Kapitel 2 der Arbeit gibt einen Überblick über die umfangreiche theoretische 
und empirische Literatur zum Thema Wissensspillover und FuE-Kooperationen. 
Der Überblick über die theoretische Literatur beginnt mit der Darstellung der 
industrieökonomischen Theorie und hier insbesondere von „non-tournament“ 
und „tournament“ Modellen. Dem schließen sich kurze Abhandlungen über die 
Ergebnisse der Transaktionskostentheorie und des Ressourcenbassierten Ansat-
zes an. Die Beschreibung der empirischen Literatur fokussiert sich auf Modelle, 
die Daten aus Innovationserhebungen nutzen, da auch für diese Arbeit derartige 
Daten Verwendung finden. Diskutiert wird insbesondere das Modell von Cassi-
man und Veugelers (2004), das die Grundlage für die vorliegende Arbeit bildet. 
Sowohl die empirische als auch die theoretischen Arbeiten kommen zu dem Er-
gebnis, dass sich Wissensspillover positiv auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit auswirken 
Kooperation im Bereich FuE und Innovation einzugehen. Sie liefern außerdem 
Argumente dafür, dass verschiedene Arten von Wissensspillovern die Wahr-
scheinlichkeit zu kooperieren auf unterschiedliche Art und Weise beeinflussen. 
Analytischer Rahmen der empirischen Analysen 
Kapitel 3 skizziert die Arbeitsschritte im empirischen Teil der Arbeit und erläu-
tert den Zusammenhang zwischen der Höhe des generierten Wissens und den 
tatsächlich genutzten bzw. aufgetretenen Wissensspillovern. Dabei wird die Auf-
gliederung der Wissensspillover in Spillover von Unternehmen der gleichen 
Branche, Unternehmen anderer Branchen und wissenschaftlichen Einrichtungen 
ebenso angesprochen, wie der im weiteren Verlauf der Analyse untersuchte Ein-
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fluss von absorptiven Fähigkeiten und intellektuellen Eigentumsrechten auf die 
Höhe der tatsächlich auftretenden Wissensspillover. Der in dem Kapitel entwi-
ckelte umfassende analytischen Rahmen für den empirischen Teil der Dissertati-
on kann in der folgenden Graphik zusammengefasst werden: 
Abbildung 1 Überblick über den analytischen Rahmen für die empirische Analy-
sen 
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Das Mannheimer Innovationspanel 
Eine ausführliche Beschreibung des Mannheimer Innovationspanels (MIP) ist 
Gegenstand von Kapitel 4. Diese vom bmbf in Auftrag gegebene Innovationser-
hebung unter Unternehmen mit fünf und mehr Beschäftigten im verarbeitenden 
Gewerbe und Dienstleistungssektor des Zentrums für Europäische Wirtschaftfor-
schung (ZEW) in Mannheim bildet die Datenbasis für die empirischen Analysen 
in den folgenden Kapiteln. Neben einer Beschreibung der für die Erhebung ver-
wendeten Konzepte und Fragestellungen, beinhaltet dieses Kapitel auch Informa-
tionen über die verwendete Erhebungs- und Aufbereitungsmethodik, wie die Be-
schreibung der Grundgesamtheit und Rücklaufquoten. 
Von potenziellen zu realisierten Wissensspillovern 
Die eigentliche empirische Arbeit beginnt mit Kapitel 5. In diesem Kapitel wird 
mit Hilfe von Informationen über die FuE-Aufwendungen einzelner Unterneh-
men und ganzer Industrien ein empirisches Maß für den Wissensstock eines Un-
ternehmens bzw. einer Branche generiert. Dabei kommt die sog. „perpetual in-
ventory methode“ zum Einsatz, die es ermöglicht aus einem Anfangsbestand an 
Wissen und nachfolgenden Zugängen an Wissen einen aktuellen Bestand zu er-
zeugen. In die Berechnung dieses Bestands geht auch eine Abschreibungsrate für 
Wissen ein. Bisherige Studien haben meist eine für alle Branchen konstante Ab-
schreibungsrate angenommen. Die vorliegende Arbeit geht über die bestehende 
Literatur hinaus, indem die Abschreibungsrate aus dem durchschnittlichen Pro-
duktlebenszyklus einer Branche berechnet wird und somit für jede Branche un-
terschiedlich ist. Das Ergebnis von Kapitel 5 ist ein geschätzter Bestand an Wis-
sen für einzelne Branchen und Unternehmen im Jahr 2002, der potentiell zu Spil-
lovern werden kann („potenziell abgehende Spillover“). 
Kapitel 6 der Arbeit beginnt mit einer Diskussion verschiedener Faktoren, die 
den freien Fluss von Wissen zwischen Unternehmen einschränken können. Aus-
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gangspunkt ist die Frage warum nicht der gesamte Bestand an Wissen (Kapitel 5) 
von allen Unternehmen in gleichem Umfang genutzt werden kann. Kapitel 6 gibt 
zwei Antworten auf diese Frage: Erstens, ein Teil des entstandenen Wissens kann 
durch Patente und Geheimhaltung vor einer Nutzung durch andere Unternehmen 
geschützt werden und zweitens, nicht alle Unternehmen haben die gleiche Fähig-
keit externes Wissen zu identifizieren, assimilieren und schließlich in innovative 
Produkte und Prozesse umzusetzen („absorptive capacity“ Cohen und Levinthal, 
1989).  
Unter Verwendung von Fragen aus dem Mannheimer Innovationspanel kann 
mit Hilfe von Ordered Probit Modellen gezeigt werden, dass sowohl Patente als 
auch Geheimhaltung den Wissensfluss zwischen Unternehmen signifikant redu-
zieren. Auch die zweite These, dass nicht alle Unternehmen die gleichen absorp-
tiven Fähigkeiten haben, kann mit multivariaten Verfahren (Multivariates Probit 
Modell) und Daten aus dem Mannheimer Innovationspanel, empirisch belegt 
werden. Die Analysen zeigen zudem, dass absorptiven Fähigkeiten für verschie-
dene Arten von Wissen von unterschiedlichen Unternehmenscharakteristika ab-
hängen.  
Die dargestellten Ergebnisse bilden zusammen mit dem in Kapitel 5 errechne-
ten Bestand an Wissen die Basis für die Berechnung der tatsächlich entstandenen 
Wissensspillover aus Sicht eines Unternehmens. Kapitel 6 schließt mit einer Be-
rechnung eben dieser tatsächlichen Wissenspillover. Dafür wird der Bestand an 
Wissen für jede Branche zunächst mit der durchschnittlichen Bedeutung von Pa-
tenten und Geheimhaltung in der Branche multipliziert, um vom Bestand an ge-
neriertem Wissen zum Bestand an frei verfügbarem Wissen („realisierte abge-
hende Spillover“ / „potentiell eingehende Spillover“) jeder Branche zu kommen. 
Für den Bestand an Wissen, der aufgrund von FuE Aufwendungen in wissen-
schaftlichen Einrichtungen entstanden ist, wird die Annahme getroffen, dass die-
ser komplett frei verfügbar ist. Ein entsprechendes Maß wird auch für jedes Un-
ternehmen berechnet, indem der Wissensstock eines Unternehmens (Kapitel 5) 
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mit der Bedeutung von Patenten und Geheimhaltung auf Unternehmensebene 
multipliziert wird („realisierte abgehende Spillover“).  
Der Bestand an frei verfügbarem Wissen in den einzelnen Branchen und wis-
senschaftlichen Einrichtungen, d.h. die potenziell eingehenden Spillover, wird 
anschließend mit der Höhe der absorptiven Fähigkeiten eines Unternehmens mul-
tipliziert. Dabei wurde berücksichtigt, dass sich die absorptiven Fähigkeiten für 
verschiedene Wissensarten unterscheiden, d.h. der Bestand an frei verfügbarem 
Wissen in der Branche zu der das jeweilige Unternehmen gehört (WB) wird mit 
den absorptiven Fähigkeiten für Wissen aus der eigenen Branche (ACB) multip-
liziert, der Bestand an frei verfügbarem Wissen aus anderen Branchen (WE) und 
wissenschaftlichen Einrichtungen (WW) mit dem entsprechenden absorptiven 
Fähigkeiten (ACE bzw. ACW) für diese Wissensarten. Die Höhe der gesamten 
entstandenen Wissensspillover, die das Unternehmen von außen aufnimmt („rea-
lisierte eingehende Spillover“), ergibt sich als Summe aus den mit den absorpti-
ven Fähigkeiten gewichteten einzelnen Beständen. In einer Formel zusammenge-
fasst lässt sich dieser letzte Schritt folgendermaßen darstellen, wobei j die Bran-
che des Unternehmens repräsentiert und i alle anderen Branchen: 
( * ) * ( * )i
i j
Realisierte eingehende Spillover ACB WB ACE WE ACW WW
≠
= + +∑  
Ergebnisse, Schlussfolgerungen und Ausblick 
In Kapitel 7 wird schließlich der Einfluss, der in den vorherigen Kapiteln be-
rechneten Spillovermaße, auf die Kooperationsneigung von Unternehmen unter-
sucht. Als Vergleichsmodell dient das Modell von Cassiman und Veuge-
lers (2002), das mit wesentlich einfacheren Spillovermaßen arbeitet und nicht 
nach der Herkunft der Spillover (eigene Branche versus andere Branchen und 
Wissenschaft) unterscheidet. Neben seiner Rolle als Vergleichsmodell liefert das 
Modell von Cassiman und Veugelers (2002) auch Ansatzpunkte für die Kon-
struktion von Variablen, die Kooperationsmotive abbilden können, die über reine 
Wissensspillover hinausgehen. In die Instrumentenvariablenschätzung in der vor-
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liegenden Arbeit gehen daher zum Beispiel auch Indikatoren für andere Koopera-
tionsmotive ein, wie etwa die Größe des Unternehmens, ein Indikator für den 
Erhalt öffentlicher Förderung oder die Zahl der Hauptkonkurrenten eines Unter-
nehmens, die in Anlehnung an die Arbeit von Cassiman und Veugelers (2002) 
berechnet werden.  
Die Ergebnisse der multivariaten Analysen zeigen, dass insbesondere die in der 
Vergangenheit realisierten eingehenden Spillover, d.h. externes Wissen, das ein 
Unternehmen tatsächlich genutzt hat, einen positiven Einfluss auf die Kooperati-
onswahrscheinlichkeit von Unternehmen im Bereich FuE und Innovation haben. 
Für die in der Vergangenheit realisierten abgehenden Spillover, d.h. das vom Un-
ternehmen generierte Wissen, das nicht durch Patente oder Geheimhaltung ge-
schützt wurde, findet sich hingegen kein eindeutig positiver Zusammenhang.  
In einem zweiten Analyseschritt werden die realisierten eingehenden Spillover 
in Wissensspillover aus der eigenen Branche und von außerhalb der Branche un-
terschieden. Letztere Gruppe setzt sich aus den Spillovern aus anderen Branchen 
und der Wissenschaft zusammen. Aufgrund methodischer Überlegungen (Korre-
lationsanalyse) wurde auf einer weitere Aufspaltung verzichtet. Bei der nach 
Herkunft der Spillover getrennten Analyse zeigt sich, dass die realisierten Wis-
sensspillovern von außerhalb der eigenen Branche einen signifikant positiven 
Einfluss auf die Kooperationswahrscheinlichkeit haben, während die Spillover 
aus der eigenen Branche keinen Einfluss haben.  
Insgesamt bestätigt die vorliegende Studie den positiven Zusammenhang zwi-
schen eingehenden Wissensspillovern und Kooperationen von Unternehmen im 
Bereich FuE und Innovation. Sie zeigt damit, dass die in der bestehenden Litera-
tur verwendeten einfacheren Spillovermaße die realisierten eingehenden Spillo-
ver adäquat abbilden.Im Gegensatz zu anderen Arbeiten findet sich in der vorlie-
genden Arbeit allerdings kein eindeutiger Zusammenhang zwischen realisierten 
abgehenden Spillovern und der Kooperationsneigung von Unternehmen. Die 
Nicht-Berücksichtigung des Bestands an erzeugtem Wissen in der empirischen 
Literatur könnte ein Grund für diese Unterschiede sein. 
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Die Untersuchung von Wissensspillovern und Kooperationen könnte um in die-
ser Arbeit nicht berücksichtigte Aspekte erweitert werden. Als erstes ist hier die 
Unterscheidung zwischen den Unternehmen, die nicht kooperieren wollen und 
den Unternehmen die nicht kooperieren können, zu nennen. Dies würde eine de-
tailliertere Analyse des Einflusses von Wissensspillovern auf die Kooperations-
neigung erlauben, die aufgrund der Datenlage in dieser Arbeit nicht durchgeführt 
werden konnte. Ein zweiter Ansatzpunkt für weitergehende Studien ist die Unter-
suchung des Zusammenhangs zwischen Wissensspillovern und Kooperations-
partnern im Zeitablauf. Mit Hilfe von Panelanalysen könnten Fragestellungen 
wie etwa der Einfluss von Spillovern auf die Dauer einer Kooperationsbeziehung 
zwischen verschiedenen Unternehmen untersucht werden. Dazu wäre aber auch 
ein Datensatz nötig, der es erlaubt die Partner in einer Kooperation zu identifizie-
ren. Die Analyse von Netzwerken, bei der die jeweiligen Partner in einer Koope-
rationsbeziehung bekannt sind, bietet für die Beantwortung dieser Fragestellun-
gen eine gute Basis. 
Die in der non-tournament Literatur getroffene Unterscheidung in endogene 
Wissensspillover (Spillover erhöhen sich wenn Unternehmen kooperieren) und 
exogenen Spillovern (Spillover bleiben trotz Kooperation konstant) liefert weite-
re Ansatzpunkte für die Forschung in diesem Bereich. Zum Beispiel könnte em-
pirisch untersucht werden, ob sich die Kooperationsneigung eines Unternehmens 
erhöht, wenn sich die Spillover bei Kooperation um einen gewissen Betrag erhö-
hen.  
Durch Kooperation und Wissensspillovern zwischen Wissenschaftlern und 
Praktikern wird es sicherlich gelingen, auch diese Forschungslücken zu schlie-
ßen. 
XII 
Acknowledgements 
“All men by nature desire to know.” 
Aristotle (Metaphysica 330 BC) 
I would like to thank each and everyone that kept my desire to know more 
about knowledge spillovers and R&D co-operation alive. 
First and foremost I am indebted to my Ph.D. advisor, Prof. Uwe Cantner, who 
provided critical comments on my work and stirred my interest in the topic of 
innovation economics while I was still a student at the University of Augsburg. I 
am garetfull to my co-supervisor Prof. David Audretsch for his support and en-
couragement. 
I would like to thank the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) and 
in particular its president Prof. Wolfgang Franz for supporting this dissertation 
with time, funds and the ability to publish some parts of this dissertation in ZEW 
Discussion papers. 
This dissertation would not have been complete without the support of many of 
my colleagues from the department of Industrial Organisation and International 
Management. I would like to thank in particular Wolfgang Sofka, who not only 
provided me with scientific advice and comments but also kept an upbeat mood 
in our office. Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude for many helpful 
and challenging comments to Dr. Christian Rammer, Dr. Georg Licht and Dr. 
Bettina Peters. 
This dissertation would probably not be readable, if not for the help of four na-
tive speakers Andrew Flower, Tyler Schaffner, Alexis Develle and Jörg Dall-
meier, who provided excellent support, by correcting my spelling mistakes. 
Finally I would like to thank my whole family: My parents for supporting me 
while I was at the University of Augsburg and at Wayne State University in De-
troit and my wife Carmen for being very supportive and understanding through 
the hard times of writing this thesis.  
XIII 
Even though she is not able to read yet, I also thank my daughter Tabea for 
smiling at me each time I set of to work on this thesis. 
       Tobias Schmidt, November 2007 
XIV 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures.................................................................................................. XVII 
List of Tables .................................................................................................. XVIII 
List of Abbreviations.........................................................................................XXI 
1 Introduction....................................................................................................1 
2 The Relationship between Knowledge Spillovers and R&D Co-
operation: A Review of Related Theoretical and Empirical Literature ........7 
2.1 Industrial Organisation Theory .............................................................8 
2.1.1 Non-Tournament Models 8 
2.1.2 Tournament Models 29 
2.2 Transaction Cost Theory.....................................................................32 
2.3 The Resource Based View of the Firm ...............................................34 
2.4 Empirical Studies ................................................................................36 
2.4.1 Descriptive Studies 37 
2.4.2 Econometric Studies Using Data from Innovation Surveys 38 
2.4.3 Econometric Studies Using Data from Other Databases 52 
2.5 Different Types of R&D Partnerships and R&D Spillovers...............53 
2.5.1 R&D Partnerships 54 
2.5.2 R&D Spillovers 58 
2.6 Deduction of Hypotheses for the Empirical Part of the Study ...........64 
3 Overview of the Empirical Part of the Study ..............................................66 
4 The Mannheim Innovation Panel.................................................................71 
4.1 Introduction.........................................................................................71 
4.2 Goals of the MIP Innovation Surveys.................................................72 
4.3 Methodology for Data Collection .......................................................74 
4.3.1 Basic Definition of Innovation and Innovating Firms 74 
4.3.2 Populations, Sample and Non-Response Analyses 76 
4.3.3 Survey Questionnaire and Survey Process 81 
4.3.4 Data Preparation, Data Quality and Expansion 82 
4.3.5 Publications and Usage of the Microdata 84 
XV 
4.3.6 Main Results of the 2005 Mannheim Innovation Panel 85 
5 The Construction of the Potential Outgoing Spillover Pools/Knowledge 
Stocks at the Industry and Firm-Level.........................................................88 
5.1 Empirical Measures for Knowledge Flows and Knowledge Stocks...88 
5.2 Database for the Construction of the Knowledge Stock.....................92 
5.3 Construction of Industry-Specific Knowledge Depreciation Rates....94 
5.4 The Knowledge Stocks of Selected Industries....................................97 
5.5 The Knowledge Stock of a Firm.........................................................98 
6 From Potential Outgoing to Realized Incoming Spillover Pools ..............100 
6.1 Factors Moderating the Free Flow of Knowledge ............................100 
6.2 Different Types of Knowledge Spillover Pools................................105 
6.3 From Industry-Level Potential Outgoing Spillovers to Firm-
Specific Realized Incoming Spillovers – Analytical Framework.....108 
6.4 The Effects of Patents and Secrecy on Knowledge Spillovers .........110 
6.4.1 Legal versus Strategic Protection Methods as a Mean to 
Reduce Knowledge Spillovers – A Review of Related 
Literature 112 
6.4.2 Estimation of the Effects of Patents and Secrecy on 
Knowledge Spillovers 117 
6.4.3 Results of the Empirical Model 127 
6.4.4 Conclusions and Implications for the Next Steps of the 
Analysis 132 
6.5 The Construction of the Potential Incoming Spillover Pools at the 
Industry-Level and the Realized Outgoing Spillover Pool at the 
Firm-Level ........................................................................................133 
6.6 Absorptive Capacity as the Determining Factor of Realized 
Incoming Knowledge Spillovers.......................................................137 
6.6.1 Related Literature on the Components and Determinants of 
Absorptive Capacity for Different Types of Knowledge 140 
6.6.2 Data, Construction of the Variables and Empirical Model 147 
6.6.3 Results 155 
6.7 Construction of the Realized Incoming Spillover Pool at the Firm-
Level..................................................................................................165 
XVI 
7 The Relationship between Knowledge Flows and R&D Co-operation – 
A Multivariate Analysis.............................................................................166 
7.1 Motives and Determinants of R&D Co-operation: Going Beyond 
Knowledge Spillovers .......................................................................166 
7.2 Estimating the Impact of Knowledge Spillovers on the R&D Co-
operation Decision of Firms..............................................................177 
7.2.1 The Model of Cassiman and Veugelers – Benchmark Case 177 
7.2.2 Estimating the Impact of Knowledge Spillovers on R&D 
Co-operation decisions of Firms with the Constructed 
Spillover Variables 188 
8 Summary and Conclusion..........................................................................198 
Appendix ............................................................................................................203 
Literature ............................................................................................................233 
 
 
XVII 
List of Figures 
Figure 1-1 Share of Publicly Funded R&D Projects in Germany between 
1980 and 2004 ................................................................................................5 
Figure 3-1 Overview of the Analytical Framework for the Empirical Part of 
this Study ......................................................................................................70 
Figure 4-1 Goals of the Mannheim Innovation Panel Surveys ............................74 
Figure 4-2 Share of Innovators in Germany, 1992-2004 .....................................86 
Figure 4-3 Innovation Expenditure of German Firms, 1992-2005 ......................87 
Figure 6-1 From Potential to Realized Incoming Spillover Pools .....................110 
Figure 6-2 Expected Effects of Different Types of Protection Methods on 
Knowledge Spillovers ................................................................................119 
Figure 7-1 Reasons for R&D Co-operations – Results for Four German 
Bundesländer ..............................................................................................167 
Figure 7-2 Potential Factors Influencing a Firm’s Decision to have at Least 
one R&D Co-operation with External Partners..........................................179 
 
XVIII 
List of Tables 
Table 2-1 Main Findings on the Link Between Spillovers and R&D Co-
operation in the Non-Tournament Literature ...............................................24 
Table 2-2 Main Findings of Econometric Studies Using Innovation Survey 
Data...............................................................................................................46 
Table 4-1 Sample Sizes of the MIP Survey of 2001, 2003 and 2005 (Selected 
Industry Groups)...........................................................................................80 
Table 5-1 Estimated Depreciation Rates for R&D Capital (in %) and Average 
Product Life-Cycle (in Years) for Selected Industry Groups.......................96 
Table 5-2 Estimated Knowledge Stocks for Selected Industry Groups in 2002..98 
Table 6-1 Regression Results of Ordered Probit Estimations (Dependent 
Variable: Importance of Lack of Information on Technologies as an 
Obstacle to Innovation) ..............................................................................129 
Table 6-2 Estimate Potential Inter-Industry Knowledge Spillover Pools in 
2002 and the Average Importance of Patents and Secrecy in 2002-2004..136 
Table 6-3 Coefficients of Probit and Trivariate Probit Estimation on the  
Determinants of Absorptive Capacity ........................................................157 
Table 6-4 Coefficients of Five Different Probit and Trivariate Probit 
Estimations on the Determinants of Absorptive Capacity .........................158 
Table 7-1 An overview of Motives for (Strategic) Inter-Firm Technology Co-
operation .....................................................................................................169 
Table 7-2 Coefficients of Probit Estimations of the Probability to have at 
Least one R&D Co-operation between 2002 and 2004..............................187 
Table 7-3 Results of Instrumental Variable Probit Estimations on the 
Determinants of R&D Co-operation between 2002 and 2004 ...................196 
Table A-1 Intramural R&D Expenditure in Industry and Services in Billion 
(current) Euros form 1995 to 2002.............................................................204 
XIX 
Table A-2 Gross domestic R&D expenditure (GERD) by Government and 
Higher Education Institutes in Billion (current) Euros from 1995 to 2002 
in Germany .................................................................................................205 
Table A-3 Variables included in the Model on the Relationship between 
Patents and Secrecy and Knowledge Spillovers.........................................206 
Table A-4 Industries Included in the Model on the Relationship between 
Patents and Secrecy and Knowledge Spillovers.........................................208 
Table A-5 Additional Descriptive Statistics for the Sample used to Estimate 
the Effect of Patents and Secrecy on Knowledge Spillovers .....................208 
Table A-6 Descriptive Statistics (Means) for the Sample used to Estimate the 
Effect of Patents and Secrecy on Knowledge Spillovers ...........................209 
Table A-7 Coefficients of Ordered Probit Estimations of the Effect of Patents 
and Secrecy on Knowledge Spillovers .......................................................210 
Table A-8 Variables Included in the Empirical Model of the Determinants of 
Absorptive Capacity ...................................................................................212 
Table A-9 List of Industry Dummies Included in the Model of the 
Determinants of Absorptive Capacity ........................................................214 
Table A-10 Descriptive Statistics for Variables included in the Model of the 
Determinants of Absorptive Capacity ........................................................215 
Table A-11 Regression Results from Probit (1) and Trivariate Probit (2)-(4) 
Estimations of the Determinants of Absorptive Capacity ..........................217 
Table A-12 Construction of Variables for the Benchmark Case on the 
Importance of Knowledge Spillovers for R&D Co-operation ...................220 
Table A-13 Descriptive Statistics (Means) for the Benchmark Case on the 
Importance of Knowledge Spillovers for R&D Co-operation ...................223 
Table A-14 Results for the First Stage OLS Regressions of the Two Stage 
Probit Estimations of the Probability of Cooperating ................................224 
Table A-15 Construction of Variables for the Model on Knowledge 
Spillovers for R&D Co-operation using the Constructed Spillover 
Measures.....................................................................................................225 
XX 
Table A-16 Descriptive Statistics (Means) of the Sample used for the Model 
on Knowledge Spillovers for R&D Co-operation using the Constructed 
Spillover Measures .....................................................................................227 
Table A-17 Results for the First Stage of the Instrumental Variable Probit 
Estimations of the Model on Knowledge Spillovers for R&D Co-
operation using the Constructed Spillover Measures .................................229 
Table A-18 Results for the Instrumental Variable Probit Estimations of the 
Model on Knowledge Spillovers for R&D Co-operation using the 
Constructed Spillover Measures.................................................................231 
 
XXI 
List of Abbreviations 
ANBERD  Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Development 
AUT Austria 
BERD  Business Enterprise Expenditure on R&D 
CATI Cooperative Agreements and Technology Indicators Database 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CIS  Community Innovation Survey 
DESTATIS German Statistical Office 
EU  European Union 
FhG-ISI Frauhenhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research 
FIN  Finland 
FRA  France 
GER Germany 
GERD  Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D 
Infas Institute für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft 
IV Probit Instrumental Variable Probit Estimation 
MIP  Mannheim Innovation Panel 
NACE Nomenclature générale des activités économiques dans les Com-
munautés européennes - Standard Classification of Industries EU  
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
R&D   Research and Development 
RJV  Research Joint Venture 
SIC   Standard Industrial Classifications Index 
SPA  Spain 
SPRU Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex 
TC   Theory Transaction Cost Theory 
UK  United Kingdom 
ZEW Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) 

 1 
1 Introduction 
“The whole is more than the sum of its parts.” 
Aristotle (Metaphysica 330 BC) 
This famous quote by Aristotle is quite fitting for the study I will conduct on 
the following pages, as my study is on combining knowledge from different ac-
tors via R&D co-operation to form a whole that is supposedly better than the 
whole that would have resulted if no R&D co-operation or no combination of 
knowledge would take place. 
A “historic” example of such a combination of knowledge from different do-
mains via R&D co-operation is the disc that changed the way music and data is 
distributed today, the “Compact Disc” or “CD”1. In 1979 a joint team from Phil-
ips and Sony started to work on a way of storing digital audio tracks on a disc. 
They came up with a version that was based on Acrylic glass, which bent under 
high pressure. At that stage the technology to put digital music on a disc was al-
ready developed but the technology for a suitable carrier was not. A product de-
veloped by the chemical giant Bayer finally provided the solution. The character-
istics of the polycarbonate that was previously used and is still used for things 
like stadium roofing and lenses for glasses proved to be ideal for the production 
of Compact Discs. Today all the firms involved in the development of the CD 
have profited from combining their knowledge, as 750.000 CDs are produced 
daily in just one plant of Philips in Hannover-Langenhagen. Not only have the 
firms profited, but also the consumers who were given a new way of listening to 
music in high quality. Beethoven lovers in particular were delighted, as the play-
ing time of a CD was based on the length of Beethoven’s ninth symphony instead 
of the originally proposed one hour (Philips, 2006a).  
                                              
1 For a more detailed description of the case see Rammer (2003).  
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In retrospective, Philips writes on its website “Nobody even invented one part 
of the technology alone. The CD was invented collectively by a large group of 
people working as a team. […] ‘We needed all the skills that you would find in a 
large lab,’ says Piet Kramer, […] ‘Electronics engineers, photographic experts, 
mechanical engineers, control engineers, you have to bring all of these experts 
together, and then look to see if it can be done.’ The pooling of creativity like 
this is typical of the way in which technological progress is made nowadays.” 
(Philips, 2006b). This is just one example of how the combination of knowledge 
can lead to greater success than if it were kept at two different locations.  
A fundamental issue with combining knowledge is how it should be done. 
Knowledge has features of a public good, which cause market failure and lead to 
the problem of organizing the transfer and combination of knowledge held at dif-
ferent locations. One way to overcome the market failure and to structure the 
transfer of knowledge between firms or between firms and research institutions is 
by co-operation. Since the exchange of knowledge is particularly relevant and 
important for the innovation process of firms, as the case of the CD has high-
lighted, the discussion on co-operation has focused on co-operation in research 
and development activities and other innovation activities. These types of co-
operation and their relation to knowledge flows between firms are at the centre of 
this study. 
The successful R&D co-operation between Philips, Sony and Bayer is not the 
only evidence that co-operating on R&D and innovation is indeed a profitable 
strategy. Many authors have empirically investigated the effect of R&D partner-
ships in general and R&D partnerships with certain types of partners (consumers, 
suppliers, research institutes, etc.) on the technological and economic success of 
firms. Almost all of them found a positive effect (see Aschhoff and Schmidt, 
2006 for an overview). This positive impact of knowledge exchange and R&D 
co-operation on the performance of firms – and, as a result, on the performance 
of the whole economy - has drawn a lot of interest from academic researchers, 
practitioners and policymakers alike. 
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It is hard to pin down exactly when academic researchers started to investigate 
R&D co-operations at the firm-level in their various forms. Kogut (1988) re-
views the empirical and theoretical literature on joint ventures (not only R&D 
joint ventures) and cites studies from the late 1960s that investigated the sectoral 
distribution of joint ventures. The analysis by Hagedoorn (2002) is evidence that 
not only joint ventures in general, but also research joint ventures have drawn the 
interest of empirical researchers for decades, as he analyses 40 years of data on 
research partnerships. Theoretical research on R&D partnerships can be traced 
back to the 1980s when the number of R&D partnerships grew considerably and 
they become a more and more popular mode of organizing business (Hagedoorn, 
2002; OECD, 1996). As most other theoretical and empirical strains of literature, 
the research on R&D partnerships is build on concepts and models that are much 
older, like the concept of market failure and incentives. 
The focus of research on R&D partnerships has undergone changes over time in 
terms of the type of partnership analysed as well as the topic analysed. Early em-
pirical and theoretical studies almost exclusively analyse research joint ventures 
(RJV), both in the form of equity joint ventures and as non equity joint ventures. 
While the former covers arrangements where two or more firms jointly form and 
own a separate firm or organization that carries out R&D, the latter includes a 
variety of contractual agreements, for examplemore often than not involving the 
exchange of knowledge or certain technologies (see Hagedoorn, 1993, Killing, 
1988, Siebert, 1996; Kogut, 1988). More recently, the term “research joint ven-
ture” has been replaced by “R&D co-operation” in theoretical and empirical pa-
pers alike. “R&D co-operation” covers not only contractual partnerships but also 
looser forms of collaboration between firms and sometimes even informal 
agreements (e.g. Bönte and Keilbach, 2005; Wiethaus, 2005). This change to a 
broader perspective on collaborative R&D and research partnerships was made 
possible in part by the advent of the Community Innovation Surveys in the Euro-
pean Union that ask firms for details of collaborative research not only within 
joint ventures but also outside of them. 
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With the transition from the RJV to a broader spectrum of R&D partnerships 
there was also a shift from the analysis of effects of R&D co-operation on com-
petition and social welfare to a consideration of the motives of R&D co-
operation and in particular the role of knowledge in the R&D co-operation proc-
ess.2 This change in the research focus is associated with the switch from a more 
defensive view of R&D co-operation, i.e. that R&D co-operation has a negative 
influence on competition, to a more optimistic view, i.e. R&D co-operation as a 
vehicle for knowledge sharing. The emergence of the “knowledge-based econ-
omy” has further strengthened the role of R&D co-operation. With the increasing 
complexity of products and technologies and shorter product life-cycles “tapping 
external sources of know-how becomes a must” (Tsang, 2000: 225) and the ex-
change of knowledge becomes even more important.  
Even though the positive effect of co-operation on success and the increased 
pressure to use external knowledge means that private firms have an incentive to 
cooperate on R&D and innovation activities, the market failure caused by knowl-
edge spillovers leads to an amount of knowledge sharing and R&D co-operation 
that is below the socially desirable level. Hence policy intervention can improve 
the current situation. Theoretical and empirical research has shown that through 
R&D co-operation spillovers can be internalised and the incentives for private 
R&D activities restored. What is more, R&D co-operation helps to increase the 
knowledge flow between firms, as well as between firms and research institu-
tions, which is also in the interest of public policy. For these reasons, a great 
amount of funding for R&D and innovation activities now goes to supporting co-
operative R&D activities as the following figure shows for Germany as an exam-
ple: 
                                              
2 The link between knowledge spillovers and firms’ co-operation decisions had already been assumed 
and used by the early theoretical models, though (see e.g. D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). 
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Figure 1-1 Share of Publicly Funded R&D Projects in Germany between 1980 
and 2004  
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Source: Fier et al. (2005): 25. 
The important role of knowledge spillovers and R&D co-operation between 
firms will be the starting point for my analysis. In particular I will build on the 
existing empirical literature on knowledge flows in and out of the firm as a mo-
tive for R&D co-operation among firms and between firms and public institu-
tions. The well-known empirical model by Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002 and 
the empirical studies building upon it will serve as the role-model for my study. 
However, I will extend this literature in several directions: 
One of the main novelties of this study is that I take into account the fact that 
not all knowledge is equal and that different types of knowledge require different 
internal capacities and capabilities (“absorptive capacity”) to be efficiently ac-
quired, disseminated and exploited (Section 6.6). The distinction between ab-
sorptive capacity for knowledge from universities, knowledge from firms from 
the same industry and knowledge from other industries has not been analysed in 
the literature thus far. This separation allows us to construct measures of different 
pools of (realized) knowledge spillovers at the firm level and investigate their 
effect on the R&D co-operation decisions of firms separately.  
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In order to construct a measure of the amount of knowledge a firm actually 
uses, the knowledge stock of an industry and of a firm will be estimated using the 
perpetual inventory method (Chapter 5) with industry-specific depreciation rates. 
Previous studies have almost exclusively used a single depreciation rate to take 
into account that knowledge becomes obsolete. I will extend the existing litera-
ture in this area by calculating industry-specific depreciation rates based on the 
average product life-cycle in each industry (Section 5.3). The knowledge stocks 
of each industry will then be weighted by the individual firm’s absorptive capac-
ity. Before weighting the knowledge stock with the firms’ absorptive capacity I 
take into account that not all knowledge generated spills out into the public do-
main. Some of the knowledge can be appropriated using patents or secrecy as a 
protection method (Section 6.4). This is to say that I construct measures of real-
ized spillover pools for each firm based on their absorptive capacity and the level 
of knowledge protection chosen by the firms producing the knowledge. I end up 
with mesures of knowledge spillovers that are considerably closer to the actual 
knowledge flows than previous studies. 
Finally, the data I use is rather new (in particular CIS IV data) and has not pre-
viously been used to estimate these types of relationships. 
The analysis will proceed as follows: In the next section I will review the em-
pirical and theoretical literature on the link between R&D co-operation and 
knowledge spillovers. This will be supplemented by an overview of different 
concepts, definitions and types of spillovers and R&D partnerships. In chapter 4 I 
will describe the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) which will serve as the da-
tabasis for my analysis. Chapter 5 I will estimate the knowledge stock of a firm 
and selected industries, before proceeding to the construction of the realized 
spillover pools (i.e. the knowledge a firm has access to as opposed to all knowl-
edge available in an economy) in chapter 6. The spillover measure constructed in 
chapters 5 and 6 will then be used to estimate the impact of knowledge spillovers 
on the decision to cooperate in R&D in chapter 7. Chapter 8 will conclude and 
provide some suggestions for future research. 
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2 The Relationship between Knowledge Spillovers and R&D 
Co-operation: A Review of Related Theoretical and 
Empirical Literature 3 
The link between spillovers and R&D partnerships4 has been analysed from a 
variety of perspectives. Researchers have provided insight into the formation, 
development and effects of R&D co-operation as well as the rationale behind 
their formation using theoretical models from game theory, transaction cost the-
ory and the resource based view. Empirical research has shown that the link be-
tween spillovers5 and incentives to form R&D partnerships actually exists. The 
empirical evidence and theoretical models developed will be reviewed below. 
Considerable attention will be given to the review of the non-tournament litera-
ture since this strand takes the link between spillovers and R&D partnerships 
most directly into account. The resource based view and transaction cost theory 
are more concerned with the explanation of the existence of R&D co-operations 
than the impact of spillovers. They provide some insight into the motives for 
R&D co-operation, however, and will thus be included in this review.  
The review of the empirical literature will focus on empirical studies based on 
innovation surveys in many European countries, most prominently the Cassiman 
                                              
3 The literature cited here only focuses on the role of knowledge and R&D spillovers as a motive for 
firms to form research partnerships. Other motives for R&D co-operation will be discussed in the 
empirical parts of this study (see Section 7.1). Empirical as well as theoretical studies related to cer-
tain topics and concepts relevant for our study, like absorptive capacity and the generation of R&D 
stocks, will be discussed in the sections and chapters dealing with them. Macroeconomic papers are 
beyond the scope of this work. For other reviews of the microeconomic literature see De 
Bondt (1996), Hagedoorn et al. (2000), Caloghirou et al. (2003), Veugelers (1998). 
4 The terms “R&D partnership” and “R&D co-operation” will be used interchangeably in this study. As 
will become clear in section 2.5 many forms of R&D partnerships exist and researchers have used the 
term “R&D co-operation” for many different types. A detailed description of the concept I use for the 
empirical part of the study will be given in section 3. Unless otherwise noted the term “co-operation” 
refers to R&D co-operation and not co-operation in general. 
5 The term “spillover” stands for R&D spillovers and knowledge spillovers alike. A delineation of differ-
ent concepts will be given in section section 2.5. 
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and Veugelers (2002) paper and the empirical studies following their approach. 
Some empirical studies using databases other than innovation surveys will also 
be included in the review. 
The review chapter will conclude by providing an overview of different defini-
tions, concepts and terminology used in the literature for R&D partnerships and 
R&D spillovers. 
2.1 Industrial Organisation Theory 
Industrial organization is a branch of the neoclassical literature and analyses 
and explains the behaviour of firms on the market. From the neo-classical point 
of view firms are described by their production and cost functions and react to 
changes in the market environment. They also shape the market structure with 
their behaviour. To analyse R&D partnerships and their effects on the market, 
R&D spending and social welfare, two game theoretic approaches have been em-
ployed in the theoretical industrial organization literature: non-tournament and 
tournament models. 
2.1.1 Non-Tournament Models 
Non-tournament models are the theoretical models that take into account the re-
lationship between research joint ventures (RJV)/R&D co-operation and spill-
overs most directly. 
They all have a similar structure and are usually set up as follows: 
o Firm operate in an industry whose structure can be described as a du-
opoly/oligopoly. 
o Competition can be described by a Nash Game. 
o There are two stages to the game, the product market stage (2nd) and 
R&D activities stage (1st). Firms compete or cooperate/collude in one or 
both. 
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o There are different research paths available to every firm to come up 
with a certain degree of cost reduction or demand increase through high-
quality products. “An equivalent amount of R&D spending will generate 
an equivalent reduction in production costs or enhancement in demand”. 
(De Bondt, 1996: 10). As a consequence each firm in an industry can 
reach a level of cost reduction or demand increase equal to that of its 
competitors by spending the same amount on R&D as its competitors 
(Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1990). 
o R&D investment in the 1st stage influences the (aggregate) output or the 
prices in the 2nd stage through cost reductions or increases in demand 
and thus impacts welfare. 
o If firms cooperate they choose an R&D level that maximizes joint profits 
at the output stage. 
As far as spillovers are concerned, a fundamental assumption of almost all the 
non-tournament models dealing with RJVs is that spillovers are a source of mar-
ket failure6, because they reduce the private incentive to invest in R&D (see e.g 
Spence, 1984; Katz, 1986; Teece, 1986; De Bondt et al., 1992; Suzumura, 1992; 
Levin and Reiss, 1988) below the socially desirable level (Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz, 1980; Beath et al., 1998; Bernstein and Nadiri, 1989). These spillovers 
occur because of the public good character of knowledge (Arrow, 1962a; Jaffe, 
1986; Liebeskind, 1997; Hagedoorn et al., 2000).  
R&D co-operation is seen as one way to internalize the spillover arising from 
R&D activities and consequently to correct the market failure associated with 
spillovers (Beath et al., 1998; De Bondt et al., 1992; D'Aspremont and Jacque-
min, 1988). In order to implement spillovers in non-tournament models research-
                                              
6 That spillovers can cause market failure is not specific to knowledge spillovers, but rather a generally 
accepted fact (Rosen, 2002; Baumol, 1982). Bernstein and Nadiri (1989) show empirically that in the 
presence of R&D spillovers the social return on R&D is higher than the private return on R&D in 
each industry they studied. 
 10 
ers assume, that the cost reductions achieved by one firm through investment in 
R&D, positively affect the cost reduction of other firms.7 The total cost reduction 
for firm i is thus a function of firm i’s own R&D investment and spillovers, 
which are in turn a function of firm j’s R&D investment. 
The model by D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988; 1990) has been the most in-
fluential in this area of theoretical research and can serve as a role model of the 
non-tournament literature’s treatment of research joint ventures.  
The main goal of D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988; 1990) was to analyse the 
effect of research joint ventures on social welfare in a two stage game. The game 
is carried out in a duopoly where firms decide in the first stage on R&D spending 
levels (xi; xj) and in the second stage on the quantity of production (qi; qj). The 
authors compare four different settings: (1) competitive behaviour of both firms 
in both stages, (2) co-operation in the first stage and competitive behaviour in the 
second stage, (3) co-operation in both stages (“monopoly”), and (4) the first-best 
solution where social welfare W is maximized. The inverse demand function for 
the market is given as  
D-1=a-b(q1+q2)  
with qi the quantity produced by firm i. Firms are described by their cost func-
tion C which has the following form: 
Ci(qi, xi, xj) = [A-xi-ßxj]qi for i=1,2 and i≠j8. 
The cost of production of output qi is thus given as a function of a firm’s own 
R&D spending and R&D spending of the other firm in the market, which spills 
over (see Levin and Reiss, 1984). The magnitude of the spillover is determined 
by the value of ß which is larger than zero (no spillovers at all) and smaller than 
1 (perfect spillovers). Their main finding is that for spillover levels (ß) larger 
                                              
7 This type of relationship has been proposed among others by Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Levin and 
Reiss (1988) and Levin and Reiss (1984). 
8 A number of conditions for the parameters have to be satisfied: a,b>0; 0<A<a, 0<ß<1; xi-ßxj≤A; q1+q2  
≤a/b (see D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988: 1133) 
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than 0.5 the aggregate (cooperative) level of R&D spending is higher than in the 
non-cooperative case9, in contrast to their expectation that R&D levels would 
drop because of the reduction of duplicative research and competition moving 
closer to the monopolistic type.10 What is more, for large spillovers the aggregate 
output of the duopoly is also higher in the case of co-operation in the first-stage 
than in the non-cooperative case.11 D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988; 1990) 
suggest that if profits are higher in the cooperative case as well, this might give 
rise to private incentives for co-operation without any public policy intervention. 
The basic framework has been extended in a variety of ways12: Authors analyse 
oligopolies instead of duopolies, differentiated products instead of homogenous 
products, Bertrand instead of Cournot competition in the product market stage, 
and product innovations instead of process innovations. Other extensions include 
splitting up the first stage (R&D) into separate stages and introducing upstream 
industries with vertical spillovers and co-operation.13 
                                              
9 Note, De Bondt et al. (1992) find that the cost reduction through R&D is maximized in a homogeneous 
oligopoly for spillover levels equal to 0.5 and in a differentiated oligopoly with many rivals for spill-
over levels between 0.5 and 1. They also find that “spillovers that maximize effective R&D also 
maximize firm output, consumer surplus and profits from production.” (De Bondt et al., 1992: 46). 
10 For smaller values of ß≤0.4 the results change. In this case, the aggregate R&D spending level is only 
higher in the cooperative than in the non-cooperative stage if the two firms cooperate in both stages 
of the game. 
11 Again, for smaller values of ß≤0.4 the results change. In that case, the aggregate output level is always 
higher if the two firms do not cooperate. 
12 Google Scholar (http://scholar.google.com/ (Google Scholar, 2006) a search tool for scientific articles 
listed 501 papers and articles that cite D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) on February 1st, 2006. To 
review them all would be beyond the scope of this mainly empirical study. The subsequent para-
graphs will thus sketch the main extensions and deviations from the D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 
model only exemplarily. 
13 Other authors have extended the model but also shifted the focus to other aspects of the R&D process 
and R&D co-operation formation. They include, Yi and Shin (2000), Poyago-Theotoky (1995) (num-
ber of research partners) and Hinloopen (1997) (subsidizing R&D vs. allowing R&D co-operation). 
These aspects are not relevant for our empirical study and will thus not be discussed in detail. 
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Suzumura (1992) considers an industry containing n firms which all produce a 
homogeneous product. His inverse demand function consequently depends on the 
total amount of output produced and can be written as p=f(Q), where p is the 
price and Q the aggregated output. Suzumura (1992: 1312, 1314) further extends 
the model of D’Aspremont and Jacquemine by evaluating the outcome of coop-
erative R&D not only with respect to the first best welfare solution  
WF(x):W(x, qF(x))   
but with respect to a second best welfare solution  
WF(x):W(x, qN(x))        
where qF(x) is the “socially first-best output profile corresponding to x” 
(Suzumura, 1992: 1312) and qN(x) “is the second-stage Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium [output] given x” (Suzumura, 1992: 1310). His results show that neither 
non-cooperative nor cooperative R&D behaviour (1st stage) leads to (first- or 
second-best) socially desirable R&D levels. Regardless of the level of spillovers, 
cooperative R&D leads to R&D levels below the socially desirable level (the 
same result was found by D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). Non-cooperative 
behaviour leads to underinvestment as compared to the socially optimal levels if 
spillovers are high. If spillovers do not exist, non-cooperative R&D leads to 
overinvestment. Suzumura (1992) also shows that the D'Aspremont and Jacque-
min (1988) result - that cooperative R&D outperforms the non-cooperative case 
if spillovers are significantly higher - holds in his setting. 
One paper related to Suzumura (1992) is by Simpson and Vonortas (Simpson 
and Vonortas, 1994). They also analyse the R&D investment levels in competi-
tive and cooperative R&D scenarios. Their contribution to the non-tournament 
literature is that they use more general demand functions than D'Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988) analyse oligopolies and make no functional assumption about 
the spillover effect. Instead the spillover is included in their model by specifying 
that the derivative of the cost function of firm i with respect to R&D expenditure 
of firm j is non-negative. Simpson and Vonortas (1994) find that even in the ab-
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sence of spillovers, a RJV will spend more on R&D than individual firms, given 
demand is concave. If demand is linear cooperative R&D expenditure is increas-
ing in the level of spillovers. 
Kamien et al. (1992) extent the D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) framework 
in several ways, they introduce Bertrand competition in the product market and 
analyse oligopolies instead of duopolies. In contrast to Suzumura (1992), their 
model also allows for differentiated products. The basic spillover process is simi-
lar in D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992): R&D spend-
ing reduces costs and the results of R&D can spill over to competitors. Spillovers 
can have two different effects according to Kamien: The “competitive-advantage 
externality” (Kamien et al., 1992: 1294), which arises because the spillover re-
duces competitors’ costs and thus intensifies competition, and the “combined-
profit externality” (Kamien et al., 1992: 1295). The latter occurs because one 
firm’s investment affects the profits of all other firms through cost-reducing 
spillovers. The equation including spillovers is the one for effective R&D, which 
is defined as “firms i’s effective R&D investment, that is, the amount of money it 
alone would have had to invest in R&D, if no other firm invested in R&D, to 
achieve the same unit cost reduction.” The equation looks like this (Kamien et 
al., 1992: 1297):  
*i i jX x xβ= + ∑  
xi is the total amount firm i spends on R&D and β the share of other firms’ 
R&D that spills over to firm i. Kamien et al. (1992) analyse four different scenar-
ios which can be distinguished by the level of spillovers and the type of competi-
tion. The authors assume that the level of spillover changes with the type of co-
operative partnership formed. In the D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) model, 
the level of spillovers is fixed regardless of firms cooperating or not. The first 
dimension along which the scenarios in Kamien et al. (1992) are evaluated are 
thus spillovers. In a research joint venture (RJV) spillovers are (deliberately) per-
fect (β=1). The opposite scenario is labelled “R&D” and stands for the case in 
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which only involuntary spillovers occur and β is between zero and one. The sec-
ond dimension of the scenarios is competition, if firms do not coordinate their 
R&D activities at all this is called “competition”, if they do coordinate their 
R&D Kamien et al. (1992) call it “cartelization”. The extreme cases are then 
R&D competition and RJV cartelization, with R&D cartelization and RJV com-
petition as mixed forms. They identify the RJV cartelization mode (close co-
operation) as the most desirable from a social welfare perspective and the RJV 
competition mode as the least desirable if spillovers are sufficiently high, regard-
less of the type of competition (Bertrand or Cournot) assumed for the product 
market. RJV competition leads to the lowest prices and the highest profits for 
individual firms and consequently to the highest total welfare (consumer plus 
producer surplus) if spillovers are significantly high. Kamien et al. (1992) argue 
that R&D cartelization outperforms R&D competition if the rate of spillovers 
between partners is high enough. They also show that regardless of the agree-
ment on spillovers (full sharing or only involuntary spillovers) it is better for 
firms - in terms of profits - to cooperate than not.  
Katz (1986) proposes a model using a non-tournament game with four different 
stages: at the first stage firms decide if they want to join a co-operation (member-
ship stage), in the second stage they decide on the specific form the cooperative 
agreement will take in terms of R&D output and/or cost sharing (agreement 
stage), at the third stage R&D is conducted by each firm independently (devel-
opment stage) and finally at the fourth stage the level of output is determined 
(production stage). Spillovers occur because R&D expenditure by one firm low-
ers the production costs of other firms. Unlike in D'Aspremont and Jacque-
min (1988; 1990) the spillover rate changes, i.e. it is endogenously determined by 
the partners in the agreement, if the firms are part of a cooperative agreement. 
The spillover rate changes because they choose a cost-sharing rule in the second 
stage that leads to a level of R&D in the third stage that maximizes profits. 
Katz (1986) argues that no firm would have an incentive to leave an industry-
wide cooperative agreement if the spillover level for non-cooperating firms is 
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equal to zero. If non-cooperative spillover levels are equal to one (perfect spill-
overs) no firm would have an incentive to conduct R&D, because if R&D were 
beneficial, firms would move to an industry–wide agreement. An industry-wide 
R&D co-operation is found to lead to more R&D and consequently higher social 
welfare if competition on the product markets is low, non-cooperative spillover 
levels are high and the R&D agreement focused on basic research. The last find-
ing is driven by the assumption that basic research results are more likely to spill 
over to competitors than results from development R&D, even if the firms do not 
cooperate. 
Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) model is not a non-tournament model in its pure 
form, as it does not include a demand equation.14 In the Katsoulacos and 
Ulph (1998) model the profits firms make are exclusively dependent on R&D 
expenditure. They see their paper as an extension of the Katz (1986) study and 
are mainly concerned with the amount of knowledge shared between firms, with 
or without co-operation. Besides endogenous spillovers they allow for multiple 
research labs, consider product and process innovations and intra- and inter-
industry spillovers. The level of spillovers in Katsoulacos and Ulph depends on 
“the adaptability of the research to the other firm […] and the amount of informa-
tion sharing” (Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998: 335) or the technical substitutability 
or complementary between R&D results. If firms form a research joint venture 
they maximise joint profits but do not (necessarily) fully share all knowledge (in 
contrast to Katz, 1986). If firms operate in the same industry, spillovers to rivals 
will result in lower profits than no spillovers if they operate in complementary 
industries the opposite will be true. The game is played in three stages: First 
firms choose their R&D strategy, which determines how easily their findings can 
                                              
14 Because it is possible to implement cases in their model in which only one firm innovates this model 
could also be considered a tournament model. Since they claim to extend the study by Katz (1986) 
and compare their findings with his study I included their paper in this section. What is more, they do 
not explicitly model the race, but assume (exogenously) that one firm becomes the leader and the 
other the follower. 
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be adapted by other firms. In the second stage the level of R&D spending is de-
termined, before firms decide in the third stage on how much of the discovery 
should be shared with the other firm. The outcome of the model depends on 
whether both firms innovate or just one and whether the two firms operate in a 
single industry or in complementary industries. Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) 
show that firms operating in complementary industries may share all their 
knowledge even in the absence of any cooperative agreement, regardless of 
whether one or both firms are successful with their R&D activities. Conse-
quently, a cooperative agreement cannot improve on knowledge sharing. The 
only scenario in which the cooperating firms (definitely) share more knowledge 
than the non-cooperating ones is in the case where both are successful innovators 
and from the same industry. 
Leahy and Neary (1997) are mainly concerned with developing an optimal pol-
icy strategy for R&D. They analyse an oligopoly which has the option to cooper-
ate on the first stage (R&D) and competes in the second stage à la Bertrand or 
Cournot. As in the other models, the spillover effect is included in the model by 
introducing a variable for the total amount of R&D spending by all firms in the 
economy into the cost function of the firm in question. If firms choose their R&D 
level in a way that maximizes industry profits, they are considered as cooperating 
by Leahy and Neary (1997). A special focus of their paper is on strategic behav-
iour (“R&D levels are choosen in the anticipation of their effects in the second 
stage game” Leahy and Neary, 1997: 648) vs. non-strategic behaviour. Leahy and 
Neary (1997) find that strategic behaviour reduces the benefits incurred when 
firms cooperate on R&D. It leads to lower levels of R&D spending and output 
than in the non-strategic case. As far as co-operation itself is concerned they 
show that under the assumption that spillovers are strictly positive and no strate-
gic behaviour occurs co-operation is always positive as it increases R&D and 
output levels compared to the non-cooperative setting. If strategic behaviour is 
present co-operation leads to higher output, R&D spending and welfare if and 
only if spillovers are significantly high. 
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Motta (1992) supports the findings of D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), that 
when spillover levels are high, co-operation increases welfare. He extends the 
basic model by analysing innovations that are quality-improving instead of cost 
reducing. He also allows the spillover parameter to change if firms move from 
non-cooperative to cooperative behaviour, in a manner similar to Katz (1986). 
The critical level of spillovers for which co-operation becomes welfare improv-
ing is not a fixed value but depends on the relationship between the level of spill-
overs with cooperative agreements and without and the number of firms in an 
industry. The main result found by Motta (1992) is that if the spillover level is 
high enough then “quality level, output, net profits and welfare are higher under 
cooperative R&D behaviour than under fully non-cooperative behaviour” (Motta, 
1992: 655). 
Vonortas, 1994 also assumes that the spillover rate can change if firms cooper-
ate. This assumption actually drives his results, as he finds that improved knowl-
edge sharing among members of a joint venture leads to higher welfare even if 
spillover levels are relatively low and the opportunities for innovative processes 
are poor. If the spillover level does not change even though firms cooperate 
(called “secretariat joint venture” Vonortas, 1994: 422), the spillover rate has to 
be higher than 0.5 in order for the cooperative solution to be better form a social 
welfare point of view than the non-cooperative. Vonortas (1994) obtains these 
results, which are similar to those of D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988; 1990), 
even though he splits up the R&D stage into two separate stages, a stage where 
the firm decides whether to conduct generic research and how much to spend on 
it and a stage where they spend money on development R&D.15  
Beath et al. (1998) split the R&D process up into two separate stages. First 
firms invest in R&D and produce knowledge. In the second stage, this knowl-
edge is used to generate cost reducing innovations. Spillovers can occur at both 
                                              
15 Vonortas (1994) argues that R&D should not be aggregated, but rather that generic R&D is different 
from development R&D with respect to spillovers and other characteristics; a fact that will become 
relevant in the empirical part of this study. 
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stages. At the first stage a spillover arises from “the effort-increasing effect of 
being in competition with rival scientist and imparts an element of ‘racing’ in this 
non-tournament model” (Beath et al., 1998: 52). At the second stage knowledge 
spills over from one firm to the other, increasing effective R&D and conse-
quently reducing production costs. They assume that the second stage spillover 
becomes perfect if firms cooperate. Beath et al. (1998) do not conduct a welfare 
analysis, but show that RJV can achieve the same level of cost reduction with 
less R&D expenditure than if the two firms had carried out R&D independently. 
Their argument for this finding is that research joint ventures can “economize on 
scarce R&D resources” (Beath et al., 1998: 57). 
The modelling of spillovers is the starting point for the theoretical model of 
Kamien and Zang (2000). They argue that the level of effective R&D, i.e. a 
firm’s own R&D plus R&D spillovers (Kamien and Zang, 2000: 997), depends 
on the absorptive capacity of the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) represented 
by a firm’s R&D spending and its R&D orientation (basic vs. firm-specific ap-
proach), which influences the spillovers between two firms. In addition the total 
amount of spillovers also depends on the exogenous spillover level. In their 3-
stage game firms first choose their R&D approach, then the amount to spend on 
R&D and finally the output levels under Cournot competition. Similarly to the 
aforementioned models, the outcome of the model should now depend on the 
interplay between the R&D approach and the exogenous level of spillovers. 
Kamien and Zang (2000) show, however, that joint profits are maximized (given 
co-operation in the first and second stage) if both firms choose a very broad 
R&D approach, regardless of the exogenous spillover level. Kamien and 
Zang (2000) thus conclude that if firms cooperate they choose an equally broad 
R&D approach in the first stage of the game. They confirm D’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin’s finding that for spillover levels larger than 0.5 social welfare is 
higher if firms cooperate than if they compete.16 
                                              
16  An empirical application of Kamien and Zang (2000) model can be found in Kaiser (2002a).  
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General demand and cost functions, product differentiation and price competi-
tion are the extensions of the D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) model intro-
duces by Ziss (1994). His aim is to compare four different settings: no co-
operation, co-operation at the first stage (R&D joint venture) only, co-operation 
at the second stage (prices or output) only and co-operation at both stages 
(“merger”). He challenges the finding by D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), 
that joint ventures are mutually beneficial if spillovers are high.17 Ziss (1994) 
argues that due to “offsetting internalisation of R&D spillover and strategic ef-
fects” (Ziss, 1994: 377) cooperative R&D is no guarantee for increased social 
welfare if high spillovers are present. His finding rests on the assumption that 
research joint ventures have a negative strategic effect, i.e. that firms involved in 
a R&D joint venture try “to move along the contract curve from the joint-profit-
maximum point to the monopoly point.” (Ziss, 1994: 376).18 If this is the case 
collaborative firms will reduce joint R&D in order to reduce output (Cournot 
competition) or increase prices (Bertrand Competition), which leads to a negative 
effect of co-operation on R&D and consequently social welfare. Ziss (1994) 
makes the point that the findings of D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) for co-
operative R&D are driven by their assumption of linear demand functions with 
homogenous products. 
The studies mentioned above deal exclusively with a single industry and ana-
lyse only inter-industry R&D partnerships (with the exception of Katsoulacos 
and Ulph, 1998). This shortcoming has been addressed by Banerjee and 
Lin (2001), Inkmann (2000) and Steurs (1995).  
Banerjee and Lin, 2001 introduce an upstream firm that produces inputs for 
downstream firms and allows for cost-reducing spillovers between firms in the 
                                              
17 However, Ziss (1994) supports D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), as he shows that D’Aspremont 
and Jacquemines’s findings with regard to the monopoly case are robust to the specification of the 
cost and demand functions. 
18 This is in contrast to most other non-tournament studies, which assume that R&D co-operation is in-
tended to achieve the joint-profit maximizing R&D levels. 
 20 
same industry and between the two industries. They extend their model further 
by allowing oligopolistic competition in both the upstream and downstream mar-
kets. Even though spillovers play a role in determining the outcome of the model 
in terms of the optimal size of the research joint venture, Banerjee and Lin (2001) 
provide no explicit analysis of how the transmission works. They just state that 
the positive externality created by upstream firms’ R&D activities poses an in-
centive for upstream firms to “invite downstream firms to join in the R&D and 
share the cost of innovation” (Banerjee and Lin, 2001: 288). 
Inkmann (2000) addresses the relationship between inter-industry spillovers 
and R&D investment under co-operation and competition more directly. He iden-
tifies a “spillover parameter space”, i.e. combinations of inter- and intra-industry 
spillover levels, for which R&D investment levels and firms’ profits are higher in 
the (vertical or horizontal) co-operation scenarios than the non-cooperative ones. 
He finds that for a large spillover parameter space, vertical co-operation (“one 
downstream firm cooperates with one upstream firm” Inkmann, 2000: 13) is the 
most profitable form of conducting R&D. His study is very similar to that by 
Steurs (1995).  
Steurs (1995) extends the D’Aspremont and Jacquemine model by introducing 
two industries, each consisting of two firms. Given this setting he allows spill-
overs and co-operation both within an industry and across industry borders. Simi-
lar to the findings by Inkmann (2000) he shows that the interplay of intra- and 
inter-industry spillovers is important in determining the profitability and welfare 
effects of R&D partnerships. To be more precise, he finds that intra-industry co-
operation profit-levels are higher than non-cooperative profit levels if inter-
industry spillovers are higher than zero and intra-industry spillover levels are lar-
ger than 0.5. If intra-industry spillover levels fall below 0.5, the inter-industry 
spillover level has to be small to guarantee the stability of the R&D co-operation. 
If no intra-industry spillovers exist, intra-industry R&D is always more profitable 
for firms than non-cooperative behaviour. Inter-industry R&D co-operation is 
only less profitable than R&D competition if both intra- and inter-industry spill-
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overs are small. Comparing both forms of cooperative agreements Steurs (1995) 
shows that “inter-industry R&D co-operation is more likely to result in higher 
R&D investment, output and welfare than intra-industry R&D co-operation” 
(Steurs, 1995: 268). 
Kesteloot and Veugelers (1994) focus on the stability of R&D co-operations 
formed in a repeated non-tournament model. If firms deviate from the agreement, 
they face punishment in the form of lower profits in future periods than they 
would have gained through co-operation. Not only is the repeated structure of the 
game different from other studies, but so is the treatment of spillovers. In 
Kesteloot and Veugelers (1994) model there are “unintended (exogenous) spill-
overs”, which exist because knowledge is not perfectly appropriable, and “in-
tended (endogenous) spillovers” due to knowledge sharing among partners in an 
agreement. They find that “cooperative profits are higher with large positive (ex-
ogenous, unitended) knowledge spillovers” (Kesteloot and Veugelers, 1994: 
651). The stability of a cooperative agreement is higher with lower spillovers (if 
firms products are substitutes), however. If cooperating firms can improve on 
knowledge sharing within the agreement (intended spillovers), they are able to 
reduce the incentives to cheat.19 
Kesteloot and Veugelers (1994) build in dynamic aspects of the co-operation 
decision by repeating the non-tournament game infinitely. Rosenkranz (1995) 
takes this one step further in her model, which is hard to classify as either a non-
tournament model or a tournament model. It can serve as a case that bridges both 
strands of literature. The analysis is conducted in a duopoly setting where firms 
invest in R&D in order to speed up the innovation process and to improve the 
quality of their products. If the two firms cooperate they maximize joint profits 
by sharing all of the know-how developed in the R&D process, i.e. spillovers 
                                              
19 De Bondt and Veugelers (1991) find in a similar setting that after a certain threshold of spillovers is 
reached, additional knowledge spillovers increase the incentive for firms to conduct R&D in co-
operation with others. Hagedoorn et al. (2000) writes that “R&D co-operation performs considerably 
better […] the higher the rate of knowledge spillovers” (Hagedoorn et al., 2000: 574). 
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between partners are perfect. They then compete in the product market in Ber-
trand competition. Rosenkranz (1995) shows that firms will always form a R&D 
partnership since joint profits are higher than if they did not cooperate. This re-
sult holds even in the absence of ex-ante (pre-cooperative) knowledge spillovers. 
The incentive comes from “competitive spillovers” (Rosenkranz, 1995: 14), i.e. 
the innovation of one firm will affect the other firm’s profit negatively because of 
competition in the product market. If both firms cooperate, they are able to inter-
nalize this spillover by monopolizing the market and sharing the total profit ob-
tained equally. Because of the monopolistic market after co-operation, consumer 
surplus decreases compared to the non-cooperative stage and, the total welfare 
effect becomes negative (Rosenkranz, 1995: 14-16). 
To summarize: The non-tournament literature in all of its facets clearly shows 
that spillovers have an effect on firms’ decisions to cooperate. This is because co-
operation not only increases social welfare under certain circumstances (includ-
ing the spillover level), but also provides the firms with an opportunity to maxi-
mize their joint profits.  
The reasons provided for the superior performance of research partnerships are: 
o R&D co-operation internalizes spillovers and thus increases the incen-
tive to undertake R&D investment, which leads to higher levels of R&D 
expenditure in the cooperative case than in the non-cooperative case 
(e.g. D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Katz, 1986; Suzumura, 1992; 
De Bondt and Veugelers, 1991; Kamien et al., 1992; Motta, 1992). As a 
result of the higher R&D investment level and because the relationship 
between R&D and cost reduction or product improvements is assumed 
to be the same for both cooperating and non-cooperating firms (Beath et 
al., 1998), the total cost reduction or quality improvement of cooperative 
R&D is higher than in the non-cooperative case or as Kamien et al. put it 
“unit costs tend to decline more with R&D cartelization than with R&D 
competition” (Kamien et al., 1992: 1294). 
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o Firms co-operating on R&D can achieve the same amount of cost reduc-
tion or similar quality with less R&D expenditure (e.g. Simpson and 
Vonortas, 1994; Motta, 1992). 
o Cooperative R&D levels can be chosen in a way that maximize joint 
profits (e.g. Kesteloot and Veugelers, 1994; Suzumura, 1992 ; Vonortas, 
1994; Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998) 
o R&D co-operation reduces needless duplication of research efforts (e.g. 
Beath et al., 1998; Kamien et al., 1992; Katz, 1986; Poyago-Theotoky, 
1995; Rosenkranz, 1995) 
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Table 2-1 Main Findings on the Link Between Spillovers and R&D Co-operation in the Non-Tournament Literature 
Author # Stages Industry Spillovers Product Market 
Competition 
Main Finding 
Katz (1986) 4-stage Oligopoly Cost-reducing 
R&D,  
endogenous20 
Cournot, 
Homogenous  
products 
Industry-wide co-operation is welfare 
improving if spillovers without co-
operation exist or spillovers within 
agreements are high. 
D'Aspremont 
and Jacque-
min (1988) 
2-stage 
 
Duopoly Cost-reducing 
R&D, exogenous 
Cournot, 
Homogenous  
products 
For significantly high spillovers coop-
erative R&D leads to higher output, 
higher R&D spending and higher wel-
fare than non-cooperative behaviour. 
Kamien et al. 
(1992) 
2-stage Oligopoly Cost-reducing 
R&D, exogenous 
Bertrand/Cournot, 
Heterogenous prod-
ucts 
For significantly high spillovers, R&D 
co-operation and coordination leads to 
higher firm profits than in the non-
cooperative case. 
      
                                              
20 “Endogenous” means that the spillover rate is assumed to be higher (most times equal to 1) if firms cooperate, than if they do not. 
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Author # Stages Industry Spillovers Product Market 
Competition 
Main Finding 
Motta (1992) 2-stage Oligopoly quality-improving 
R&D, endoge-
nous 
Cournot, 
Heterogenous prod-
ucts 
For specific spillover ranges R&D co-
operation leads to higher output, prof-
its, quality and welfare. 
Suzumura (1992) 2-stage Oligopoly Cost-reducing 
R&D, exogenous 
Cournot, 
Homgeous  
products 
Cooperative R&D outperforms the non-
cooperative case if spillovers are sig-
nificantly high. 
Simpson and 
Vonortas (1994) 
2-stage Oligopoly Cost Reducing 
R&D,  
endogenous 
Cournot, 
homogenous  
products 
RJV will spend more on R&D even in 
the absence of spillovers than individ-
ual firms. 
Kesteloot and 
Veugelers (1994) 
2-stage Duopoly Cost-reducing 
R&D,  
endogenous and 
exogenous 
Cournot, 
homogenous  
products 
Profits of cooperating firms are higher 
if unintended spillovers are large. In-
creasing endogenous spillovers through 
knowledge sharing leads to more stable 
co-operations. 
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Author # Stages Industry Spillovers Product Market 
Competition 
Main Finding 
Vonortas (1994) 3-stage Duopoly Cost-reducing 
R&D, 
endogenous 
Cournot, 
Homogenous  
products 
If spillovers are high, R&D co-
operation is beneficial. If firms improve 
knowledge sharing within a RJV it is 
beneficial at low levels of spillovers as 
well. 
Ziss (1994) 2-stage Duopoly Cost-reducing 
R&D,  
exogenous 
Bertrand/Cournot, 
Heterogenous prod-
ucts 
Cooperative R&D does not necessarily 
increase welfare, output or R&D ex-
penditure. 
Rosenkranz 
(1995) 
2-stage Duopoly Knowledge spill-
overs and compe-
tition spillovers,  
endogenous 
Bertrand, 
Heterogenous  
products 
If firms share all knowledge generated 
through R&D in a cooperative agree-
ment, they will monopolize the product 
market and profits will be higher than if 
they compete. 
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Author # Stages Industry Spillovers Product Market 
Competition 
Main Finding 
Steurs (1995) 2-stage Duopoly Cost-reducing 
R&D,  
exogenous 
Cournot, 
Homogenous prod-
ucts (upstream and 
downstream firms) 
Intra-industry co-operation is more 
profitable than competitive R&D if in-
ter-industry spillovers are small or 
equal to zero. Inter-industry co-
operation is only less profitable than 
R&D competition if both types of spill-
overs are small. 
Leahy and Neary 
(1997) 
2-stage Oligopoly Cost-reducing 
R&D,  
exogenous 
Bertrand/Cournot, 
Homogenous  
products 
Cooperative R&D raises output, R&D 
and welfare if firms behave non-
strategically. If firms behave strategi-
cally, spillovers need to be significantly 
high to lead to the same outcome. 
Beath et al., 
(1998) 
3-stage Duopoly Cost-reducing 
R&D,  
endogenous 
Cournot, 
Homogenous product 
Co-operation increases the level of 
spillovers and as a result helps firm to 
reach the same level of cost reduction 
with less R&D expenditure. 
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Author # Stages Industry Spillovers Product Market 
Competition 
Main Finding 
Katsoulacos and 
Ulph (1998) 
3-stage Duopoly Knowledge Spill-
overs,  
endogenous 
No product market  R&D co-operation does not necessarily 
lead to higher knowledge sharing than 
non-cooperative behaviour 
Inkmann (2000) 3-stage Oligopoly Cost-reducing 
R&D,  
exogenous 
Cournot, 
Homogenous  
products (upstream 
and downstr. firms) 
For a wide spillover parameter space 
firms’ profits are higher if they cooper-
ate vertically than if they cooperate 
horizontally or not at all. 
Kamien and 
Zang (2000) 
3-stage Duopoly Cost-reducing 
R&D,  
endogenous with 
absorptive capac-
ity 
Cournot, 
Homogenous  
products 
Total welfare is higher if firms cooper-
ate than if they compete, for spillover 
levels above .5. If firms cooperate they 
choose broad R&D approaches.  
Banerjee and Lin 
(2001) 
2-stage Oligopoly Cost-reducing 
R&D, exogenous 
Cournot, 
Homogenous  
products (upstream 
and downstream) 
Positive externalities arising from up-
stream firms’ R&D provide incentives 
to form joint ventures with downstream 
firms 
Source: Own illustration 
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2.1.2 Tournament Models  
“Technological competition often has several of the characteristics of a race.” 
(Grossman and Shapiro, 1987: 372). This is the basic assumption of the tourna-
ment literature, which is concerned with the timing of innovation, the number of 
firms involved in the tournament and the dynamics of R&D expenditure during 
the tournament (Reinganum, 1989). The success and timing of innovation activi-
ties in these models basically depends on the amount of R&D spending on the 
part of the firms taking part in the tournament. The firm that spends most on 
R&D wins the tournament and is awarded the (eternal stream of) profits from it 
(Reinganum, 1989). The reason for this is that in contrast to the non-tournament 
models only one research path for any given innovation exists (Katsoulacos and 
Ulph, 1997, Hagedoorn et al., 2000) and the first to complete it wins the game. 
There are models in which the relationship between R&D investment and the 
date of success is deterministic (“auction models”) in others it is stochastic (“rac-
ing models”) (see Reinganum, 1989 for examples of both types of models). Since 
the tournaments analysed have only one winner, the profits from an innovation 
go to only one firm21 even though all firms in the tournament have spent some 
amount on R&D while the race was still on. The common verdict of tournament 
models is thus that firms (on aggregate) over-invest in R&D (see Katsoulacos 
and Ulph, 1997; Hagedoorn et al., 2000). In the words of Jennifer Reinganum 
“… aggregate expenditure on R&D is too high relative to the cooperative opti-
mum; there are too many firms and each invests too much.” (Reinganum, 1989: 
850). Katsoulacos and Ulph (1997) argue that the reason for this market failure is 
as follows: since the total profits from the innovation are awarded to the firm that 
invests more in R&D than its rivals, the incentives for firms to undertake innova-
tion activities are higher than socially desirable. 
                                              
21 There are some exceptions: Martin (2002) for example argues that some of the profits from the innova-
tion will spill over to losers of a racing model, if appropriability is not perfect. 
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As in the case of non-tournament models R&D co-operation and research joint 
ventures are seen as a way to overcome this market failure at least partially, by 
allowing the firms to coordinate their R&D activities. Whether R&D co-
operation is mutually beneficial from the viewpoint of the firms or a social planer 
depends on the specific settings of the model. Grossman and Shapiro (1987) for 
example find that certain forms of co-operation (licensing, intermediate-stage 
patents and research joint ventures) lead to higher expected profits22 only in envi-
ronments where competition would have been fierce without co-operation. 
The relationship between R&D co-operation and spillovers in tournament mod-
els has been studied by Choi (1993). He analyses a duopoly where the results of 
R&D activities by one firm can be used by the other firm to a certain degree. One 
of his central assumptions is that co-operation increases the spillover rate be-
tween the partners. Choi (1993) results are quite similar to those of the non-
tournament literature. He finds that firms have an incentive to conduct R&D co-
operatively if the spillover rates are high.23 An additional result is that the social 
incentive for R&D co-operation is higher than the private one. 
Martin (2002) arrives at a different result for the private incentive to form a re-
search joint venture. He shows that “secretariat RJVs” (firms carry out independ-
ent R&D activities, but share the results afterwards - Martin, 2002: 15) are more 
likely if the spillover level without co-operation is low. The reason for this find-
ing is that the benefit of forming a RJV is assumed to be an increase in spillovers 
received, compared to the non-cooperative case. Martin (2002) assumes that the 
firms engaging in a secretariat RJV will fully share their research findings, i.e. 
spillovers are perfect. If the level of spillovers without the cooperative agreement 
is high already the benefit from cooperating will be low and consequently so will 
                                              
22 Grossman and Shapiro (1987) give two reasons for this finding: first, RJVs reduce rivalry and second 
they reduce duplicative R&D activities. 
23 Some doubts remain about the robustness of Choi’s results, as he himself writes “It is possible to con-
struct examples where cooperative R&D agreements are preferred […] for low spillover rates.” 
(Choi, 1993: 563). 
 31 
the private incentive to form R&D joint ventures. As far as social welfare is con-
cerned, Martin (2002) argues that cooperative R&D activities always lead to 
higher social welfare than non-cooperative R&D and that under certain settings 
(e.g. high spillovers) firms have less incentive to form RJVs than would be desir-
able from a social point of view. The difference between the findings of 
Martin (2002) and those of the non-tournament literature can be explained by a 
different focus: Martin (2002) assumes that the main goal of a firm is to increase 
“input spillovers”, i.e. knowledge spilling over from its rivals, while the non-
tournament literature is more concerned with the effect of outgoing spillovers, 
i.e. knowledge a firm has generated through R&D spilling out into the public 
domain. 
Reinganum (1981) looks at spillovers during a race between two identical 
firms. The R&D activities of firms are accompanied by knowledge spillovers if 
they cooperate. These spillovers contribute to the accumulated knowledge of 
both firms and allow them to reach given levels of knowledge at a lower cost 
than under competition. She finds that without spillovers the non-cooperative 
firm innovates earlier than the cooperative one and with perfect spillovers the 
opposite is true. For spillover levels in between these two extreme cases it is not 
per se clear whether cooperative or non-cooperative R&D leads to earlier innova-
tion. The time of innovation rather depends on other factors, like the value of the 
innovation or the discount rate for revenue streams generated through the innova-
tion and patent assigned to it. 
A different type of spillovers is analysed in the study by Marion Stewart 
(1983). She investigates spillovers that occur because an innovating firm is not 
able to appropriate all of the value of its discovery. De Bondt (1996) labels spill-
overs of this type “post-racing” because they arise after the race is over (De 
Bondt, 1996: 6) in contrast to spillovers that occur during the race. Each firm in 
the oligopoly gains similarly from the spillover. Stewart (1983) finds that the 
choice of firms’ exploration rates (R&D effort) depends critically on the spillover 
parameter. If the (exogenously given) spillover level is below the spillover level 
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that would maximize firms’ profits, non-coopertive R&D efforts will be lower 
than cooperative ones. De Bondt (1996) sees this as an indication that a critical 
spillover level exists above which cooperative outcomes are better than non-
cooperative ones. 
2.2 Transaction Cost Theory 
While tournament and non-tournament models primarily explain and analyse 
the effects of cooperative behaviour and spillovers on social welfare, the transac-
tion cost theory is more concerned with the existence and origin of cooperative 
R&D activities. 
The theory of transaction cost can be traced back to Coase (1937), who argues 
that transaction costs cause market failure and firms exist because they help to 
reduce the cost of transactions (see also Williamson, 1975). The classical ques-
tion related to that branch of literature is the make-or-buy decision of the firm, 
i.e. whether transactions should be organized and carried out through market 
mechanisms or through internal organization and hierarchical relations. From the 
viewpoint of transaction cost (TC) theory firms will not only minimize produc-
tion costs but also the costs of conducting transactions (Williamson, 1975; 
Williamson, 1985). Transaction costs include among other things the costs of 
drawing up, monitoring and enforcing contracts and the costs of performing a 
transaction (Kogut, 1988). The level of transaction costs (and consequently the 
form of governance chosen) is largely determined by asset specificity 
(Caloghirou et al., 2003), i.e. “the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to 
alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of production value.” 
(Williamson, 1988: 70). Asset specificity increases transaction costs because it 
can cause opportunism and augments the problems of small numbers bargaining. 
In addition to this, incomplete contracts are seen as a source of high transaction 
costs. Because of the nature of technological knowledge, i.e. it gives rise to spill-
overs, its production involves high uncertainty and its dissemination sometimes 
leads to opportunistic behaviour, contracts including technological knowledge (or 
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intangible assets in general) will tend to be incomplete (see Hagedoorn et al., 
2000; Caloghirou et al., 2003). 
Up until the early 1990s the transaction cost theory analysed only the two ex-
treme cases of organizing transactions, the firm versus the market, as Tsang puts 
it “the proliferation of […] inter-organizational collaboration […] was […] be-
yond the explanatory domain of TC theory.” (Tsang, 2000: 220). That changed in 
1991 when Williamson (1991) published an article in response to the criticism 
that “transaction-cost economics […] deals with polar forms – markets and hier-
archies – to the neglect of intermediate or hybrid forms.” (Williamson, 1991: 
269). In that article the “hybrid form” of organizing transactions is introduced. It 
is hybrid in the sense that it is between the market and a hierarchy. Examples for 
such hybrid forms are co-operation and strategic alliances (Pisano, 1990; Mariti 
and Smiley, 1983). As for the two classical forms of transacting - hierarchies 
(firms) and arm’s length markets – the choice of hybrid forms is made if the sum 
of production and transactions costs is lower for the hybrid form than for the 
other two. The following reasons/conditions for the existence of research joint 
ventures are identified as having been put forward by transaction costs theory: 
o The specificity of assets involved is of an intermediate degree (Tsang, 
2000). 
o “High uncertainty over specifying and monitoring performance” exists 
(Kogut, 1988: 320; see also Williamson, 1991). 
o The behaviour of the parties involved in the transaction/contract is un-
certain, since joint ventures allow the “alignment of incentives to reveal 
information, share technologies, and guarantee performance” (Kogut, 
1988: 320).  
o The market for intermediate goods is inefficient (Hennart, 1988) 
o The activity to be undertaken is related to technological knowledge 
(Hagedoorn et al., 2000). 
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The link between knowledge spillovers and the existence of research joint ven-
tures is not as prominently discussed in transaction costs theory as in the non-
tournament or tournament literature. Nonetheless the models and arguments put 
forward by transaction costs theory provide some evidence that the link exists, by 
stressing the fact that technological knowledge and the spillovers associated with 
it are a source of incomplete contracts that favour the existence of hybrid organ-
izational forms such as research joint ventures. 
2.3 The Resource Based View of the Firm 
The resource bases view of the firm goes back to the seminal work of 
Penrose (1959). The basic assumption of this strand of strategic management lit-
erature is, that a firm’s behaviour and competitive advantage can be explained by 
the valuable, rare, and not easily substitutable or imitable resources and capabili-
ties it possesses24, which include the knowledge and technological capabilities of 
a firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Mowery et 
al., 1998). The aim of any firm is thus to maximize profits by using and improv-
ing its resources (Penrose, 1959; Tsang, 2000). This may involve separating re-
sources that are core to a firm from those which are not, and disposing of the lat-
ter (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
The resource based view has at first sight relative little to say (directly) about 
the formation of cooperative agreements or research joint ventures. It is possible, 
however, to interpret the arguments of the resource based literature in light of 
R&D partnerships and draw some conclusions about how knowledge spillovers 
are related to the formation of co-operations according to the resource based view 
(see Tsang, 2000 for examples.). Starting points for this exercise are the papers 
by Richardson (1972), Barney (1991) and Teece (1986). They argue that it might 
be necessary for firms to access complementary external resources to exploit 
their own resources better. This is the case in particular if firms’ own resources 
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are immobile. The immobility of a resource may not only stem from physical or 
cognitive restrictions but also from a lack of willingness on the part of the firm to 
share them with external partners (see Tsang, 2000: 222). If the former is true 
firms which want to profit from these immobile resources can cooperate with the 
firm that possesses the complementary resources (Hagedoorn et al., 2000; Tsang, 
2000). Mowery et al. (1998) summarize their discussion of the research based 
view and partner choice for co-operation by stating “the resource based-view ar-
gues that a key motive for the formation of alliances is the desire of participants 
to acquire capabilities from an external source.” (Mowery et al., 1998: 511). 
When firms (initially) do not want to share resources, co-operation will only 
happen if the benefits of co-operation are higher than the expected loss from 
sharing ones own resources25. Tsang (2000) argues that this might very well 
happen. Technologies and technological knowledge can be seen as a resource of 
the firms, which is immobile to a certain degree, because it is “specific to the 
context in which it has been created and adapted” (Cantwell, 1991: 36). 
The studies by Mowery et al. (1998) and Cantner and Meder (2006) are mainly 
empirical. They provide some empirical insight on the theoretical arguments un-
derlying the resource based view theory. These authors look at the decision to co-
operate with a specific partner, instead of the decision to co-operate at all in 
R&D. Mowery et al. (1998) finds that co-operating firms have a high degree of 
technological overlap than non-cooperating firms. Similarly, Cantner and 
Meder (2006) confirm their hypothesis that the probability to cooperate is higher 
if the technological overlap among the potential partners is higher and that “the 
higher and the more balanced the potential knowledge flows between firms are 
expected to be the higher is the probability of research cooperation between 
them.” (Cantner and Meder, 2006: 8). In that sense, the authors take a step back 
                                                                                                                                    
24 For a detailed description of the terms “capability” and “resource” see Barney (1991). I will treat the 
resource and capability based view as one strand of literature, since they are very similar. 
25 In the word of Dickson: the “fundamental motive, underlining all other reasons for combining firms’ 
resources and skills, will always be some form of ‘gain’ to the firm” (Dickson et al., 1991: 148). 
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from the actual knowledge spillovers and take a look at the prerequisites for 
knowledge spillovers. They find that if the prerequisites for knowledge spillovers 
are given, firms are more likely to co-operate. 
The literature cited above implies that gaining access to external resources and 
knowledge is a motive for firms to cooperate. Even though the literature does not 
specifically distinguish between R&D or innovation co-operations and other 
types co-operations, it can be seen as further evidence for the argument proposed 
by Martin (2002) tournament model, that generating knowledge inflows is a mo-
tive for firms to cooperate when it comes to innovation and R&D activities.26 
This point is strengthened by authors analysing the dynamic perspective of re-
source and capability building (e.g. Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Hamel, 1991; 
Teece, 1992). Their findings can be interpreted as follows: Co-operation between 
firms are undertaken in order to learn from the partners in the cooperative agree-
ment (Caloghirou et al., 2003; Tsang, 2000). 
2.4 Empirical Studies 
The theoretical literature reviewed above has discussed the effect of spillovers 
on the likelihood that firms form R&D partnerships. Solid empirical studies on 
the relationship were relatively scarce up until 2002, when Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) published their paper in the American Economic Review. 
Veugelers even stated in 1998 that empirical studies on the topic are “virtually 
non existent” (Veugelers, 1998: 20). Since the publishing of Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) paper empirical interest in the relationship between spillovers 
and co-operation has been awakened. Several studies dealing directly with this 
relationship will be reviewed below.27 
                                              
26 Note, the resource based view stresses the fact that the external resources and knowledge have to be 
complementary to ones own in order to generate profits, while the non-tournament literature does not 
distinguish between complementary or substitutive knowledge. 
27 I restrict the overview of the empirical literature to papers that focus directly on the effect of spillovers 
on R&D co-operation. Some other studies analyse the relationship indirectly, by e.g. talking about 
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2.4.1 Descriptive Studies 
An example for a descriptive study on the link between spillovers and R&D 
partnerships is Mariti and Smiley (1983), even though they do not use the term 
spillovers. These authors look at data on cooperative agreements that were an-
nounced in the European financial press in 1980 and interviews they conducted 
with these firms. 70 agreements could be identified and analysed. Mariti and 
Smiley (1983) find that 70% are related to knowledge sharing, of which 21% 
include technology transfer (one-directional) and 49% “technological comple-
mentarity” , i.e. long term knowledge exchange (Mariti and Smiley, 1983: 440), 
providing evidence that gaining access to external knowledge is a motive for 
R&D agreements. 
A similar type of analysis is conducted by Veugelers and de Bondt (1992) who 
supplement their theoretical study of spillovers and R&D investment levels in 
joint ventures and looser cooperative agreements with a short empirical section. 
Based on a sample of 161 cooperative partnerships (87 joint ventures, 52 coop-
erative agreements, 22 mergers) announced in the Belgium’s financial press dur-
ing 1986-1988, they find that the number of joint ventures is significantly (t-
tests) higher in industries which can be described as having high knowledge 
spillovers than in low-spillover industries28. Equally, the number of cooperative 
agreements is also significantly higher in high-spillover industries. 
In Felder et al. (1994) the focus is not on analysing the relationship between 
R&D co-operation and knowledge spillovers directly. Their finding that R&D 
co-operations are more prevalent in industries where legal protection methods do 
not provide significant protection of innovations and inventions, can however be 
seen as an indication that knowledge spillovers and their prevention are a motive 
for co-operation (see Gottschalk and Licht, 2003). 
                                                                                                                                    
openness (Fontana et al., 2003), screening or signalling (Fontana et al., 2005), or complementarities 
(Rocha, 1999). 
28 “High spillover industries are (tele)communication, semi-conductors, instruments, chemicals, electron-
ics, …” (Veugelers and de Bondt, 1992: 296). 
 38 
Based on data from the CIS III for Flandern, Veugelers (1998) finds that coop-
erating firms use all chanels and mechanisms to acquire external information 
more often than non-cooperating firms. Firms involved in R&D co-operations 
also assign a significantly higher value to mechanisms used to appropriate 
knowledge (patents, secrecy, …) than non-cooperating firms. Veugelers (1998) 
sees these descriptive statistics as an indication that spillovers are an important 
motive for firms to engage in research partnerships. 
2.4.2 Econometric Studies Using Data from Innovation Surveys  
One of the earliest econometric studies on the relationship between spillovers 
and R&D co-operation using innovation survey data was conducted by König et 
al. (1994). These authors use data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel’s first 
wave of 1993 to analyse size specific spillover effects during 1990 and 1992. 
Their spillover measure is constructed using a factor analysis of the importance 
of secrecy, first mover advantages, complexity of design and restrictions on R&D 
employee turnover as a method to protect innovations. To be able to analyze size 
specific effect they include separate spillover measures for firms with less than 
50, 50-249, 250-999, and 1000 or more employees in their model. They find that 
only for large firms (1000+) do spillovers have positive and significant influ-
ences on the probability of co-operation, for very small firms the impact is even 
negative. The results of three additional regressions (Tobit, Poisson, and Negbin 
models) indicate that potential spillovers increase the variety of different co-
operation partners. 
Wölfl (1998) conducts a similar study also using the Mannheim Innovation 
Panel of 1993. She distinguishes between R&D co-operations involving firms 
(with suppliers, competitors and customers) and R&D co-operations in general, 
which additionally includes research institutions, universities and consultancies. 
Her focus is on the difference between size-specific spillovers and industry-
specific spillovers. Both are calculated using the mean of the importance of vari-
ous protection methods ranging from patents to secrecy. Her main finding from 
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logit regression models is that for co-operation with firms spillovers are a deter-
minant regardless of size. She also finds that the effect is increasing with size, i.e. 
for larger firms the internalization of spillovers is a more important motive for 
co-operation than for smaller firms. Her results also point to the existence of in-
dustry effects. She finds that in very competitive industries, like automobiles and 
electronics, spillovers can be a hindering factor for the formation of R&D co-
operations. The explanation provided by Wölfl (1998) for the different effect of 
spillovers in different industries, is that competitive pressure is not the same 
across all industries.29  
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) added a new dimension to the analysis of the 
relationship between knowledge spillovers and R&D co-operation, by distin-
guishing between incoming spillovers and appropriability. The concept of incom-
ing spillovers is used for knowledge the firm acquires from the environment in 
contrast to appropriability or outgoing spillovers, i.e. knowledge a firm generates 
and tries to protect from flowing out. They start their analysis by assuming that 
firms try to manage spillovers. From their literature review they conclud that 
firms try to maximize incoming spillovers and minimize outgoing spillovers. In 
order to analyse the effect of spillovers on the likelihood of co-operation in R&D 
activities, they use data from the Belgian part of the first Community Innovation 
Survey, conducted in 1993, and focus on innovating firms from manufacturing 
industries only. To address the problem that spillovers (and some other variables 
in their model) are endogenous they use a two-step estimation procedure. In addi-
tion to one measure for incoming spillover (based on a question of the usage of 
external sources for information) and one for approbriability (based on a question 
of protection methods), they include several other variables to control for R&D 
co-operation motives other than knowledge spillovers. They include variables for 
                                              
29 For co-operation in general (including universities, etc.), which is treated as a comparison group in the 
study by Wölfl (1998) the industry-specific spillover variables are no longer significant for most in-
dustries and the size-specific spillovers change their signs to negative for small and medium sized 
firms. 
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cost and risk-sharing as a motive for R&D co-operation, the need for comple-
mentary knowledge, and the size of the enterprise. The main result that Cassiman 
and Veugelers (2002) obtain by estimating their model with cross-sectional data 
for 411 firms, is that “incoming spillovers and appropriability have important and 
separately identifiable effects” (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002: 1181). They find 
both a positive relationship between the level of incoming spillovers and the 
probability of cooperating in innovation activities, and a positive relationship 
between the level of appropriability and the likelihood to cooperate. In their 
study Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) also investigate how spillovers may affect 
the likelihood of cooperating with specific partners. Their results indicate that 
R&D co-operation with suppliers and customers is not affected by the level of 
incoming spillovers, but by the level of appropriability. For the probability of 
cooperating with research institutions the opposite is true. 
Kaiser (2002a) uses the German innovation survey of 1996 for the service sec-
tor to estimate the impact of horizontal and vertical spillovers on firms’ co-
operation decision in general and with horizontally (competitors) or vertically 
(customers and suppliers) related partners. Firms can either form cooperative 
agreements with one or the other type of partner or with both partners at the same 
time. Analysing 1,233 firms he finds that horizontal spillovers have a positive 
(and weakly significant) effect only for the decision to cooperate at all. However, 
they do not affect the propensity of cooperating with vertically related partners or 
with both types of partners at the same time. According to Kaiser's (2002a) find-
ings, vertical spillovers do not influence the probability of cooperating in general. 
In an earlier study on the manufacturing sector Kaiser and Licht (1998) found 
the opposite. Using data from the first wave of the Mannheim Innovation Panel 
conducted in 1993 they find that vertical spillovers increase the likelihood of 
RJVs significantly. Horizontal R&D spillovers do not seem to have a significant 
impact on a firm’s decision to engage in joint R&D in their model.  
The finding that knowledge spillovers might affect different types of R&D co-
operation differently has been picked up by Belderbos et al. (2004). They esti-
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mate the effect of knowledge spillover on three types of R&D co-operation: co-
operation with competitors (horizontal), clients and suppliers (vertical) and uni-
versities or other research institutions (institutional). Analogue to this distinction 
by type of co-operation partner they also distinguish incoming spillovers by the 
source producing the knowledge and end up with three types of spillovers: hori-
zontal, vertical and institutional. To control for the effect of appropriability they 
include a variable for outgoing spillovers. In contrast to the Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) study they use the importance of patents and the importance of 
competitors as a source of information as their measure of outgoing spillovers 
rather than the importance of protection methods, which can be seen as an indi-
rect measure of outgoing spillovers. Using data from the 1997 and 1998 innova-
tion surveys from the Netherlands they were able to construct a panel data set of 
2,156 innovating establishments30 from both manufacturing and services. Their 
main results obtained with a systems estimator (multivariate probit) are that ver-
tical spillovers have a positive effect on the probability of cooperating with cli-
ents and suppliers and that institutional spillovers affect institutional co-operation 
significantly. No significant relationship between horizontal spillovers and hori-
zontal co-operation could be found, however. 
Lopez (2004) uses Spanish data from the third Community Innovation Survey 
to analyse the determinants of the probability of cooperating with competitors, 
suppliers and customers and research institutions on R&D and innovation activi-
ties. He estimates several conditional maximum likelihood models with 2,518 
manufacturing firms. The results he obtains for the probability of cooperating in 
general are similar to those found by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002): The in-
coming and the appropriability variable are positive and significant in all his 
models. The estimated coefficients for the different types of co-operation partner 
are different from Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) for the incoming knowledge 
spillover variable, however. Incoming spillovers only influence R&D co-
                                              
30 This is one of the very few empirical studies that use information on the level of establishments in-
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operations with research institutions in Lopez's (2004) study. The appropriability 
variable is only marginally significant positive for the model that explains the 
probability of cooperating with competitors and strongly positive and significant 
for the other two types of partners. 
While the studies cited above have only looked at one country, 
Dachs et al. (2004) and Abramovsky et al. (2005) compare the relationship be-
tween spillovers and R&D co-operation across countries: 
Finish and Austrian data from the third Community Innovation Survey are used 
by Dachs et al. (2004) to analyse the motives firm have to form cooperative R&D 
partnerships with other firms and institutions. The sample used in that study is 
restricted to the manufacturing sector and covers 258 innovating Austrian firms 
and 643 innovating Finish firms, which are analysed separately. 
Dachs et al. (2004) include several incoming spillover measures in their model31, 
which are normalized to the industry (2-digit) mean: vertical spillovers, horizon-
tal spillovers, institutional spillovers (universities and research institutions) and 
public spillovers (conferences, journals, fairs and exhibitions). Like 
Belderbos et al. (2004) they analyse the effect of these spillovers on R&D co-
operation in general and on R&D co-operation with different partners. Using 
probit models they find that horizontal spillovers have a positive and significant 
impact on the probability of cooperating for Austrian firms, but a negative effect 
in Finland. For vertical spillovers the opposite is true, with the exception that the 
coefficient in the equation for Austria is not significant. The results for the differ-
ent types of co-operation partners show similar differences between the two 
countries.32 Vertical spillovers have a positive effect on co-operation with sup-
                                                                                                                                    
stead of the level of firms. 
31 They also include two variables for the utilization of strategic or formal means of protection, but do 
not interpret them as appropriability or an inverse measure of outgoing spillovers. They find that both 
measures are positive and significant in the Finish equation used to explain the probability of cooper-
ating, but insignificant in the estimation on the Austrian data. 
32 These differences show up not only for the spillover variables but also for the variables included in the 
model to capture other types of motives for co-operation. 
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pliers, customers and institutions in Finland, while they are not significant in 
Austria. Horizontal spillovers decrease the likelihood of cooperating with suppli-
ers and customers in Finland, but not in Austria. Only for co-operation with 
competitors similar results for both countries are obtained. This type of co-
operation is positively influenced by horizontal spillovers only, in both countries. 
Another study using CIS III data from different countries to estimate the same 
econometric model on the relationship between R&D co-operation and spillovers 
is Abramovsky et al. (2005). They analyse 3,590 French, 1,183 German, 2,747 
Spanish and 1,145 British firms from the manufacturing and service sector. The 
spillover measures are almost identical to the ones used by Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002), as is the method used. Abramovsky et al. (2005) estimate their 
models with and without controlling for endogeneity of the appropriability and 
incoming spillover variable. Regardless of the specification used, the importance 
of protection methods for innovations at the firm-level (appropriability) has a 
positive and significant effect on R&D co-operation in France, Germany and 
Spain. The variable is also significant in the UK, if no instrumental variable es-
timation approach is used. The findings for the incoming spillover variable are 
more sensitive to the estimation method employed. For France and the UK in-
coming spillovers have a positive and significant effect on the probability of co-
operating, for Germany and Spain, however, incoming spillovers are significant 
only if a 2-step procedure with instrumental variables is used. 
Abramovsky et al. (2005) also split up the R&D co-operation variable into three 
different categories: co-operation with the research base, co-operation with sup-
pliers and co-operation with customers or competitors. The robustness of the 
findings to the estimation procedure used is similar to that for R&D co-operation 
in general. Appropriability is positive and significant in virtually all countries for 
all types of R&D co-operation regardless of the method used. Exceptions are 
France for the R&D co-operation with research institutes which looses its signifi-
cance if endogeneity is taken into account and the UK for which the appropriabil-
ity variable is not significant. For incoming knowledge spillovers the pattern is 
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that higher spillovers increase the likelihood of cooperating with any given part-
ner in France and the UK, but not in Germany and Spain, in the single step esti-
mation, and for all countries if instrumentation is employed. The authors con-
clude that appropriability and incoming spillovers are motives for firms to coop-
erate on R&D activities in all of the four countries. They see their study as sup-
port for the findings by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002). 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between R&D co-operation and knowl-
edge spillovers in France has been provided by Negassi (2004). He combines 
data from the first and second CIS with microdata on the financial situation of 
firms and several other firm characteristics to estimate the relation. He analyses 
national as well as international spillovers and both turn out to be not significant. 
For his sample of manufacturing firms he only finds a positive but not significant 
effect of pure knowledge spillovers on the R&D co-operation decision of firms. 
Bönte and Keilbach (2005) have a different focus in their study of research 
partnerships. They analyse data from the German innovation survey of 1993 and 
1994 to estimate the effect of knowledge spillovers on the extent of cooperative 
R&D agreements (formal vs. informal co-operation) with customers and suppli-
ers respectively. They include three spillover measures: specific spillovers 
(knowledge from suppliers and customers), generic spillovers (knowledge flows 
from competitors, vertically related firms, universities and research institutions), 
and appropriability. The latter has a positive and significant influence on formal 
and informal R&D co-operation. As the marginal effect for this variable is not 
significant in the equation for informal R&D co-operation, the authors argue that 
a marginal increase of the importance of appropriability does not induce firms to 
cooperate informally. Generic incoming spillovers do not influence the co-
operation decision significantly, while specific spillovers have a slightly positive 
effect on R&D co-operation with customers. 
The following table summarizes the main findings of the literature analysing 
innovation survey data. It clearly shows that the impact of spillovers is different 
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for different types of co-operation and that appropriability/outgoing spillovers 
and incoming spillovers have separate effects on firms’ co-operation decisions. 
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Table 2-2 Main Findings of Econometric Studies Using Innovation Survey Data 
Type of Co-
operation 
Study Data/Country/industries 
Effect of Knowledge Spill-
over on R&D Co-operation33 
König et al. (1994) MIP 1993 / Germany / manufacturing Appropriability: +++  
(for large firms only) 
Kaiser and Licht (1998) MIP 1993 / Germany / manufacturing Vertical spillovers: + 
Wölfl (1998) MIP 1993 / Germany / manufacturing Appropriability: ++/+++ 
Co-operation in 
general 
 
 
 
 
 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) CIS I / Belgium / manufacturing Incoming spillovers: +/++ 
Appropriability: + 
                                              
33 The construction of the variables for the type of knowledge spillovers and the type of R&D co-operation differs even if the same term is used by the different au-
thors and vice versa. I use the terminology of Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) as far as possible. The results reported for Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and 
Abramovsky et al. (2005) are those of a two-step estimation procedure with instrumental variables. For Wölfl (1998) the results for R&D co-operation with other 
firms (competitors, suppliers and customers) are reported. 
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Type of Co-
operation 
Study Data/Country/industries 
Effect of Knowledge Spill-
over on R&D Co-operation33 
Kaiser (2002a) Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) 1995 / 
Germany / services 
Horizontal spillovers: + 
FIN:Horizontal spillovers: ---  
        Vertical spillovers: +++ 
Dachs et al. (2004) CIS III / Austria and Finland / manufactur-
ing 
AUT:Horizontal spillovers: ++ 
Negassi (2004) CIS I + II / France / manufacturing Incom. spillovers: no effect. 
Lopez (2004) CIS III / Spain / manufacturing Incoming spillovers: +/+++ 
Appropriability: +++ 
 
Co-operation in 
general 
Abramovsky et al. (2005) CIS III / France, Germany, Spain and the 
U.K. /manufacturing and services 
FRA/GER/SPA/UK: 
Incoming spillovers: +++ 
FRA/GER/SPA: 
Appropriability: +++ 
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Type of Co-
operation 
Study Data/Country/industries 
Effect of Knowledge Spill-
over on R&D Co-operation33 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) CIS I / Belgium / manufacturing Incoming spillovers: +++ 
Appropriability: + 
Belderbos et al. (2004) Dutch innovation surveys 1996 and 1998 / 
Netherlands / manufacturing and services 
Institutional spillovers: +++ 
Dachs et al. (2004) CIS III /Austria and Finland / manufactur-
ing 
Horizontal sp.: FIN  --/ AUT +   
Vertical spillovers: +++ 
Lopez (2004) CIS III /Spain/ manufacturing Incoming spillovers: + 
Appropriability: +++ 
Institutional co-
operation with 
research institu-
tions and uni-
versities 
Abramovsky et al. (2005) CIS III / France, Germany, Spain and the 
U.K. /manufacturing and services 
FRA/SPA/GER/UK: 
Incoming Spillovers:: ++/+++ 
FRA/SPA/GER: 
Appropriability: ++/+++ 
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Type of Co-
operation 
Study Data/Country/industries 
Effect of Knowledge Spill-
over on R&D Co-operation33 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) CIS I / Belgium / manufacturing Appropriability: + 
Belderbos et al. (2004) Dutch innovation surveys 1996 and 1998 / 
Netherlands / manufacturing and services 
Horizontal spillovers: - 
Vertical spillovers: +++ 
Institutional spillovers: +++ 
Lopez (2004) CIS III /Spain/ manufacturing Appropriability: +++ 
Vertical co-
operation with 
suppliers and 
customers 
Abramovsky et al. (2005) CIS III / France, Germany, Spain and the 
U.K. /manufacturing and services 
FRA/SPA/GER/UK: 
Incoming Spillovers: ++/+++ 
FRA/SPA/GER: 
Appropriability: ++/+++ 
Dachs et al. (2004) CIS III /Austria and Finland / manufactur-
ing 
FIN: 
Horizontal spillovers: ---  
Vertical spillovers: +++ 
AUT: 
Public spillovers: + 
Co-operation 
with customers 
Bönte and Keilbach (2005) MIP 1993 and 1994 / Germany / manufac-
turing 
Appropriability: --- 
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Type of Co-
operation 
Study Data/Country/industries 
Effect of Knowledge Spill-
over on R&D Co-operation33 
Belderbos et al. (2004) Dutch innovation surveys 1996 and 1998 / 
Netherlands / manufacturing and services 
Institutional spillovers: +++ 
Dachs et al. (2004) CIS III /Austria and Finland / manufactur-
ing 
FIN:  
Horizontal spillovers: +++  
AUT: 
Horizontal spillovers: +++ 
Public spillovers: + 
Lopez (2004) CIS III /Spain/ manufacturing Appropriability: + 
Horizontal Co-
operation with 
competitors 
 
Abramovsky et al. (2005) CIS III / France, Germany, Spain and the 
U.K. /manufacturing and services 
FRA/SPA/GER/UK: 
Incoming Spillovers:: ++/+++ 
SPA: 
Appropriability: ++ 
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Type of Co-
operation 
Study Data/Country/industries 
Effect of Knowledge Spill-
over on R&D Co-operation33 
Dachs et al. (2004) CIS III /Austria and Finland / manufactur-
ing 
FIN: 
Horizontal spillovers: ---  
Vertical spillovers: +++ 
AUT: 
Institutional spillovers: ++ 
Public spillovers: ++ 
Co-operation 
with suppliers 
 
Bönte and Keilbach (2005) MIP 1993 and 1994 / Germany / manufac-
turing 
Incoming Spillovers: + 
Appropriability: --- 
Variety of co-
operation part-
ners 
König et al. (1994) MIP 1993 / Germany / manufacturing Potential spillovers: +++ (for 
large and medium sized firms 
only) 
Effect is positive and significant at the 10% level (+); 5% level (++) or 1% level (+++). 
Effect is negative and significant at the 10% level (-); 5% level(--) or 1% level (---).  
Source: Own illustration. 
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2.4.3 Econometric Studies Using Data from Other Databases 
Research on R&D co-operation and spillovers has not been confined to innova-
tion surveys. Other databases on R&D co-operation and research joint ventures 
existed before the innovation surveys were conducted.34 Some studies using al-
ternative databases will be presented below as examples. 
Hernan et al. (2003) uses the so called “STEP to RJV” database that contains 
information on research joint ventures formed between 1986 and 1996 under two 
EU programs (EUREKA and the EU Framework Program). The database con-
tains the names of participating firms and a description of the project. The advan-
tage of this database compared to the innovation surveys is that it contains infor-
mation on cross-boarder co-operation within the EU. The disadvantage is that it 
does not contain any purely domestic joint ventures. In order to analyse the influ-
ence of partner characteristics on R&D co-operation the authors combine the in-
formation in the RJV database with background information on the firms in-
volved. In their empirical model Hernan et al. (2003) analyse 54,610 firms of 
which 798 participated in at least one research joint ventures during 1995-1996. 
The two spillover variables they construct are the time it takes for innovations to 
diffuse within an industry and the industry level of the effectiveness of patents 
(based on Levin et al., 1987). Hernan et al. (2003) find that firms become less 
likely to participate in research joint ventures the longer it takes for innovations 
to diffuse and the more effective patent protection is (both indicators for low lev-
els of knowledge spillovers). They conclude that “knowledge diffusion is central 
to our understanding of RJV formation.” (Hernan et al., 2003: 87). 
International co-operation is also the topic of Smith et al. (2001). They use 
Danish data from the EU’s 4th Framework Program to identify firms cooperating 
on R&D (with foreign partners) and merge it with data from the Danish business 
register and a survey of CEOs. In line with Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) they 
focus on the role of knowledge spillovers as a determinant of research co-
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operation. The incoming spillover measures are constructed using a question 
from the survey of CEOs on the motives behind co-operation in firms that al-
ready cooperate and the potential motives to cooperate for non-cooperating firms. 
The average score of the motives, access to technology, equipment and R&D 
networks is labelled “technological ingoing spillovers” and the average impor-
tance of access to financial sources and increasing market contact are used as a 
proxy of “economic ingoing spillovers”. Outgoing spillovers are measured using 
questions on the protection of core competences and the usage of intellectual 
property rights for cooperating firms and potential risks in joint R&D and R&D 
strategies for non-cooperating firms.35 All the variables included in the model 
could be calculated for 124 observations. In their logit model of the probability 
of cooperating within the 4th EU framework program both the variable for ingo-
ing technological spillovers and the outgoing spillover variable are positive and 
significant. Due to the limited number of observations and the doubtful construc-
tion of some variables, the robustness of the results of this study can be ques-
tioned. 
In summary, the empirical studies using databases other than innovation sur-
veys arrive at results similar to those of the authors using innovation surveys, i.e. 
they find significant effects of knowledge spillovers on the probability of cooper-
ating in R&D. 
2.5 Different Types of R&D Partnerships and R&D Spillovers 
The literature review of the theoretical and empirical papers has already shown 
that a variety of different terms, definitions and concepts can be used to describe 
spillovers and various forms of R&D partnerships. Before I proceed with the em-
pirical study, I will review the concepts proposed on a systematic basis. Given 
that a wide array of definitions and concepts exists to describe R&D partnerships, 
                                                                                                                                    
34 For an overview of alternative databases, see Hagedoorn et al. (2000) and Vonortas (1994). 
35 The usage of different questions to construct the same variable is highly problematic from our point of 
view. 
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it is even more surprising that most of the studies cited above reach similar con-
clusions on the link between R&D and knowledge spillovers and R&D partner-
ships. 
2.5.1 R&D Partnerships 
R&D partnerships between firms or between firms and research institutions can 
take various forms, just like any other partnerships. There are forms in which 
contracts are signed or even an entire new entity is set up and much loser forms 
of partnerships and collaboration. In this subsection I will present two classifica-
tions of R&D partnerships. The first will use the dimension of the type of agree-
ment and the second the type of partners involved in the agreement36. 
Classification by Type of Agreement 
A first dimension along which R&D partnerships can be classified is the type 
and intensity of the agreement: 
Kogut (1988) reviews the empirical and theoretical literature on joint ventures 
(not only R&D joint ventures) and cites studies from the late 1960s that investi-
gated the distribution of joint ventures among different industries. He uses the 
transaction cost literature to identify the difference between a mere contract and a 
research joint venture. According to Kogut (1988) a joint venture can be distin-
guished from other forms of collaboration by two properties “joint ownership 
(and control) rights and the mutual commitment of resources.” (Kogut, 1988: 
320). It is clearly the tightest form of R&D partnership, as it usually involves 
setting up a new firm or establishment which is co-owned by all partners in the 
partnership. In the taxonomy of Hagedoorn et al. (2000) this type of R&D part-
nership where a new entity is formed is called “equity joint ventures” or “re-
search corporation” as opposed to “research joint ventures” (RJV) or “non-equity 
                                              
36 Mariti and Smiley (1983) paper defines a co-operative agreement as “any long term, explicit agree-
ment amongst two or more firms” (Mariti and Smiley, 1983: 437), indicating that R&D partnerships 
could also be classified by their duration. 
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joint ventures”, which are formal agreements based on contracts. In the categori-
zation proposed in Hagedoorn et al. (2000) even research contracts, i.e. one firm 
commissioning another firm to perform R&D, are included under research joint 
ventures. Vonortas (1994) distinguishes between “Secretariat RJVs” and “operat-
ing entity RJV”. The former represents the form of partnerships where firms co-
ordinate their R&D activities but R&D is performed separately at each firm, 
while the latter involves founding a new firm. The use of the term “research joint 
ventures” for the type of partnership that does not involve forming a new firm is 
not very widespread, however. Even Hagedoorn (1993) uses the term joint ven-
ture only for forms of R&D partnerships where a separate firm is set up for the 
R&D activities to be performed and labels other forms of formal partnerships 
“contractual agreements” in his 1993 study. The latter include “joint R&D 
agreements, technology exchange agreements, customer supplier relationships 
and one-directional technology flows” (Hagedoorn, 1993: 374). In 2002 he uses 
the term “R&D partnerships” to represent formal agreements not involving a 
joint firm (Hagedoorn, 2002). Similarly, Veugelers and de Bondt (1992) use the 
term “joint venture” for co-owned R&D firms only and “strategic alliances” for 
forms without equity commitments. Others that have used “research joint ven-
ture” to describe the type of partnership with a separate firm, are Mariti and 
Smiley (1983), Beath et al. (1998), Grossman and Shapiro (1987), 
Kamien et al (1992), Caloghirou et al. (2003) to name a few.  
Kamien et al. (1992) introduces the additional form of partnership “RJV car-
telization” and “R&D cartelization”. Both can be described as cooperative forms 
where firm coordinate their R&D expenditure but do not share any of the results 
of their independently conducted R&D activities. Caloghirou et al. (2003) de-
scribe RJVs as a subset of “strategic technological alliances”. According to 
Teece (1992) strategic alliances are agreements between partners to coordinate 
their activities and pool their resources in order to reach a goal, jointly deter-
mined by both partners.  
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In summary, the term “research joint venture” has been used to describe differ-
ent types of partnerships, but for most authors it represents joint R&D at a spe-
cific facility, set up by the partners of the R&D agreement. 
More recently, the term “research joint venture” has been replaced by “ R&D 
co-operation” in theoretical and empirical papers alike. “R&D Co-operation” 
covers not only contractual partnerships but also looser forms of collaboration 
between firms, like informal agreements (e.g. Bönte and Keilbach, 2005; 
Wiethaus, 2005)37. This change to a broader perspective on collaborative R&D 
and research partnerships was made possible in part by the advent of the Com-
munity Innovation Surveys (CIS) in the European Union that asks firms about 
collaborative research within joint ventures but also outside of them. The defini-
tion used in the CIS surveys of 2001 and 2005 are based on the Oslo Manual 
(OECD and Eurostat, 1997): 
“Innovation co-operation involves active participation in joint innovation pro-
jects with other organisations. These may either be other enterprises or non-
commercial institutions. The partners need not derive immediate commercial 
benefit from the venture. Pure contracting out of work, where there is no active 
collaboration, is not regarded as co-operation. Co-operation is distinct from open 
information sources and acquisition of knowledge and technology in that all par-
ties take an active part in the work.” (OECD and Eurostat, 2005: § 271).  
This definition goes beyond that of a RJV by not only focusing on R&D activi-
ties but also on other innovation activities, which includes production start-up for 
technological innovations or marketing for new and improved products.38 Even 
though all empirical studies using the Community Innovation Surveys use the 
question on innovation co-operation to construct their co-operation variable, the 
term “R&D co-operation” is still used. Following this convention I will also talk 
                                              
37 The share of firms cooperating informally, i.e. without a contract, on R&D activities is fairly high 
according to Link and Bauer (1989) and Bönte and Keilbach (2005). 
38 For a list of other innovation activities see OECD and Eurostat (1997): Section 5.2. 
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about “R&D co-operation” for the rest of this study, even though I use the 
broader definition cited above. 
Almost all forms of research joint ventures are included in this definition, ex-
cept for “contract research” where one firms buys R&D services from other firms 
or institutions. It is noteworthy that pure “fishing for ideas”, i.e. looking for new 
ideas outside the firms boundaries, is also not included in this definition of R&D 
co-operation but informal agreements (not based on contracts or other for-
mal/written agreements) are. 
Classification by Type of Partners 
Another way to distinguish R&D partnerships is by the type of partners in-
volved in the cooperative agreement. R&D partnerships can be formed between 
two or more public firms/institutions (public-public co-operation), two or more 
private firms (privat-private co-operation) or between public and private 
firms/institutions (public-private co-operation) (OECD and Eurostat, 2005; 
Hagedoorn et al., 2000). 
The private-private partnerships can be split up into horizontal co-operation and 
vertical co-operation, based on the position of the partners in firms’ value chains. 
Horizontal partnerships include agreements with competitors and vertical part-
nerships with customers and/or suppliers (Kaiser, 2002a; Belderbos et al., 2004). 
R&D co-operation partners can also be grouped by their industry or country of 
origin, which leads to the concepts of international versus national R&D partner-
ships (see e.g. Cincera et al., 2003; Hamel, 1991; Qiu and Tao, 1998) and intra-
industry versus inter-industry co-operation (see e.g. Atallah, 2002). Of course 
there are also mixed forms of co-operation, which involve various types of part-
ners, competitors, universities and suppliers, from several industries and coun-
tries. 
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2.5.2 R&D Spillovers 
R&D spillovers are (positive) externalities39 (see e.g. D'Aspremont and Jac-
quemin, 1988; Griliches, 1992; Rosen, 2002), which occur because “[…] knowl-
edge is inherently a public good” (Jaffe, 1986: 984; Liebeskind, 1997: 624)40. 
This means that knowledge has the features of non-rivalrousness in consumption 
and non-excludability (Hanusch and Cantner, 1993; Stiglitz, 1999a; Geroski, 
1995). While the first feature of knowledge as a public good (non-rivalrousness), 
or as Samuelson (1954) originally calls it “collective consumption goods” 
(Samuelson, 1954: 387), has not been discussed widely41, the “non-
excludability” attribute can be seen as the basis for the analysis of knowledge 
externalities or spillovers. Because knowledge is (to a certain degree42) non-
excludable in the sense that everyone has access to knowledge once it has been 
generated, it spills over from the producer of the knowledge to the (potential) 
user.43 Romer for example acknowledges that knowledge spillovers are almost 
certain to occur: he writes that “investment in knowledge suggests a natural ex-
ternality” (Romer, 1986: 1003). A few years later he equates knowledge spill-
overs to incomplete appropriability (Romer, 1990: 75). 
                                              
39 A standard definition of externalities is provided by Rosen (2002). He writes “When the activity of 
one entity (a person or a firm) directly affects the welfare of another in a way that is outside the mar-
ket mechanism, that effect is called an externality […]” (Rosen, 2002: 80). 
40 The link between public goods and externalities is straight forward. Rosen (2002) writes that “public 
goods can be view as a special kind of externality.” (Rosen, 2002: 81) He also uses the term “benefi-
cial spillovers” as a synonym for positive externalities (of R&D). 
41 Romer (1990) is an exception.  
42 Knowledge can be appropriate to a certain degree through (patent) protection or because of its lo-
cal/incremental character and might thus be at least a “partially excludable, non-rival input” (Romer, 
1990: 74) for the innovation process, if not a private good (see Hanusch and Cantner, 1993 for a dis-
cussion of these topics). 
43 Hanusch and Cantner (1993) discuss other implications of the public good character of knowledge, for 
example market failure and the consequences for technology policy in detail. 
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In summary, one can say, that knowledge spillovers occur because knowledge 
is only incompletely excludable and thus has some features of a public good or at 
least it is “ a latent public good” (Nelson, 1989: 233). 
Knowledge spillovers are, however, not the only spillovers that arise from 
R&D activities. Other types of R&D spillovers will be described below. Analo-
gous to the description of R&D partnerships, spillovers arising form R&D activi-
ties will be categorized by type of spillover and by sources of spillovers.44 
Classification by Type of R&D Spillover 
A first distinction for R&D spillovers is attributed to the seminal work of Zvi 
Grilliches (Griliches, 1979a; 1992). He puts R&D spillovers into two groups: 
knowledge and rent spillovers. Knowledge spillovers or as Grilliches sometimes 
calls them “true spillovers” (Griliches, 1979a: 104) arise if information and ideas 
flow from one industry to another industry without payment.45 This knowledge 
can be “borrowed or stolen from other sectors or industries” (Griliches, 1979a). 
In order to measure these knowledge spillovers he uses the weighted, aggregated 
stock of R&D expenditure by all industries but a firm’s own.46 Rent spillovers 
occur because firms pay less for inputs than the quality of these inputs is worth. 
Knowledge spillovers or technological spillovers are also considered by De 
Bondt (1996). He defines knowledge spillover as the “involuntary leakage or 
                                              
44 Research on spillovers and externalities started very early. Griliches (1992) mentions Edgeworth and 
studies from the 1940s and 1950s that model the effect that the outcome of activities of all firms in an 
industry influences a given firm’s performance in terms of returns and productivities. Jaffe (1996) 
cites Marshall (1920) famous book “Principle of Economics” to illustrate that the investigation of 
R&D spillovers has a long history. I will start our overview with the seminal works of 
Griliches (1979a; 1992), which build on this literature, since they specifically focus on R&D spill-
overs and have been the basis for almost all studies relevant for our analysis. 
45 Earlier studies that dealt with knowledge flows have used the term “borrowed” knowledge instead of 
“spillovers”. An example is Terleckyj (1974), who constructed a technology flow matrix on the basis 
of input-output tables. 
46 A more detailed description of his measurement of knowledge spillovers will be provided in section 
5.1. 
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voluntary exchange of useful technological information” (De Bondt, 1996: 3). He 
stresses that not all knowledge exchange or flows between firms should be 
treated as knowledge spillovers, but rather only those that are useful for the firm 
at the receiving end of the knowledge transfer. 
Jaffe (1996) lists three types of spillovers: knowledge spillovers, which are de-
fined in line with Griliches (1979a; 1992), market spillovers and network spill-
overs. Market spillovers are present if the benefits of an innovation flow to mar-
ket participants via the market. This happens if quality improvements are not 
fully reflected in a product’s price or if performance increases in the production 
process lower the price of a good (Jaffe, 1996). These kind of spillovers are simi-
lar to the rent spillovers described by Griliches (1979a; 1992). The dividing line 
between market and knowledge spillovers in Jaffe’s report is that knowledge 
spillovers result without market interaction, while market spillovers occur be-
cause firms interact on the market. A third group of spillovers are network spill-
overs. These “result when the commercial or economic value of a new technol-
ogy is strongly dependent on the development of a set of related technologies.” 
(Jaffe, 1996: 6). 
Rosenkranz (1995) introduces “competitive spillovers”, i.e. one firm’s innova-
tion affects other firms’ profits negatively because of competition in the product 
market. Similarly, Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) note that for firms operating in 
the same industry, spillovers to rivals will result in lower profits compared to a 
situation without spillovers. Kamien et al. (1992) considers the same effect under 
the headline of “combined profit-externalities”. However, competitive spillover 
can be interpreted as a result of knowledge spillovers, because they materialize in 
the product market but are caused by R&D results flowing from one firm to an-
other. 
Spillovers differ also with respect to the willingness of the firm conducting 
R&D to prevent them. This difference has been noted by Katsoulacos and 
Ulph (1998) who incorporate involuntary spillovers into their model. The level of 
these spillovers depends on the technology and the effectiveness and usage of 
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intellectual property rights. Similarly, Veugelers writes “spillovers can refer to 
both involuntary and voluntary leakage of knowledge” (Veugelers, 1998: 6).47 
Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) argue that the total progress achieved by a firm’s 
innovation activities depends on their own progress and that of others (“received 
progress”). They also mention that the actual relationship between total progress 
and the other two types depends on the substitutability and complementarity be-
tween one’s own and others’ discoveries. This suggests that external knowledge 
(spillovers) can be substitutive for or complementary to ones own knowledge. A 
similar distinction can be found in Baumol (1993) and the unpublished paper by 
Veugelers and Koen (1999). 
The theoretical literature has developed different ways to incorporate spillovers 
in its models, which are the basis for four additional terms used to describe spill-
overs. Spillovers can be modelled as symmetric, i.e. all firms receive the same 
amount of spillovers, or asymmetric, which means that firms differ with respect 
to the level of spillovers they receive because one firm is the leader and another 
the follower or because of different absorptive capacities (De Bondt and Henri-
ques, 1995; De Bondt, 1996; Von Graevenitz, 2004). The other two groups are 
“exogenous” and “endogenous” spillovers which are related to the two groups 
just mentioned. If the level of spillovers is treated as a given/fixed parameter in 
the model, as e.g. in D'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988; 1990), this is called an 
exogenous spillover; if it depends on firms’ characteristics or cooperative activi-
ties, as in Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) or Kaiser (2000), it is called endogenous. 
To be more precise, spillovers are considered as endogenous if the spillover rate 
changes if firms form an R&D agreement (Beath et al., 1998; Katsoulacos and 
Ulph, 1998). 
                                              
47 See also De Bondt (1996). 
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Classification by Source of R&D Spillover 
The classification of spillovers by type of source is very similar to that of R&D 
partnerships. There are vertical and horizontal spillovers, depending on whether 
the source of spillovers is a customer/supplier or a competitor (Atallah, 2002; 
Kaiser, 2002b), and spillovers from universities (Adams, 2004; Nadiri, 1993). 
The distinction between spillovers from public and private sources can be attrib-
uted to the different types of knowledge these sources create (Becker and Peters, 
2000; Nelson and Wolff, 1997). A different terminology for these classes of 
spillovers has been used by Bönte and Keilbach (2005). They analyse specific 
spillovers (knowledge from suppliers and customers) and generic spillovers 
(knowledge flows from competitors, vertically related firms, universities and re-
search institutions). 
Spillovers can also be classified by the geographical distance between the 
sender(s) and recipient(s) of the spillover: There are international and national 
spillovers (Branstetter, 2001; Harabi, 1997; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999; 
Bernstein and Mohnen, 1994; Keller, 2002) and regional or intra-regional spill-
overs (Fritsch and Franke, 2004; Arndt and Sternberg, 2000; Acs et al., 2002). 
These distinctions are warranted since many studies have documented that 
knowledge and technology diffusion is attenuated by distance and in particular 
by the existence of a border between partners (Jaffe et al., 1993; Porter and Stern, 
2000; Branstetter, 2001; Peri, 2005).  
The focus of other studies is to analyse differences between intra-industry 
(from a firm’s own industry) and inter-industry spillovers (between different in-
dustries) (e.g. Kaiser, 2002b; Bernstein, 1988; Cincera et al., 2003). The argu-
ments for that distinction are similar to those presented for the separation by geo-
graphical distance. Griliches (1992) states that external knowledge is more useful 
to firms if it is from an actor within the same industry (3 digit SIC). Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) and Lane and Lubatkin (1998) argue that it is easier to learn 
from similar partners and in areas where a firm posses some prior knowledge and 
experience. This is more likely to be the case within an industry than outside of 
 63 
it. Bernstein (1988) and Steurs (1995) analyse both types of spillovers and find 
separate effects for intra- and inter-industry spillovers. Empirical studies using 
R&D stocks and spillover pools also take these separate types of spillovers into 
account when they assign different weights (technological proximity) to different 
industries’ R&D expenditure (e.g. Adams, 1990; Griliches, 1992; Jaffe, 1986; 
Cincera, 2005).48 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and the empirical studies following them have 
confirmed that it is worth separately including measures for “incoming spill-
overs” and “outgoing spillovers” in empirical models trying to explain R&D co-
operation, because they have different effects on the co-operation decision (see 
above). Incoming spillovers can be described as the knowledge received by a 
firm, whereas outgoing spillovers consist of the knowledge flowing out from a 
firm.  
Beyond these more widely used concepts, other distinctions include the follow-
ing: Monjon and Waelbroeck (2003) use a question on information sources in the 
French CIS survey of 1997 to separate direct spillovers from indirect spillovers. 
Direct spillovers are present if firms use knowledge from a single source (e.g. 
customers, suppliers) for their innovation activities, while indirect spillovers arise 
if transmission channels such as patent applications or conferences are used to 
acquire external information. Rouvinen (2002) calls the latter “disembodied in-
ward spillovers” in his study of Finnish CIS data for the manufacturing sector. 
The whole process of invention and innovation provide the basis for the conclu-
sion by Orlando (2004) that spillovers from innovation activities could be differ-
ent in nature from those resulting from inventive activity. Similarly, 
Vonortas (1994) notes that knowledge from basic research is different from 
knowledge from development research. 
A very specific distinction is made by Geroski et al. (1993). He splits his spill-
overs into “production spillovers” and “use spillovers”. Production spillovers are 
                                              
48 Orlando (2004) analyses technological and geographical aspects of spillovers simultaneously.  
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measured as the “total number of innovations produced by all members of the 
two-digit industry” and use spillovers by the “total number of innovations used 
by all members of the two-digit industry“(Geroski et al., 1993: 210). 
Obviously, most of the proposed terminology and concepts are complements 
rather than substitutes, in the sense that a spillover can be described using several 
different concepts, e.g. an international, horizontal, outgoing knowledge spill-
over. 
2.6 Deduction of Hypotheses for the Empirical Part of the Study  
The review of the empirical and theoretical literature has clearly shown that a 
link between knowledge spillovers and R&D partnerships exist. What is more, 
most studies indicate that the relationship is a positive one, i.e. the higher the 
level of spillovers the more profitable (and thus likely) are R&D partnerships. I 
will focus on realized knowledge spillovers, i.e. the knowledge a firm can not 
appropriate and involuntarily spills over into the public domain (“realized outgo-
ing spillovers”) and the knowledge a firm actually acquires from its environment 
(“realized incoming spillovers”), instead of knowledge spillovers in general. My 
empirical study is thus in line with the empirical literature using innovation sur-
vey data from the CIS. 
A first hypothesis to be tested in the empirical part of my study would thus be: 
H1: The level of realized knowledge spillovers has a positive effect on the 
probability that firms will cooperate on R&D and innovation activities. 
However, in light of the empirical findings that appropriability and incoming 
spillovers have different effects on firms’ co-operation decisions, I will chose a 
more differentiated approach and split up this first hypothesis into two separate 
hypotheses:  
H1a: The level of realized outgoing knowledge spillovers has a positive effect 
on the probability that firms will cooperate on R&D and innovation activities. 
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H1b: The level of realized incoming knowledge spillovers has a positive effect 
on the probability that firms will cooperate on R&D and innovation activities. 
The assumption that both types of knowledge spillovers affect the likelihood of 
cooperating on R&D positively is drawn from the empirical literature on the 
topic. One might argue, however, that the level of knowledge spillover has a 
negative effect on the likelihood for cooperating. If realized incoming knowledge 
spillover levels are high, firms do not necessarily have to co-operate on R&D to 
get access to valuable knowledge and thus may be less likely to co-operate. Be-
cause both types of spillovers are related as actual outgoing spillovers will be-
come potential incoming spillovers eventually, high levels of outgoing spillovers 
can have the same negative effect as high levels of realized incoming spillovers. 
On the contrary, firms with high levels of realized outgoing spillovers have a 
high incentive to co-operate in order to reduce the involuntary and uncontrolled 
outgoing spillovers and control their knowledge outflows through co-operating 
with external partners (internalize the spillover). 
Some studies distinguish between different types of spillovers and different 
types of co-operation and find that some incoming spillovers are more relevant in 
determining a firm’s decision to cooperate with specific partners than others.49 
The focus in the literature is on horizontal vs. vertical spillovers. I will extend 
this literature to intra-industry, inter-industry and scientific incoming knowledge 
spillovers. The hypothesis I want to test is: 
H2: Realized Incoming knowledge spillovers from different sources influence a 
firm’s decision to cooperate on R&D and innovation activities differently. 
                                              
49 Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) conclude “Different spillover measures seem to have seperately iden-
tifiable effects on the firm’s co-operation decisions.” (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002: 1179). 
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3 Overview of the Empirical Part of the Study 
The main aim of the empirical part of this study is to investigate the relation-
ship between realized knowledge spillovers50, as defined by Griliches (Griliches, 
1979a; 1992), and R&D co-operation, as defined by Eurostat and the OECD 
(OECD and Eurostat, 2005: § 271) at the firm level, using data from the Mann-
heim Innovation Panel (see section 3). 
The exact formulation of the question I will use is „Did your enterprise cooper-
ate on any of your innovation activities with other enterprises or institutions dur-
ing 2002-2004?” (Eurostat, 2004 Question 6.2). The accompanying guidelines 
for the respondents, which gives the exact definition of R&D co-operation for my 
study is “Innovation co-operation is active participation in formal or informal 
innovation projects with other enterprises or non-commercial institutions. Both 
partners do not need to commercially benefit. Exclude pure contracting out of 
work where there is no active co-operation.” (Eurostat, 2004 Question 6.2). I will 
restrict my analysis to R&D co-operations with external partners and exclude 
R&D co-operations with firms form a firms own industry group. External part-
ners are suppliers, customers, competitors, commercial laboratories/R&D enter-
prises, universities, or government or private non-profit research institutes. 
The starting point for this analysis will be the construction of appropriate 
knowledge spillover measures. The construction of these measures is a shortcom-
ing of most empirical studies on the link between spillovers and R&D co-
operation. Especially the modelling of outgoing spillovers is rather crude in the 
empirical literature, since it is almost exclusively based on the importance of pro-
tection methods for inventions and innovations and not on the actual knowledge 
pools available or created by a given firm. As far as incoming spillovers are con-
cerned, the existing studies focus on the actual or potential uses of external in-
                                              
50 The term “spillovers” will be used as a synonym for knowledge spillovers for the reminder of this 
study. 
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formation sources as a proxy for incoming spillovers. Again the actual amount of 
knowledge created within an economy, i.e. the knowledge that can potentially 
spill over to rivals has been neglected in most of the previous literature. 
These issues will be addressed in the subsequent chapters of this study. The 
empirical investigation is split up into three parts: 
1. Construction of the potential outgoing spillover pools/knowledge stock 
of industries and individual firms. 
2. Construction of the realized outgoing and realized incoming spillovers 
pools. 
3. Estimation of the impact of incoming and outgoing spillovers on firms’ 
R&D co-operation decision. 
The first part (chapter 5) deals with the construction of the knowledge stocks of 
an industry and individual firms in Germany, i.e. the amount of knowledge an 
industry or firm has accumulated up until a given point in time. I will distinguish 
between knowledge generated within a firm’s industry, outside a firm’s industry 
and in universities and research institutions. The OECD Analytical Business En-
terprise Research and Development databases (ANBERD), which contains R&D 
expenditure data for Germany and many other countries will be used to construct 
these three knowledge stocks, i.e. I assume that the total amount of knowledge 
generated in an economy can be approximated by the total amount spent on R&D 
activities. The results of part one will be three separate knowledge pools.51 The 
first will be for knowledge generated by private firms in each industry, the sec-
ond for knowledge generated by scientific institutions and the third knowledge 
generated by each individual firm. 
In the second part of the empirical study (chapter 6) the pools of knowledge 
generated by private firms will be used to construct the “realized” outgoing spill-
                                              
51 Vonortas criticises the existing literature because they “lump all R&D together in a single category 
and distinguish between different kinds of technological knowledge only arbitrarily“ (Vonortas, 
1994: 414). 
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over pools of firms and the potential incoming spillover pools at the industry-
level. The assumption in that part of the empirical study will be that not all 
knowledge produced in an economy becomes publicly available, since firms un-
dertaking R&D and producing knowledge can appropriate some part of it through 
patents and secrecy. In the second part of the empirical study I will thus try to 
determine empirically how much knowledge can be appropriated by the use of 
protection methods or rather how much of the generated knowledge actually 
spills over into the public domain. By using the industry level of the importance 
of legal and strategic protection methods as a filter between the knowledge gen-
erated in an industry and the knowledge available outside a firms boundaries, I 
will be able to construct industry specific outgoing spillover pools (“realized out-
going spillovers”), which are equal to the potential incoming spillover pools for 
that industry.52 These “realized” outgoing spillover pools will also be constructed 
for each individual firm in my sample. For the construction of the firm specific 
pools, a firm’s knowledge stock will be weighted by its valuation of patents and 
secrecy as protection methods for inventions and innovations. 
In order to get from the potential incoming spillover pools at the industry level 
to the realized incoming spillover pools for an individual firm, I employ the con-
cept of absorptive capacity developed by Cohen and Levinthal (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989; 1990). I argue that the total amount of external knowledge actu-
ally used depends on firms’ absorptive capacity.53 The second part of the empiri-
cal study will thus also focus on the effect of absorptive capacity on knowledge 
flows (Section 6.5). To be more precise, I will determine the level of absorptive 
capacity of an individual firm, depending on certain firm characteristics. The re-
                                              
52 Under the assumption that all scientific knowledge becomes publicly available, I am also able to con-
struct the pool of potential scientific knowledge spillovers. For a given firm the potential incoming 
spillover pool for intra-industry knowledge is the industry-level potential incoming spillover pool re-
duced by the firm’s (accumulated) R&D expenditure. 
53 Compare, “The amount of spillover from one firm to the other actually depends on two factors: the 
adaptability of the research to the other firm (the firm’s capacity to utilise the research) and the 
amount of information sharing.” (Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998: 335) 
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alized incoming spillover variables will then be constructed by multiplying the 
potential (industry-level) incoming spillover pool with the firm-level absorptive 
capacity. Since the distinction between the three different types of knowledge 
will be retained for the part on absorptive capacity, I will be able to construct 
three different realized incoming knowledge spillover pools for each individual 
firm. 
The third and last part of the empirical study (chapter 7) will then deal with the 
impact of the realized incoming and outgoing spillovers (at the firm level) on 
firms’ decision to engage in cooperative R&D and innovation activities. As a 
benchmark case I will estimate a model that is set up similar to that of Cassiman 
and Veugelers (2002). 
Figure 3-1 on the next page provides an overview of the full model. The lower 
part of the model will be applied at the industry level and the firm level to arrive 
at the industry level of potential incoming spillovers and the firm specific pools 
of “realized” outgoing knowledge spillovers. 
The main database for the empirical part of this study will be several waves of 
the Mannheim Innovation Panel, an annual survey conducted by the Centre for 
European Economic Research (ZEW) and its partners, which will be described in 
more detail in the following chapter. 
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Figure 3-1 Overview of the Analytical Framework for the Empirical Part of this 
Study 
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4 The Mannheim Innovation Panel 
In this chapter the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), a large scale survey of 
the innovation behavior of German firms, will be presented. It is the main source 
of data for the empirical parts of the study that follow below. Instead of going 
into details this chapter will provide a general overview of the surveys alongside 
the basic concepts used. Similar overviews and documentation for the long run-
ning project of the ZEW have been published in Janz et al. (2001), Janz et al. 
(2002), Janz et al. (2003), Rammer et al. (2005c), Schmidt et al. (2005). The de-
scription here closely adheres to that of Schmidt et al. (2005) and Rammer et al. 
(2005c). 
4.1 Introduction 
In 2005 the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) conducted the 
14th innovation survey in the manufacturing sector and the 11th in the service 
sector. The surveys on innovation activities of German firms with 5 or more em-
ployees are conducted annually since 1993 (manufacturing) and 1995 (services) 
in co-operation with infas - Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft [Institute 
for Applied Social Sciences] and the Frauenhofer Institute for Systems and Inno-
vation Research (FhG-ISI) (partner in 1995, 1997-1999, and 2005-). The studies 
are commissioned by the Federal ministry of Education and Research (bmbf). 
The survey’s outline varies according to a design scheme with more or less com-
prehensive versions alternating. While in odd years the questionnaires includes 
questions on framework conditions relevant for innovation activities, like e.g. 
obstacles to innovation, R&D activities, or innovation strategies, the question-
naire in even years concentrates on core indicators, like the indicators for product 
and process innovation. The definitions of the core concepts and the survey 
methodology follow the “Proposed Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting 
Technological Innovation Data (Oslo Manual)” (OECD and Eurostat, 1997), 
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which are published by the OECD and Eurostat and are the basis for all innova-
tion surveys in the OECD. 
From the very beginning, the innovation surveys of the ZEW were part of the 
international system of innovations surveys, such that in 1993, 1997, 2001 and 
2005 the Mannheim Innovation Panel was the German part of the so called 
“Community Innovation Survey” (CIS I- CIS IV) of the European Commission. 
These Europe-wide surveys are conducted every fourth year in all member states 
of the European Union and are coordinated by Eurostat. In 2004 a Commission 
Regulation (European Commission, 2004a) was adopted by the EU member 
states, requiring member states to deliver data on key innovation indicators to 
Eurostat biannually. 
The annual innovation surveys of the ZEW are set up as a panel survey 
(“Mannheim Innovation Panel”), i.e. each year the same sample of enterprises is 
surveyed. Biannually a random sample of new firms is drawn to “refresh” the 
sample – usually from the population of newly founded enterprises, i.e. corrected 
for sample attrition due to firm closure or drop out. The panel structure allows 
the analysis of innovation activities over time, which is particularly beneficial for 
questions such as concerning the effect of innovation activities in the past on pre-
sent employment growth or performance. Because of the panel structure, the 
Mannheim Innovation Panel is a solid basis for the analysis and evaluation of 
economic and technology policy issues. 
4.2 Goals of the MIP Innovation Surveys 
The foremost goal of the Mannheim Innovation Panel is to describe and assess 
the innovation activities of German firms in a comprehensive way. Figure 4-1 
provides an overview of the topics that are covered in the surveys. The questions 
are not just pertaining to relevant inputs for the innovation process (e.g. human 
capital, financial resources), but also on indicators of innovation success (e.g. 
turnover from innovations, cost reduction due to process innovations and return 
on turnover.). Questions on key figures of the firms sampled, like the number of 
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employees and turnover as well as indicators for product and process innovation 
and market novelties are also included in the survey on annual basis. In the more 
comprehensive survey design these are supplemented by other questions on top-
ics relevant for innovation and technology policy, covering questions on obsta-
cles to innovation, external relations in the innovation process and public R&D 
and innovation support. 
These topics are not only part of the innovation surveys in Germany, but are 
also recommended by the Oslo Manual. The Oslo Manual54 recommends the in-
clusion of the following topics in innovation surveys, which are also covered in 
the German surveys55 (some only in the more comprehensive surveys): 
o Indicators for technological product and process innovations 
o Turnover with product innovations and market novelties 
o Objectives of innovation activities 
o Sources of information for innovation 
o Factors hampering innovation activities 
o Protection and appropriation of returns to innovation 
o Expenditure on innovation 
                                              
54 The list is based on the 1997 version of the Oslo Manual (OECD and Eurostat, 1997). In 2005 the 
OECD published a revised Oslo Manual (OECD and Eurostat, 2005), which essentially covers the 
same topics but extends the coverage to non-technological innovations, i.e. marketing and organiza-
tional innovations. 
55 The German surveys sometimes go beyond the suggested coverage of the Oslo Manual, e.g., to inves-
tigate current policy topics in more detail. 
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Figure 4-1 Goals of the Mannheim Innovation Panel Surveys 
 
Source: ZEW Mannheim (2005) in Schmidt et al. (2005). 
4.3 Methodology for Data Collection 
The Oslo Manual provides not only the basis for the questionnaire design, but 
also for the methodology of innovation data collection though surveys. This fur-
ther helps to generate comparable data on innovation activities of countries in the 
EU and OECD. The recommendations of the Oslo Manual with regard to survey 
procedures are also conformed with when conducting the Mannheim Innovation 
Panel surveys. In this section I will present the key aspects of the survey proce-
dures used for the MIP by the ZEW. 
4.3.1 Basic Definition of Innovation and Innovating Firms 
Following the recommendations of the Oslo Manual, an innovation is defined 
as follows: 
“Technological product and process innovations (TPP) comprise implemented 
technologically new products and processes and significant technological im-
provements in product and processes. A TPP innovation has been implemented if 
it has been introduced on the market (product innovation) or used within the pro-
duction process (process innovation): TPP innovations involve a series of scien-
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tific, technological, organisational, financial and commercial activities. […]” 
(OECD and Eurostat, 1997: 47, §130) 
Innovators are firms that have introduced at least one technological product or 
process innovation during the last three years (reference period) prior to the sur-
vey period. To give an example, a firm which introduced an innovation in 2001, 
would be an innovator in the 2002 survey (reference period 1999-2001), 2003 
(reference period 2000-2002) and 2004 (reference period 2001-2003). For ques-
tions on innovation expenditure only the last year of the reference period is rele-
vant.56 
An important feature of the innovation concept as defined in the Oslo Manual is 
also the minimum entry level. The Oslo Manual sets the minimum entry level, as 
“new (or significantly improved) to the firm” (§131, p.47), i.e. a new technologi-
cal process is an innovation if it is (subjectively) new to the firm developing it. It 
does not have to be new to the world or the market it operates in. Consequently, 
the innovation concept of the MIP surveys does not only cover world-first inno-
vations but also the diffusion of innovations and the imitation of product and 
process innovations. However, it does not allow the diffusion of particular tech-
nologies or a specific innovation to be analysed, as the so-called “subject ap-
proach” is applied in all Mannheim Innovation Panel surveys. With this approach 
the focus is on the firm as a whole and not on individual innovations. Some MIP 
questionnaires ask for the most important innovation. 
Another important concept is that of an “innovating firm” or rather “innovation 
active firm”. These are firms that either introduced at least one innovation during 
the three year reference period, or have ongoing or abandoned innovation activi-
ties. 
                                              
56 For a discussion of the three year reference period see Rammer et al. (2005c). 
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4.3.2 Populations, Sample and Non-Response Analyses 
The target population of the MIP are all legally independent enterprises57 in 
Germany with at least 5 employees from the following NACE divisions (2-digit) 
or NACE sections (1-digit)58: 
Manufacturing: 
o Mining and quarrying and Manufacturing (C+D) 
o Electricity, gas and water supply (E) 
o Construction (F) 
Services: 
o Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal and household goods (G) 
o Transport, storage and communication (I) 
o Financial intermediation (J) 
o Real estate, renting and business activities (K) 
o Motion picture and video activities and Radio and television activities 
(92.1+92.2) 
o Sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar activities (90) 
The number of enterprises, employees and the total turnover in each NACE di-
vision and section are taken from official statistics compiled by the German sta-
                                              
57 In the Council Regulation 696/1993 (European Commission, 1993), the enterprise is defined as “the 
smallest combination of legal units that is an organisational unit producing goods or services, which 
benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in decision making, especially for the allocation of its 
current resources. It may carry out one or more activities at one or more locations and it may be a 
combination of legal units, one legal unit or part of a legal unit.” 
58 The list provided here is based on the 2003 survey. Every other year, the coverage is adapted to current 
policy interests and increased importance of certain industries. In 2003, e.g. the media sector was 
covered for the first time in the German innovation survey. The empirical part of this study will be 
restricted to industries included in all surveys, as described below. 
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tistical office (DESTATIS), if available.59 For all those industries without official 
statistics the population is estimated using information from associations, admin-
istrative bodies and the statistics on turnover tax (“Umsatzsteuerstatistik”, Fach-
serie 14, Reihe 8) from DESTATIS. For most service industries no distribution 
of firms across size classes and regions was available until 2003. Consequently 
this distribution was estimated along with the figures for the last year of the ref-
erence period, because of publication delays of the official statistics. The new 
statistics on services industries (“Dienstleistungsstatistik”, Fachserie 9) contains 
information on size classes and has been used since 2004 as a basis for construct-
ing the total population of enterprises in selected service industries (NACE I+K). 
The East-West distribution is still based on turnover tax statistics. 
The stratified random sample for the survey is drawn from the CREDITRE-
FOM database.60 This database is compiled by the credit rating agency Creditre-
form and contains (almost) all active enterprises in Germany. It is the best basis 
for drawing the sample, given that only the German statistical office has access to 
the business register. 
The sample is stratified by industry, size and region. There are eight size 
classes for manufacturing industries (5-9, 10-19, 20-49, 50-199, 200-499, 500-
999, 1000+) and seven size classes for the service sector industries, i.e. there is 
only the size class 500+ for service industries. Up until 2004 the industries used 
for sampling are not NACE divisions, but rather combinations of NACE divi-
sions: 10-14, 15+16, 17-19, 20-22, 23-24, 25, 26, 27-28, 29, 30-32, 33, 34-35, 
36-37, 40-41, 50+52, 51, 60-63+64.1, 65-67, 70-71, 72+64.2, 73+74.2+74.3, 
74.1+74.4, 74.5-74.8+90, 92.1+92.2. Since the Commission regulation cited 
above requires member states of the EU to submit data on the innovation behav-
iour of firms at the NACE division level, the industry stratification was changed 
                                              
59 Foe example, manufacturing (NACE C-F): Fachserie 4, Reihen 1.2; 2.1, 6.1, and 5.2 / wholesale and 
retail trade (NACE G): Fachserie 6, Reihe 1.2 and 3.2 / Transport, storage and communication 
(NACE I) Fachserie 8 Reihe 2, 3, 4 and 8. 
60 For a description of the database see Almus et al. (2000). 
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in 2005, basically to 2-digit NACE groups, with a few exceptions, e.g. NACE 
10-14 and 15+16. The main change in 2005 was that NACE 50 and 52 (retail 
trade), NACE 70 and 71 (real estate and renting) and NACE 45 (construction) are 
no longer included in the core sample.61 The regional dimension of innovation 
activities is gaining importance for policy makers. This is particularly true for 
East and West Germany. In order to be able to analyse the differences between 
the two German regions, the sample is also stratified by these two regions. All in 
all this leads to more than 350 strata for the sampling. The sample fractions for 
each cell are not proportional. Some restrictions have been imposed to increase 
the validity of the results. These restrictions are:  
o All large enterprises are included in the sample. 
o East German firms have a higher sample probability than West German 
ones. 
o Firms in industries with a low overall number of firms have a higher prob-
ability to be drawn than firms in large industries. 
o At least 10 firms should be drawn from each cell. 
o To maintain the panel structure of the survey, all enterprises that have an-
swered at least once in previous years are included in the sample. 
The gross sample size is about 25,000 enterprises for the large scale survey 
with its long questionnaire (odd years) and about 7,000 enterprises for the short 
version (even years). The number for the smaller surveys is lower because the 
short questionnaire is sent out to the panel firms only, while the large survey is 
targeted at panel firms and other firms. In 2005 the sample size was increased 
considerably to about 33,000 firms to increase the reliability of the results. Be-
tween 20 and 25% of all enterprises that are considered as valid respondents – 
some firms are not eligible because they have gone out of business or merged 
with other firms - answer the questionnaires. The response rates for Germany are 
                                              
61 To maintain the panel structure, firms from these industries that answered at least once in the past are 
still part of the sample. 
 79 
lower than in most other countries conducting voluntary surveys. For the CIS III 
survey for example the response rate in Germany was 21%, in Belgium und 
Denmark it was 30%, in Sweden 48%. The highest response rate for a voluntary 
survey was Luxemburg and Estonia with 73% and 62% respectively. 62 These 
two countries did not however solely rely on written questionnaires but did also 
conduct face-to-face interviews. 
Some descriptive statistics on the samples and response rates of the MIP sur-
veys I use in the empirical part of this study are presented in the table on the next 
page.63 
                                              
62 Figures are taken from European Commission (2004b). 
63 I will use three MIP surveys, that of the year 2001 (reference period 1998-2000), 2003 (reference 
period 2000-2002) and 2005 (reference period 2002-2004). 
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Table 4-1 Sample Sizes of the MIP Survey of 2001, 2003 and 2005 (Selected 
Industry Groups64) 
NACE Gross Sample (corrected)a) Net Sampleb) Response-Rate 
 2001 2003 2005c) 2001 2003 2005 c) 2001 2003 2005 c) 
15-16 723 607 1080 160 133 146 22% 22% 14% 
17-19 526 573 815 117 129 141 22% 23% 17% 
20-22 851 896 2476 168 173 321 20% 19% 13% 
23 60 81 81 19 17 17 32% 21% 21% 
24 556 641 1014 115 144 172 21% 22% 17% 
25 605 659 939 160 157 175 26% 24% 19% 
26 472 502 681 101 105 101 21% 21% 15% 
27-28 1328 1340 1866 307 319 362 23% 24% 19% 
29 1399 1534 1668 306 314 307 22% 20% 18% 
30-32 825 972 1241 190 196 231 23% 20% 19% 
33 600 836 925 136 188 218 23% 22% 24% 
34-35 403 520 752 79 123 123 20% 24% 16% 
36-37 409 495 679 81 113 124 20% 23% 18% 
40-41 323 387 926 109 91 194 34% 24% 21% 
45 530 574 291 162 114 123 31% 20% 42% 
50-52 3011 2276 1804 592 343 342 20% 15% 19% 
60-64 1914 1879 2500 430 344 432 22% 18% 17% 
65-67 1081 1091 1512 235 171 244 22% 16% 16% 
70-71 877 885 266 169 146 111 19% 16% 42% 
72 833 936 919 165 188 185 20% 20% 20% 
73 416 523 548 129 121 124 31% 23% 23% 
74 3176 3621 4343 693 675 751 22% 19% 17% 
Sum 20918 21828 27326 4623 4304 4944 22% 20% 18% 
a) Gross sample reduced by neutral non-response (enterprises closed during observation period) 
b) Filled-in questionnaires 
c) In 2005 the NACE coverage of the MIP was changed. For details see section 4.3.2. 
Source: Own calculations. 
                                              
64 The MIP also covers NACE 10-14, 90, 92.1, 92.2.  
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In order to correct for possible differences in the innovation behaviour of re-
spondents and non-respondents, a non-response analysis is conducted. The sam-
ple frame for this non-response analysis, where firms are contacted by telephone 
and asked about the key innovation indicators, are all enterprises from the main 
sample that did not return a filled in questionnaire. The size of this non-response 
survey is about 4,000 enterprises. The results are used to correct the standard ex-
pansion factors for non-response bias. 
4.3.3 Survey Questionnaire and Survey Process 
The MIP surveys are conducted as voluntary sample surveys among German 
firms with at least 5 employees. The firms drawn from the total population of 
firms in Germany receive a standardised questionnaire usually in late March or 
beginning of April each year. The length of this questionnaire is between 4 (even 
years) and 16 pages (odd years). The length of the questionnaire and conse-
quently the response burden can be seen as one of the main reason for low re-
sponse rates. The ZEW is thus always trying to reduce the number of questions 
and the length of the questionnaire as far as possible. The 2005 CIS IV question-
naire is evidence of that goal, whereas the 2001 CIS III questionnaire in Germany 
had 16 pages the CIS IV questionnaire in Germany had just 8 pages and 44 ques-
tions. Each questionnaire contains a list of examples of product and process in-
novation in manufacturing and services.  
In order to increase the response rates for the survey the firms in the sample 
which did not return a filled in questionnaire until a given date receive a written 
reminder supplemented by a new questionnaire. The methodological guidelines 
for the CIS IV recommend two such reminders. Some times three reminders have 
been sent out in the past. 
After this first phase of the innovation survey, the non-response sample is 
drawn from the firms in the original sample which did not return a filled-in ques-
tionnaire. These about 4000 firms are contacted by telephone and asked to an-
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swer a very short questionnaire on the key innovation indicators and their num-
ber of employees and turnover. 
4.3.4 Data Preparation, Data Quality and Expansion 
The raw data from the questionnaire is collected by infas. The ZEW then con-
ducts a number of data preparation and consistency checks on this data in order 
to be able to calculate reliable and representative figures for the total population. 
The first step is to check the data for consistency of answers. Typical inconsis-
tencies that occur are that firms report more R&D than innovation expenditure, 
which includes R&D expenditure, or report R&D in millions instead of thou-
sands. Another type of inconsistency is corrected by using “back-filtering”. This 
procedure applies if firms answer some questions in one direction and other, re-
lated questions to the contrary. For example, if a firm reported R&D expenditure 
for 2002, it should also have ticked “yes” for the question on ongoing innovation 
activities during the reference period 2000-2002. If it did not, the answer is 
“back-filtered” and the answer for ongoing innovation activities is changed from 
“no” or “missing” to yes. Consistency is also required for the scope of the figures 
reported. The MIP targets only German firms. Thus, if firms report world-wide 
figures a correction factor has to be determined and applied to the data. While the 
first two inconsistencies can be detected by semi-automated procedures and 
checks using the panel, the last one is harder to detect, especially for small and 
medium sized enterprises. 
The next step is to make sure that all large companies are included in the sur-
vey. This is particularly important for the calculation of quantitative figures in 
the data, most prominently the innovation expenditure data and the measures of 
success of innovations. If some of these large companies are missing from the 
sample, the innovation expenditure and other quantitative figures would be un-
derestimated when calculating statistics for the total population of German firms. 
Large companies and groups that are of interest are those with more than 10.000 
employees and their headquarters in Germany. For industries that do not have 
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companies with more than 10.000 employees, the largest four are considered. If 
large companies did not return the questionnaire, company reports and publica-
tions are used to gather information about their key financial and economic fig-
ures (relevant for expansion) and as far as possible for their innovation activities 
(R&D spending etc.). If some legally independent divisions of a large group re-
turned the questionnaire the results are “consolidated” and only figures for those 
divisions that are missing are added, if possible. If some values cannot be col-
lected from company reports and publications, imputations are made based on 
the panel, i.e. previous answers of the same company. 
Imputations are not only made for large firms, but also for other firms to correct 
“item non-response”. The method of imputation varies with the type of variable 
to be imputed. For variables that are included in the survey annually, like success 
with innovations or innovation expenditure, missing values are replaced by the 
extrapolated value of previous answers (longitudinal imputation). A firm might 
have provided innovation expenditure in previous surveys for 1999, 2000 and 
2001, but did not report any expenditure figures in 2002. In that case the 2001 to 
2002 growth rate would be estimated by the growth rate between 1999 and 2001 
and applied to the 2001 innovation expenditure. If quantitative questions are only 
asked in one year, this method cannot be used. In that case the average value in 
the industry or cell is imputed. Imputation is more complex for qualitative ques-
tions, as no meaningful growth rates or industry averages can be calculated for 
these answers. In that case the imputation is done using estimation techniques. A 
propensity score is estimated based on firm characteristics, like size and industry 
and imputed. 
Imputation is necessary in order to be able to expand the sample results to the 
German statistical population. Depending on the type of variable to be expanded, 
different expansion factors and methods are used. For qualitative figures the free 
expansion method which is based on the number of enterprises in each Strata in 
the sample and the population is used, corrected for non-response bias of course. 
For quantitative indicators the bound expansion method is used, where the ex-
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pansion factor of the simple expansion method is multiplied by the inverse of the 
ratio of the turnover calculated based on the simple expansion factor divided by 
the turnover in the population. For the manufacturing sector a third expansion 
factor is calculated with this method using the number of employees instead of 
the turnover.65 
4.3.5 Publications and Usage of the Microdata 
The usage of the innovation survey is twofold. The data is used both for inno-
vation and technology policy advice and evaluation and reporting on innovation 
activities in Germany, as well as for scientific purposes.  
For each innovation survey a report is published that describes the development 
of the key innovation indicators like the share of innovators or the innovation 
expenditures, for the manufacturing and the service sector, respectively. Special 
attention is given to differences between small and large firms and innovation 
activities in East and West Germany.66 Likewise, reports on 22 industries and 
industry groups are published annually which document the development in spe-
cific industries and compare the industry dynamics with that of manufacturing or 
services as a whole. A comprehensive report on MIP surveys with the long ques-
tionnaire is published after the survey is completed. It provides analyses of the 
questions only included in that specific survey and, thus, a more in-depth look at 
various developments and effects of innovation than the regular indicator reports. 
Beyond the publications of the ZEW, the results of the innovation surveys are 
used in various government and EU reports, e.g., “Innovation in Europe” 
(European Commission, 2004b) and “Bundesbericht Forschung” (BMBF, 2004). 
The use of the MIP data for scientific purposes has increased in recent years. A 
whole range of topics have been empirically analysed by ZEW employees as well 
                                              
65 The respective formulas for calculating the expansion factors can be found in the introductory chapter 
of Rammer et al. (2005c). 
66 These and other reports can be downloaded from http://www.zew.de/innovation. Some are available in 
English. 
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as external scholars, who are granted access to anonymised micro-data in the 
form of scientific use files under certain circumstances. The topics investigated 
include: determinants of innovation behaviour of firms, the role of innovation 
activities in determining the economic and technological success of firms, em-
ployment effects of innovation and the importance of framework conditions 
(IPR, public funding, obstacles, co-operation, etc.) for innovation activities in 
Germany, to name a few.67 
4.3.6 Main Results of the 2005 Mannheim Innovation Panel 
The following figures show the latest results from the Mannheim Innovation 
survey of 2005, which was part of the CIS IV. These are included here to give 
the reader some impression on how the data is used beyond scientific analysis.  
The share of firms with innovation activities has gone down from 2003 to 2004 
for knowledge-intensive services and gone up for manufacturing and mining and 
other services. 52% of all firms from the knowledge-intensive service sector have 
introduced at least one innovation during the three year period 2002 to 2003, the 
corresponding figures for firms from manufacturing or mining are 60% and 35% 
for other services. The development over time shows the knowledge intensive 
service sector and the manufacturing and mining sector to move almost parallel 
between 1998 and 2003. Only in 2003 did both curves separate again. The inno-
vation participation in other services has been below that of the other two sectors 
since 2000. 
                                              
67 The reader of Janz and Licht (2003) summarises the scientific usage of the MIP data up to about the 
year 2000. More recent articles are available from the website mentioned above. 
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Figure 4-2 Share of Innovators in Germany, 1992-2004 
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Source: Aschhoff et al. (2006): 2. 
Notes: Innovator share: innovators as a percentage of all firms. Figures for 2003 and 2005 are 
tentative. Figures for the service sectors are only available from 1996 on. Other services figures 
from 2000 on are not comparable with those from previous years and are only shown for 2000 
and later. All figures are projected for the total firm population (firms with 5 or more employ-
ees) in Germany. 
The innovation expenditure figures displayed in Figure 4-3, show that the 
manufacturing sector spends by far the most on innovation and R&D activities. 
In 2004 the total amount spent on innovation activities for this sector adds up to 
75.3 billion Euro. In mid-2005 the manufacturing firms planed to increase their 
expenditure by 3.6 billion Euros between 2004 and 2006. In contrast, both ser-
vice sector plan to reduce their innovation expenditure over the same period by 
0.9 billion Euros to a combined 23.8 billion Euros.68 
                                              
68 Additional figures and discussion of the innovation behaviour of German firms can be found in 
Aschhoff et al. (2006). 
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Figure 4-3 Innovation Expenditure of German Firms, 1992-2005 
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Source: Aschhoff et al. (2006): 4. 
* Data for 2005 and 2006 are based on firm plans and expectations at mid-2005. 
Notes: Figures for 2003 and 2004 are tentative. Figures for the service sectors are only available 
for 1995 and later. Data for 2005 and 2006 are based on projected firm figures and expectations 
at mid-2005. Figures for other services from 2000 on are only partially comparable with those 
from previous years. All figures are projected for the total firm population in Germany. 
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5 The Construction of the Potential Outgoing Spillover 
Pools/Knowledge Stocks at the Industry and Firm-Level 
This chapter of the study is devoted to developing a measure for the stock of 
knowledge accumulated by an industry up to a certain point in time, i.e. a firm’s 
or an industry’s knowledge stock. In the first part of this chapter I will review the 
literature on measurement of knowledge flows and the construction of knowl-
edge stocks. In the second part I will describe the construction of the knowledge 
stocks of firms and industries relevant for my study. 
5.1 Empirical Measures for Knowledge Flows and Knowledge Stocks69 
In this section I construct a measure for the amount of knowledge created in an 
industry over a given period of time, i.e. the “potential outgoing knowledge spill-
over pool”70 or “knowledge pool”. 
A methodological issue in creating the knowledge stock of an industry or firm 
is how to measure knowledge empirically, mainly because knowledge flows are 
not observable, that is to say they are “invisible” (Krugman, 1991: 53). As 
Jaffe (1986) has stated, it is extremely difficult to observe the actual spillovers 
between firms. Some types of knowledge are impossible for researchers to track 
and, what is more, are not directly measurable and quantifiable.71 Several other 
authors have also acknowledged the fact that knowledge and spillovers are hard 
to measure (Geroski, 1995; Arrow, 1962a; Peters, 2003; Los and Verspagen, 
2000; Agrawal and Henderson, 2002).  
                                              
69 The terms “knowledge stocks” and “knowledge pools” will be used interchangeably. 
70 The term “potential spillover pool” has been used by Jaffe in a similar setting. While Jaffe (1986) used 
the term for the “weighted sum of other firms’ R&D” (Jaffe, 1986:  986), I use it for the unweighted 
sum of all R&D undertaken in an industry. The weighting, which is definitely important for the 
analysis of spillovers, will be done in the subsequent sections. 
71  Arrow (1962a) has already noted that the quantity of knowledge is hard to measure (Arrow, 1962a: 
155). This view is also held by Peters (2003). He writes that tacit knowledge is “[…] difficult to cod-
ify and measure.” (Peters, 2003: 370) 
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Since knowledge is not directly traceable, proxies for the knowledge flows and 
stocks have been used, among them are trade-flows or trade-relations (Coe and 
Helpman, 1995) and patent citations72, which can be seen as a paper trail left by 
those involved (see Peri, 2005 literature review). Geroski et al. (1993) use inno-
vation counts gathered from the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) innova-
tion database to measure spillovers and knowledge stocks. 
With the advent of innovation surveys, several authors have used questions on 
the importance of external sources of information for the innovation activities of 
firms as a proxy for knowledge flows (e.g. Belderbos et al., 2004; Bönte and 
Keilbach, 2005; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Dachs et al., 2004; Schmidt, 
2005b). These questions can also be seen as a paper trail of spillovers, but rely 
heavily on the subjective assessment and power of recollection of the person fill-
ing in the questionnaire. While a patent is registered at the patent office, the im-
portance of an external knowledge source for a firm’s innovation process is nor-
mally not registered anywhere. The use of survey data increases the coverage of 
spillovers to those not registered in patents, e.g. spillovers generated by inven-
tions and innovations that are not patented or patentable. 
In order to be able to analyse the influence of knowledge spillovers on various 
input and output indicators of the innovation process in spite of these problems, 
researchers have used the accumulated stock of R&D in empirical studies (e.g. 
Griliches, 1979a; 1990; Bernstein, 1988; Jaffe, 1986) as a proxy for the knowl-
edge stock.73 Starting with Griliches (1979a), empirical researchers have tried to 
estimate the amount of knowledge spillovers using R&D data. The assumption 
                                              
72 The literature using citations in patents and patent applications as measures of knowledge flows and 
spillovers is quite extensive (e.g. Jaffe et al., 1993; Porter and Stern, 2000; Maurseth and Verspagen, 
2002). However, a big drawback of patent data is that “not all inventions are patentable, not all inven-
tions are patented” (Griliches, 1990: 1669) and firms use other methods of protection for their knowl-
edge (Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et al., 1987). 
73 Kaiser (2002b) discusses alternative proxies for the knowledge stock of an industry. Among them are 
number of patents, innovation expenditure, R&D investment and the R&D capital stock. Since most 
studies use the R&D stock however, I will use R&D stocks in this study. 
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behind the use of this proxy is that the main source of new (technological) 
knowledge is the innovation process (Romer, 1986; Brusoni et al., 2002). In Ro-
mer’s model e.g. “Knowledge is accumulated by devoting resources to research.” 
(Romer, 1986: 1007). What is more, the main focus of the theoretical literature 
was to analyse the effect of spillovers arising from R&D and innovation activi-
ties (e.g. D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998; De 
Bondt, 1996). This focus has certainly also influenced the empirical literature. 
Cameron’s observation that “most researchers have chosen to use R&D spending 
as their measure of technological change, usually because R&D data are easiest 
to compile and most reliable.” (Cameron, 1996: 2) might also go some of the 
way to explaining the popularity of R&D proxies for knowledge.  
This method of constructing the knowledge spillover pool - using R&D expen-
diture data - has some drawbacks. One can easily see that this method is subject 
to a problem of double counting: If R&D of firms in an industry is duplicative, 
i.e. they do research on the same problem, the knowledge stock based on R&D 
expenditure would be biased upward.74 In addition to that knowledge can be 
generated not only by investing in R&D but also by investing in other innovation 
related activities.75 Lacking a better measure of the knowledge stock I use the 
accumulated R&D stock in this study.76 
It is widely accepted that knowledge is subject to depreciation, i.e. knowledge 
becomes more and more obsolete over time.77 Almost all studies I surveyed that 
use the R&D stock as a proxy for the knowledge spillover pool took this into ac-
count by including a depreciation rate in their calculations (e.g. Jaffe, 1986; 
                                              
74 This has been noted by Reinganum (1981), who argues that the spillover parameter depends on either 
the feasibility of transferring knowledge between partners and “the degree to which the new knowl-
edge generated by […] firms overlaps” (Reinganum, 1981: 31). 
75 For a list of other innovation activities that require investment and expenditure see OECD and Euro-
stat (1997). 
76 This is not without problems, because of the well-known fact that the service sector is less R&D inten-
sive. The knowledge stock of service industries is thus potentially underestimated. 
77 See e.g. Griliches (1979a). 
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Griffith et al., 2004; Peri, 2005; Los and Verspagen, 2000). The size of this de-
preciation rate differs from study to study. While Keller (2002), Peri (2005), 
Bernstein (1988) and Mohnen et al. (1986) use a 10% depreciation rate, most 
other studies (e.g. Jaffe, 1986) have followed Griliches and Mairesse (1984) and 
assumed a 15% depreciation rate for all industries included in their sample. Some 
authors have experimented with depreciation rates of 0 percent (see Griliches and 
Mairesse, 1984). 78 I will deviate from these approaches in that I will generate the 
R&D stocks using industry-specific depreciation rates instead of one depreciation 
rate for all industries included in my study. This is certainly an improvement, 
because it is logical to assume that knowledge becomes obsolete faster in indus-
tries which are more dynamic than others.  
To generate an industry specific depreciation rate I will utilize a question from 
the Mannheim Innovation Panel79 on the length of the average product life cycles 
of a firm’s products. I argue that the longer (shorter) the product life cycle the 
smaller (higher) the depreciation rate. I therefore use the inverse of the average 
product live cycle as the depreciation rate for the two R&D stocks based on 
firms’ R&D spending. In doing so I assume that all knowledge will become ob-
solete after the product life-cycle has come to an end. However, it is very likely 
that at least some knowledge will remain valuable and can spill over to other 
firms. It is not possible to determine the amount of knowledge that is still valu-
able after the “death” of the product with the data I have at hand, thus the simpli-
fying assumption. This approach is similar to one taken by Goto and Suzuki 
(1989). They take the inverse of the average “life span” of firms’ patents as their 
rate of depreciation for R&D capital. 
                                              
78 Hall and Mairesse (1995), who argue that different depreciation rates do not influence their estimation 
results of the effect of R&D stocks on total factor productivity significantly, only varied the deprecia-
tion rate with respect to its level, not between industries. Orlando (2004) and Bernstein and Na-
diri (1989) also state that their results are not affected by the depreciation rate chosen for the con-
struction of the R&D stocks. They do not differentiate between industries, either. 
79 See chapter 4 for a description of the survey. 
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In essence, the potential incoming spillover pools of an industry and the knowl-
edge stock of an individual firm are constructed according to the following (per-
petual inventory) method80: 
0 ( )
1,...,
*(1 ) (1 ) ( & )T T t ti i i i i
t T
S S R D−
=
= − ∂ + − ∂∑  
Where Si is the potential outgoing spillover pool of industry i in year T, 0iS the 
starting value for the knowledge stock in industry i, i∂  the time-invariant indus-
try-specific depreciation rate and & tiR D  the R&D expenditure of industry i at 
time t. 
The following section will describe the data used for the construction of the po-
tential outgoing spillover pools and the knowledge stock of a firm and the de-
tailed methodology for arriving at the industry-specific pools. 
5.2 Database for the Construction of the Knowledge Stock 
In order to be able to construct the knowledge stocks for German industries 
from the manufacturing and service sector I use two different sources of data. 
One is the OECD’s ANBERD “Analytical Business Enterprise Research and De-
velopment database (OECD, 2003), which provides information on the R&D ex-
penditure of enterprises at the industry level and governments’ R&D spending. 
The other is the R&D statistics of the “Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissen-
schaft”81 (Stifterverband), which reports figures on the (intramural) R&D expen-
ditures of German firms. The use of these two sources was necessary, since the 
recent OECD database only provided up-to-date information until 1999 and re-
ports estimated figures for 2001 and 2002, while the Stifterverband publications 
provide new data for 2001 and 2002. For the years before 2000 both databases 
                                              
80 Note, as Los and Verspagen (2000) state, that using this method requires to assume that the deprecia-
tion rate is constant over time. 
81 Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft-Wissenschaftsstatistik (2005). 
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are identical since the OECD database is a collection of the data of the national 
R&D surveys, the German version of which is conducted by the Stifterverband.82 
The use of the data poses some problems: 
First, R&D data at the industry level is only available from 1995 onward. Thus 
I use a method used by Jaffe (1986) and Peri (2005) to construct an initial R&D 
stock ( 0iS ), i.e. the initial stock is calculated by multiplying the 1995 R&D ex-
penditure with the inverse of the sum of the depreciation rate and the average 
growth rate of R&D expenditure between 1996 and 2002. 
Second, the R&D data is not available for all service industries (2-digit NACE) 
and some 2-digit NACE industries are only reported aggregated. Data is avail-
able for the following NACE: 40+41 (Electricity, gas and water supply), 45 
(Construction) , 50-52 (Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, mo-
torcycles and personal and household goods), 60-63 (Land transport; transport 
via pipelines; Water transport; Air transport; Supporting and auxiliary transport 
activities; activities of travel agencies), 65-67 (Financial intermediation), 72 
(Computer and related activities), 73 (Research and development), and 74 (Other 
business activities).83 
The service industry data poses another problem: it is available only for every 
other year.84 To calculate the R&D expenditure for 1996, 1998, and 2000 I added 
the half of the difference between the values for one year before and after the 
respective date to the R&D expenditure for the previous year.  
Finally, the most recent data from the Stifterverband for some industries is not 
available at the same level of detail as the OECD data. In order to be able to keep 
the level of detail provided in the ANBERD database, I distributed the more ag-
                                              
82 Note, I did not deflate the R&D expenditure figures (see e.g. Griffith et al., 2004 or Orlando, 2004), 
but used the current expenditure on R&D in Euros. 
83 In order to ensure consistency of the different chapters, this grouping of NACE classes in the service 
sector was retained throughout the study, i.e. the term “NACE2” stands for the adapted NACE 2-digit 
classification instead of the original NACE 2-digit classification. 
84 R&D expenditure data for NACE 72, 73 and 74 is available for the year 2000. 
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gregated figures from the Stifterverband for 2001 and 2002 according to the dis-
tribution of the OECD data from 1999. To give an example of the procedure: The 
Stifterverband reported the 2001 R&D expenditure for NACE 27+28 at € 853 
billion and the 1999 R&D expenditure at € 776 billion, while the OECD’s data-
base provided separate figures for NACE 27 (€ 259 billion) and NACE 28 (€  
517 billion) for 1999. To come up with separate estimates of NACE 27 and 28 
for 2001 the following calculations are performed € 259*(853/776) and 
€ 517*(853/776), respectively.85 
Since I want to investigate spillovers from the public domain, I also constructed 
a potential knowledge spillover pool for R&D conducted by the government and 
higher education institutes in Germany. The R&D figures (GERD by government 
and higher education in Germany) for these actors are readily available from the 
OECD ANBERD database and are reported in the Appendix. 
By restricting my observations of R&D expenditure to Germany I will not be 
able to analyse the impact of knowledge spillovers from foreign firms and re-
search institutions on the R&D co-operation behaviour of German firms. 
5.3 Construction of Industry-Specific Knowledge Depreciation Rates 
It has already been mentioned above that I want to construct industry specific 
depreciation rates from a question firms answered about the average product life 
cycle of their products in the 2003 survey of the Mannheim Innovation Panel.  
This is not unproblematic. The firms were not only asked about the length of 
the product life cycle but also if the life cycle concept was applicable in their in-
dustry and 38% in service industries and 30% in manufacturing industries stated 
that the concept was not applicable in their industry. Especially in industries like 
transportation, the proportion of those who think the concept is not applicable is 
high. However, in all industries there were some firms which gave an estimate of 
the average product life cycle. Despite these drawbacks I decided to use this data 
                                              
85 The final dataset of R&D expenditures used is reported in Table A-1 in the appendix. 
 95 
for the construction of an industry-specific depreciation rate for knowledge capi-
tal. I did not calculate a rate for each 2-digit NACE industry, however, but rather 
aggregated some industries into larger groups to end up with more reliable esti-
mates.86 The results are presented in Table 5-1 on the following page. Another 
issue is that I am only able to construct one average product life cycle measure 
for all the years instead of one for each year. Because of that I have to assume 
that the depreciation rate does not change over time, although this is probably not 
the case in reality. 
The results are mainly in line with what one could have expected, with high de-
preciation rates for the IT industry and low depreciation rates for established and 
less dynamic industries like electricity, gas and water supply.87 The surprising 
results are those for the textile and leather industry (NACE 17-19). They can be 
explained by the fashion trends the textile and leather industry is subject to. Be-
sides, the shift from classic textile to more advanced “technical” textiles in the 
last 30 years has led to an increase in innovation activities in the industry and 
shortened product life-cycles (Grosser, 2005). 
The average life-cycle for all industries included in my study is 9 years, which 
would imply an average depreciation rate of 11.1%, closer to 10% than to 15%, 
these two values most widely used in the literature. 
Data for the life-cycle of scientific knowledge is not available. However, 
NACE 73 (R&D services) depreciation rate might give an estimate of how fast 
university knowledge might depreciate as this industry is quite close to university 
R&D. Accordingly 16% is used as the depreciation rate for public R&D. 
                                              
86 This aggregation was necessary because some 2-digit industries had very few observations for the 
product life cycle. The grouping for manufacturing was done in accordance with the regular reporting 
on industries by the ZEW (see e.g. Schmidt, 2004; Rammer et al., 2005a). The service industries were 
grouped according to the grouping reported in the R&D statistics (Stifterverband für die Deutsche 
Wissenschaft-Wissenschaftsstatistik, 2005). 
87 Our results are very much in line with Goto and Suzuki (1989), who found that “industries in which 
technology is advancing rapidly […] were found to have higher rates of obsolence” than industries 
which are less rapidly advancing.”(Goto and Suzuki, 1989: 557). 
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Table 5-1 Estimated Depreciation Rates for R&D Capital (in %) and Average 
Product Life-Cycle (in Years) for Selected Industry Groups 
NACE Industries 
Product 
Life-
Cycle 
Depreciation 
Rate 
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages  7 15.2% 
17-19 Manufacture of textiles and textile products, leather 
and leather products 5 20% 
20-22 Manufacture of wood and wood products, pulp, pa-
per and paper products; publishing and printing 11 8.5% 
23-24 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel, chemicals and chemical products 14 7.2% 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 12 8.6% 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 22 4.6% 
27-28 Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal 
products 12 8.5% 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 10 9.9% 
30-32 Manufacture of office machinery and computers, 
electrical machinery, radio, television and communi-
cation equipment and apparatus 8 13.1% 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical in-
struments, watches and clocks 7 14.4% 
34-35 Manufacture of transport equipment 10 9.2% 
36-37 Manufacturing n.e.c. 8 12.8% 
40-41 Electricity, gas and water supply 20 4.9% 
45 Construction 30 3.4% 
50-52 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and personal and household goods 9 11.7% 
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NACE Industries 
Product 
Life-
Cycle 
Depreciation 
Rate 
60-63 Transport and storage 11 8.9% 
65-67 Financial intermediation 8 12.4% 
72 Computer and related activities 5 20.9% 
73 Research and development 6 16.1% 
74 Other business activities 8 12.3% 
Source: Own calculations. 
5.4 The Knowledge Stocks of Selected Industries88 
Using the results for the industry-specific depreciation rates and assuming that 
this rate is constant over time I construct a first approximation of the knowledge 
pools. The results for the industries are reported in Table 5-2. The knowledge 
stock available from public sector R&D is estimated at 68737.657 billion Euro. 
Note that this is not the value of the knowledge stock but rather the amount of 
money it took to generate it. 
The highest value can be found for NACE 34 (manufacture of motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi-trailers). The knowledge stock of NACE 34 and NACE 35 
(manufacture of other transport equipment) combined is higher than that of the 
whole university and research institute sector. NACE 24 (manufacture of chemi-
cals and chemical products) and NACE 29 (manufacture of machinery and 
equipment n.e.c.) take second and third place, respectively. This result reflects 
the commitment of these industries not only to R&D but also to innovation ac-
                                              
88 When constructing the firm specific level of realized incoming spillover, I will take into account the 
fact that the intra-industry stock of external knowledge is the intra-industry stock minus the R&D 
carried out by the enterprise itself, i.e. each firm will have its own individual intra-industry knowl-
edge stock. Here the total amount of knowledge generated in an industry is estimated. 
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tivities in general, as the regular indicator reports on the innovation behaviour89 
of German firms show (most recent report: Rammer et al., 2005a). The two ser-
vice industries with the highest knowledge stocks in 2002 are NACE 73 (Re-
search and Development) and NACE 72 (Computer and related activities). Their 
estimated knowledge stock is higher than that of some manufacturing industries, 
despite their high depreciation rates. 
Table 5-2 Estimated Knowledge Stocks for Selected Industry Groups in 2002 
NACE 2 R&D stock by industry NACE 2 R&D stock by industry 
15 986.673 31 5833.025 
16 143.582 32 18619.922 
17 714.389 33 8379.555 
18 135.704 34 52058.848 
19 18.133 35 14682.061 
20 152.795 36 845.304 
21 430.916 37 23.733 
22 141.924 40-41 605.884 
23 363.199 45 542.766 
24 35033.947 50-52 675.135 
25 3179.315 60-63 2737.901 
26 2149.938 65-67 85.096 
27 1603.361 72 3059.725 
28 2916.270 73 3384.591 
29 19551.832 74 2206.796 
30 3668.365 Sum 184930.68 
Source: Own calculations. 
5.5 The Knowledge Stock of a Firm 
The knowledge stock for an individual firm is constructed in the same way as 
the knowledge stock for an industry. The total amount of knowledge generated 
                                              
89 Note that the total amount spent on R&D is just a proxy for the knowledge generated and that the 
results should thus be interpreted with care. In particular the knowledge stock for service industries, 
which are known to have less R&D-intensive innovation and knowledge production processes (see 
e.g. Rammer et al. (2005a): in the retail trade less than 1% of all enterprises conduct R&D continu-
ously), might be higher than estimated.  
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by an individual firm is proxied by that firm’s R&D expenditure. The firm level 
R&D expenditure data comes from the Mannheim Innovation Surveys, which 
include a question on the total amount spent on in-house R&D in a given year. 
Since the first MIP survey for service industries was carried out in 1996, the ini-
tial stock of knowledge is constructed for the year 1996, using the growth rate of 
R&D expenditure for each firm from 1997 to 2002, as at the industry level. To 
depreciate firms’ R&D expenditure I used the estimated industry level of depre-
ciation instead of the firm’s in order not to lose too many observations so early in 
the empirical part of my study. 
The average knowledge stock of all firms for which R&D data is available is 
15.48 billion Euros. In 2002, almost 95% of all firms had knowledge stocks val-
ued at less than 1 billion Euros.  
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6 From Potential Outgoing to Realized Incoming Spillover 
Pools 
“If you have an apple and I have an apple and we exchange apples then you and 
I will still each have one apple. But if you have an idea and I have an idea and we 
exchange these ideas, then each of us will have two ideas.” 
George Bernard Shaw 
In the previous section I constructed the knowledge stocks of industries and in-
dividual firms. Potentially all of this knowledge could spill over to over actors in 
an economy; this is if it were a pure public good as suggested by the quote of 
Georg Bernard Shaw. In the following sections I will argue that this is not the 
case. I will argue that some knowledge can always be appropriated by the firm 
producing it and that not all knowledge that nonetheless spills over into the pub-
lic domain can be used by each firm equally. I start with a short literature review 
on factors moderating the free flow of knowledge. 
6.1 Factors Moderating the Free Flow of Knowledge 90 
Even though knowledge exhibit features of a public good (see above and 
Arrow, 1962b) there are some factors moderating the free and costless flow of 
knowledge from the producer to the user of the knowledge: 
The first moderating factor is the possibility to appropriate knowledge through 
a system of formal or informal intellectual property protection methods. Stiglitz, 
1999a for example argues that if trade secrets and patents allow the producer of 
                                              
90 This section will review the methodological issues in assessing the spillovers between firms and indus-
tries empirically, as this is the main focus of this section. I will not report the results of the studies 
analysing the effect of spillovers on productivity or output measures. The interested reader might start 
from the overviews of literature on spillover effects collected by Nadiri (1993) (rates of return on 
R&D), Harabi (1997) (“spillovers are prevelant and important” p.628), Griliches (1992; 1994) (pro-
ductivity), De Bondt (1996) (theory), among others. 
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new knowledge to appropriate some of the returns of his efforts at least some 
degree of excludability is present. Empirical evidence on the effect of appropria-
tion methods on knowledge flows has been provided by Cohen and Walsh (2000) 
who show that the use of secrecy significantly reduces the information flows be-
tween firms in the same industry. They also find that patents do not exert a sig-
nificant negative effect on knowledge flows within industries. This might be due 
to the fact that the patent system requires firms to disclose their knowledge in the 
patent application. Kaiser (2002b) argues that knowledge spillovers arise because 
protection methods are not perfect, indirectly saying that protection methods can 
reduce the flow of knowledge between firms.91 
Even though Spence left it open whether appropriability is “created by circum-
stances or policy” (Spence, 1984: 102), his model can be used to represent the 
moderating effect of protection mechanisms on knowledge spillovers. Spillovers 
in his model are represented by (Spence, 1984: 103):  
Spillovers = ( )j
j ì
m tθ
≠
∑   
where jm  is the current R&D expenditure of firm j and θ  the parameter that 
represents the level of spillovers. If θ  is equal to 1 all new knowledge spills over, 
if θ  is equal to 0 nothing spills over.  
A second moderating factor is the absorptive capacity of individuals and firms. 
While the first moderating factor affects all firms in an industry equally or at 
least does not depend on the knowledge receiving firms’ characteristics (see 
Griliches, 1992: 37: “symmetric approach”) the second moderating factor does, 
because firms’ have different absorptive capacities.92 Cohen and Levin-
thal (1989; 1990) have shown that a firm has to posses certain capabilities in or-
der to be able to source knowledge from the environment and to turn it into inno-
                                              
91 More information on the effects of different protection methods on knowledge flows will be provid-
edin section 6.4. 
92 To put it in another way, following Kaiser (2002b), its not very likely that all firms can equally gain 
from the pool of external knowledge. 
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vative products or processes.93 This capacity is build up in their model by invest-
ing in in-house R&D. The literature that follows Cohen and Levinthal (1989; 
1990) has identified a whole range of factors other than R&D that influence ab-
sorptive capacity.94 The methods and mechanisms that determine absorptive ca-
pacity have in common, that they require substantial effort and the investment of 
resources. In general the acquisition of external knowledge can thus be seen as 
costly instead of free (see Stiglitz, 1999a). A theoretical model building on the 
assumption that learning is costly and taking into account that absorptive capac-
ity matters for knowledge acquisition has been presented by Von 
Graevenitz (2004). 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) model expands the framework proposed by 
Spence, 1984 by introducing a variable which stands for firms ability to assimi-
late and exploit external knowledge (γ ) (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989: 571) 95: 
Spillovers = *( ( ) )i j
j ì
m t Tγ θ
≠
+∑  
Kamien and Zang (2000) apply this equation to their formulation of “effective 
R&D”96 (spillovers plus a firm’s own R&D expenditure) (Kamien and 
Zang, 2000: 997): 
Effective R&D= 1(1 )(1 ) i ii i j i jx x x
δ δδ δ β −+ − −  
where xi represents a firms own R&D expenditure, and xj its rival’s, δ is the 
R&D approach chosen and β the exogenous spillover parameter. By multiplying 
both R&D expenditure levels, the second part of the equation will be zero, if the 
                                              
93 For a more detailed survey of the literature on absorptive capacity see section 6.5. 
94 See Daghfous (2004) and Zahra and George (2002) for a review of the literature. 
95 T is the extra-industry knowledge pool.  
96 The term “effective R&D” has been traced back to Ruff (1969) by De Bondt (1996) and is usually 
defined as “the amount of money it alone would have had to invest in R&D, if no other firm invested 
in R&D, to achieve the same unit cost reduction.” (Kamien et al., 1992: 1297). 
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firm does not invest in R&D itself, i.e. if it does not have any absorptive capac-
ity.  
Finally, the effect of the distance between the user and producer of knowledge 
on the level of knowledge spillovers, have been intensively studied.97 Research-
ers have focused on two different types of distance, geographical distance and 
technological distance. Despite the rather pessimistic assertion of 
Griliches (1979a) that the “concept of such ‘distance’ is hard to define empiri-
cally” (Griliches, 1979a: 103), a variety of empirical distance measures has been 
suggested.  
To measure the technological distance between firms Jaffe (1986) method has 
been very influential. He positions firms in “technology space” by analysing the 
patents of firms. To be more precise, he locks at the distribution of a firm’s pat-
ents over 49 technological categories (patent classes). The exact weight is then 
determined by calculating the un-centred correlation of the patent class vectors 
for each firm.98 A major drawback of this method is that not all innovations and 
inventions are patented or patentable and thus the measure based on patent statis-
tics can be biased99. Other methods to determine the technological proximity of 
firms have been proposed: Orlando (2004) assumes that firms in the same 4-digit 
SIC are technological close, Adams (1990) uses the distribution of the scientific 
workforce as a measure of technological distance, Goto and Suzuki (1989) asses 
the distance between two industries by using Jaffe’s formula on matrixes of R&D 
expenditure in 30 different product areas. Kaiser (2002b) describes Inkmann and 
Pohlmeier (1995) method, which suggests to use the Euclidean distance between 
firm characteristics to asses the extend of the technological distance. 
A second distance measure is the geographical distance. The measurement of 
the geographical distance is straight forward. It has been measured in distance 
                                              
97 Overviews can be found in Kaiser (2002b), Cincera (2005) and Griliches (1992). 
98 For the exact formula see Jaffe (1988). 
99 For a discussion of this and other problems with Jaffe’s method see Cincera (2005). 
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units like kilometres (Kaiser, 2002b; Keller, 2002) or by grouping firms in the 
same region (Greunz, 2003; Peri, 2005; Orlando, 2004). 
In a recent paper Orlando (2004) jointly analysis technological and geographi-
cal distance, by separating the total stock of knowledge into four groups: techno-
logical close – geographical distant, etc. 
The discussion on the distance between firms can be summarized with the fol-
lowing formula adapted from Griliches (1979a: 103): 
ij jSpillovers w m=∑  
Where ijw  represents the distance between firm i and firm j and jm  is the stock 
of R&D expenditure. 
As Kaiser (2002b) has shown the particular distance measure used can have a 
significant impact on the size of the estimated knowledge spillover and should 
thus be chosen wisely. 
Negassi (2004) has combined the discussion on technological distance and pro-
tection in his formula for “national pure spillovers”, which he defines as 
(Negassi, 2004: 371) 
git ij ij j
j i
Npsspill v a RD
≠
= ∑  
Where ijv is a measure of the effectiveness of patent protection as seen by firm j, 
ija is the technological distance between firm i and j calculated from the patent 
portfolio of the firms, similar to Jaffe (1986) and RDj is the R&D expenditure of 
firm j. 
The literature cited above indicates that the amount of spillovers a firm actually 
uses does not only depend on the total amount of knowledge generated in an in-
dustry but also on the characteristics and behaviour of firms. This is the main 
reason why I distinguish between the potential spillover pool and the realized 
spillover pool in my study. The former being the pool of knowledge that is gen-
erated in an industry (potential outgoing spillover pool) or available (potential 
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incoming spillover pool) to a given firm and the later being the one not protected 
or protect-able by firms (realized outgoing spillovers) or actually used by firms 
(realized incoming spillover). 
6.2 Different Types of Knowledge Spillover Pools 
Knowledge can be tacit or formal (e.g. Polanyi, 1967; Cowan et al., 2000; 
Bartholomaei, 2005), specific or generic (see e.g. Breschi et al., 2000), embodied 
or disembodied (Romer, 1990) or in the form of information and know-how 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992), to name a few widely used distinctions for knowl-
edge. However, knowledge cannot only be distinguished by the form it takes but 
also by the source it stems from and the channels through which it is transmitted 
(Harabi, 1997). For the analysis of spillovers both distinctions play an important 
role. Both influence the ease and the costs with which knowledge can be acquired 
by firms. 
Despite the importance of the type of knowledge for the level of spillovers, I 
will only focus on the “actors” generating knowledge in an economy100, mainly 
because I lack data for the type of knowledge actually generated by the firms in 
the sample I want to analyse empirically. As noted above (see section 3), I will 
distinguish between knowledge that is generated by other firms in a firm’s own 
industry (intra-industry), firms from other industries (inter-industry) and univer-
sities or other public research institutions (science).101 102 This distinction is not 
                                              
100 As will become clear shortly, I will not analyse all the actors in the so called “national innovation 
system” (Lundvall, 1988), but rather focus on firms and research institutes like universities. 
101 Note, this segmentation is not equivalent to weighting the knowledge generated by the technological 
distance between two firms. Employing the weighting assumes that per se the more distant two firms 
are the less knowledge flows between them. Separating intra-industry from inter-industry knowledge 
flows is more general, because I just have to assume that the level of spillover is affected differently 
by different moderating factors, like absorptive capacity. 
102 The distinction by sources could also be done by looking at academic versus industrial sources 
Adams (2004) or  suppliers, customers, competitors and research institutes separately (see Von Hip-
pel, 1988). 
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arbitrary, but rather well established in the literature (see also section 2.5.2). 
However, early empirical studies and most theoretical models have only investi-
gated intra-industry spillovers, as Bernstein (1988) and Steurs (1995) argue in 
their papers. Both authors see this as a drawback of existing studies and include 
inter-industry spillovers in their models. Bernstein, 1988 shows empirically that 
both intra- and inter-industry spillovers reduce average production costs in an 
industry and that inter-industry spillovers do so more than inter-industry spill-
overs. Steurs (1995) is able to show in his theoretical model, that inter-industry 
spillovers matter for firms output and profits. In contrast, Veugelers and Koen 
(1999) show in their empirical study that inter-industry spillovers do not signifi-
cantly increase industries’ output. There are some studies that do not use the 
terms intra-industry and inter-industry spillovers, but deal with the same topic. 
Griliches (1992) argues that the usefulness of external knowledge is higher for 
knowledge within the same 3-digit SIC industry, than for knowledge from out-
side of it. In that sense he is taking the opposite position than Bernstein (1988). 
Orlando (2004) uses a similar delimitation and shows that spillovers within the 
same industry are not very elastic with regard to inter-firm distance, while spill-
overs across industry boundaries are. Goto and Suzuki (1989) suggest that R&D 
activities of (in particular input supplying) industries affect productivity growth 
in other industries further down the supply chain. Nadiri (1993) summarizes the 
literature on technology flows with the conclusion that “substantial spillover ef-
fects among different industries [exist].”(Nadiri, 1993: 22). The spillover effects 
across industries need not be symmetric, Bernstein and Nadiri (1991) show that 
some industries’ knowledge spills over to more industries than other industries’ 
knowledge. 
The private sector is not the only one which generates knowledge, however. 
The public sector is also spending large amounts on R&D either by funding pri-
vate firms or by funding universities and public research institutes. Public R&D 
activities are different from those of firms in the private sector because one of the 
goals of public R&D is to generate spillovers that benefit the economy as a 
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whole, while firms seek to prevent spillovers through appropriability.103 Proba-
bly with that in mind Stiglitz (1999b) once said that “The objective of the gov-
ernment is not to pick winners, but to identify externality-generating innova-
tions.” (Stiglitz, 1999b: 22). Hanusch and Cantner (1993) also make the case that 
governments should support the generation of external effects and not try to limit 
them.104 Becker et al. (2002) argue that public R&D funding of “socially valu-
able projects” (Becker et al., 2002: 11), i.e. projects with large externalities or 
spillovers, is in the interest of the general public. The BMBF (2004) acknowl-
edges that scientific knowledge is a public good and the government’s role in 
providing funding for the generation of new scientific knowledge. Drejer and 
Jorgensen (2005) see spillovers arising from universities through the training of 
students that leave the university and go on working in the private sector, which 
occurs naturally. 
Other studies have shown that the generation of spillovers is taken as a given in 
public R&D activities: Cohen et al. (1998) writes that academe’s commitment is 
to “both basic research as well as […] free disclosure […].” (Cohen et al., 1998: 
171-172) and that “the norm of open science [is] valued by researchers as an end 
in itself.” (Cohen et al., 1998: 191). Monjon and Waelbroeck (2003) argue that it 
is valid to assume that spillovers from universities to firms are substantial, be-
cause “universities pride themselves on having a culture of open ‘science’.” 
(Monjon and Waelbroeck, 2003: 1257). There is also empirical evidence that 
public R&D does lead to spillovers (Cameron, 1996). A quite impressive case for 
substantial benefits and spillovers from academia to industries is provided by 
Mansfield, 1998. He finds that a considerable a,mount of innovations of 77 major 
firms could not have been developed without knowledge from academic re-
search. 
                                              
103 For a discussion and literature review of the different incentive for firms and scientist, see 
Cohen et al. (1998). 
104 This policy is however not specific for public R&D. In general, appropriability possibilities and the 
diffusion of knowledge have to be balanced. 
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Spillovers from public R&D are not only different from private knowledge 
spillovers, because they stem from differently motivated actors, they are also dif-
ferent in other ways. Becker and Peters, 2000 and Nelson and Wolff, 1997 for 
example have shown that scientific knowledge requires different absorptive ca-
pacities.  
To summarize, the review shows clearly that different types of knowledge 
spillovers exist and suggests from my point of view that it is worth to distinguish 
between spillovers from private R&D in a firm’s own industry, private R&D in 
other industries and public R&D. 
6.3 From Industry-Level Potential Outgoing Spillovers to Firm-Specific 
Realized Incoming Spillovers – Analytical Framework 
To summarize the literature on knowledge pools and stocks, it’s clear from the 
previous discussion that not all knowledge generated in an industry or scientific 
institution is available to everyone within that industry or outside the industry. 
What is more, technological or geographical distance as well as absorptive capac-
ity further decreases the usability of externally available knowledge for a given 
individual. 
Accordingly, my empirical analysis of knowledge spillovers will proceed as 
follows: The stock of generated knowledge or the potential outgoing spillover 
pool (Spot) constructed in chapter 5 will be used to estimate the total stock of 
knowledge available to firms in an industry (potential incoming spillover pool). 
To arrive at the latter measure I will employ information on the use of protection 
methods (patents and secrecy) to reduce the stock of knowledge generated in an 
industry to the part that is not protected and thus potentially (not costless!) avail-
able to all actors in the economy (section 6.4).  
The main goal in this chapter of the study is to arrive at the pool of external 
knowledge that is actually used by a given firm (realized incoming spillover 
pool). To calculate that pool, I reduce the pool of available knowledge in an in-
dustry by the firm’s own knowledge pool, since a firm obviously does not have 
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to absorb its own knowledge. Employing this method will generate a different 
potential intra-industry incoming knowledge pool for each firm.  
Instead of a weighting function representing the distance between two potential 
partners I use the level of absorptive capacity of a firm to asses how much of the 
potential incoming knowledge spillover pool is actually used by a given firm. In 
my opinion, this is not a drawback but rather an advantage. The levels of absorp-
tive capacity for intra-industry knowledge, inter-industry knowledge and scien-
tific knowledge should capture some part of the technological distance effect and 
at the same time go beyond technological distance. To give an example: Firms 
with high absorptive capacity for inter-industry knowledge are either technologi-
cal close to industries other than their own or have invested in building up ca-
pacities that allow them to bridge larger technological distances. 105 This is not 
true for geographical distance, however. The inclusion of the geographical dis-
tance between firms and industries in my study is not possible, since I do not 
have information on the location of the R&D performers in each industry.106 
To summarize, the level of absorptive capacity of a firm for knowledge from its 
own industry, other industries, and science will be estimated and used as a medi-
ating factor between the potential incoming knowledge pool and the realized in-
coming knowledge spillover pools. By using the characteristics of a firm to 
weight the knowledge stock generated and publicly available in each industry, I 
will be able to construct the incoming spillover pools at the firm level. 
A graphical representation of this empirical framework is presented below. 
                                              
105 The use of absorptive capacity instead of technological distance might also control for a problem 
raised by Cincera et al. (2003), i.e. that technological distance does not allow for asymmetric knowl-
edge spillovers between industries and firms, respectively. In our setting two firms which are techno-
logically close could have different levels of spillovers if they have different levels of absorptive ca-
pacity. 
106 Kaiser (2002b) uses data on the location of the firms participating in the Mannheim Innovation panel 
to construct a measure of the distance between two firms. This could also be done in our case. How-
ever, I am not able to assign the total R&D done in an industry to the firms in the sample, since not 
all firms in an industry returned the innovation survey. 
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Figure 6-1 From Potential to Realized Incoming Spillover Pools 
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Source: Own illustration. 
6.4 The Effects of Patents and Secrecy on Knowledge Spillovers107 
The amount of knowledge available in an economy is becoming an important 
factor for innovation and growth. It depends on the amount of knowledge gener-
ated and the amount of knowledge appropriated by the producers of new knowl-
edge. In this section I will focus on the latter aspect and investigate the impact of 
the importance of two different appropriability methods in an industry on the in-
novation activities of firms in that industry. To be more precise, I will analyse the 
effect of the usage of patent protection and secrecy in an industry on knowledge 
spillovers. Since spillover effects cannot be directly observed, I will lock at the 
results of these spillovers which can partially be observed, by analysing the inno-
vation activities of firms (potentially) using external knowledge. I argue that the 
usage of patents and secrecy should affect the level of spillovers and thus de-
                                              
107 This section is largely based on Schmidt (2006). 
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crease or increase (depending on the method used) the importance of a lack of 
information as a hampering factor for firms using technological innovation proc-
esses in a particular industry. 
The difference between secrecy and patents has been analysed to a great extend 
in previous studies (see next subsection). However, few attempts have been made 
to empirically assess their effect on knowledge spillovers. While secrecy, as the 
word implies, reduces spillovers through non-disclosure, the effects of patents is 
less clear. Patents can generate knowledge spillovers through the disclosure re-
quirements laid down in patent laws, but at the same time limit knowledge spill-
overs by allowing firms developing new knowledge to use it exclusively for a 
given period of time. 
The difference between formal and strategic protection methods with respect to 
knowledge spillovers is interesting from a policy point of view. If both groups of 
protection methods influence the importance of the lack of technological infor-
mation as an obstacle to innovation with the same order of magnitude and direc-
tion, this would be an indication that the patent system does not have the desired 
effect of disclosing valuable and usable knowledge or at least that the firms re-
quiring external knowledge for their innovation activities, cannot get access to 
the relevant knowledge flows.108 
In the next subsection I will review the relevant literature on the effect of dif-
ferent legal and strategic protection methods on knowledge flows. Particular at-
tention is given to mechanisms that are able to explain the gap between the de-
sired effect of protection and the actual effect of protection. To be more precise, I 
will shed some light on the question why patent protection methods may fail in 
disclosing useful knowledge and why strategic protection methods like secrecy 
will not be perfectly efficient in reducing the outflow of knowledge. 
                                              
108 Note, the lack of information on technology might also be a hampering factor for the innovation 
activities of firms, because they lack the absorptive capacity to access and use relevant knowledge. In 
the empirical part, I will try to take this into account. 
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6.4.1 Legal versus Strategic Protection Methods as a Mean to Reduce 
Knowledge Spillovers – A Review of Related Literature 
Because “rents derive from idiosyncratic knowledge” (Liebeskind, 1997: 623), 
securing the returns and rents from innovation activities is one of the main con-
cerns of firms developing new products and processes. Moreover, it is in the pub-
lic interest to make sure that at least some part of the rents can be appropriated by 
the firm that developed an invention or innovation, in order to set incentives for 
private R&D and innovation activities. Put differently, firms would not have an 
incentive to invest in the development of new knowledge if all the benefits would 
spill over to their competitors. The well known free rider problem arises because 
“[…] knowledge is inherently a public good” (Jaffe, 1986: 984; Liebeskind, 
1997: 624; Peters, 2003), i.e. it is non-rival in consumption and (partially) non-
excludable109 (Hanusch and Cantner, 1993; Stiglitz, 1999a). Because of the latter 
feature of knowledge, firms can profit from the inventions of others, either in the 
form of rent spillovers or knowledge spillovers (Griliches, 1979b). However, not 
all knowledge is available to everyone in an economy for free. There are some 
factors that hinder the flow of knowledge, e.g. firms might have to invest in R&D 
in order to develop the capacity to understand and be able to utilize the knowl-
edge generated by others (“absorptive capacity”), as shown by Cohen and Levin-
thal, 1989; 1990. Another factor is the technological and geographical distance 
between the firm that produces the knowledge and the firm that wants to use 
it.110 
While the absorptive capacity and the distance between two firms reduces the 
amount of knowledge spilling over because of the set-up of the receiving firm, 
                                              
109 Arrow, 1962b wrote on this issue “No amount of legal protection can make a thoroughly appropri-
able commodity of something as intangible as information. The very use of the information in any 
productive way is bound to reveal it, at least in part. […] Legally imposed property rights can pro-
vide only a partial barrier, since there are obviously enormous difficulties in defining in any sharp 
way an item of information and differentiating it from similar sounding items.” (Arrow, 1962b: 615).  
110 An overview of factors moderating the flow of knowledge can be found in Section 6.1. 
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the firm generating the knowledge can also reduce the flow of knowledge by em-
ploying certain protection methods. These protection methods for new knowl-
edge can be placed into two large groups: legal protection methods (such as pat-
ents, copyrights and trademarks) and methods that rely on secrecy, complexity of 
design and fast- or first-mover advantages (hence forth called “strategic protec-
tion methods”).111 The two famous reports on the Yale survey 
(Levin et al., 1987) and Carnegie Mellon survey (Cohen et al., 2000) have shown 
that firms use both methods to protect their intellectual property and their knowl-
edge. These and other studies (e.g. Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Harabi, 1995) also 
revealed that the importance firms give to legal and strategic mechanisms varies 
by industry and the type of innovation to be protected. Sometimes an invention is 
even protected by more than one type of appropriability measure (e.g. Cohen and 
Walsh, 2000 or Arora, 1997 for an example from the chemical industry). Other 
factors that influence the choice of the appropriability mechanism and the impor-
tance assigned to one or the other mechanism have been put forward: Anton and 
Yao (2004) theoretical model shows that the “size” of innovations in terms of 
cost differentials and pre- and post-innovation market shares plays a role for the 
choice of appropriability strategy. Arundel (2001) analysis of data from the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS I) reveals that firm size reduces the relative 
importance of secrecy compared to patents while co-operation in R&D increases 
the importance of patents relative to secrecy. König and Licht (1995) find that the 
amount spent on R&D and the size of a firm positively influence the number of 
patent applications. Laursen and Salter (2005) and Liebeskind (1997) argue that 
the type of knowledge influences the choice of protection methods. 
My focus in this section is, however, not on the mechanisms that lead firms to 
use one or the other method or to assign different importance to different meas-
ures, but on how the use of different protection methods affects knowledge spill-
overs. While knowledge disclosure and dissemination is at the core of the legal 
                                              
111 See e.g. Harabi (1995), Cohen and Walsh (2000), Laursen and Salter (2005) 
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protection system, strategic protection methods are mostly targeted at preventing 
knowledge spillovers. 
The rationale behind setting up a legal protection system is to grant an invent-
ing firm the right to use their new knowledge exclusively for a given time (Levin 
et al., 1987) and thus setting incentives for private investment in innovation ac-
tivities112, while at the same time making the new knowledge available to outsid-
ers by requirements to disclose knowledge (see e.g. Gallini, 2002; Markiewicz, 
2003). In principle, the patent system is designed to exclude others from using 
the new invention and particularly the knowledge associated with it, while allow-
ing them to access the new knowledge and learn from it. Legal protection meth-
ods provide protection for knowledge that is enforceable in court, but knowledge 
physically spills over through the text of the patent. As a result firms might see 
the knowledge published in the patent application as protected (“useless”) 
knowledge rather than a knowledge spillover. However, the disclosure of (pro-
tected) knowledge can also be a source for new ideas for new products or proc-
esses and provide information about the developments of competitors and conse-
quently knowledge spillovers beyond those protected by law. If the protection 
effect outweighs the disclosure effect, legal protection actually reduces knowl-
edge spillovers rather than fostering them.113 This has been argued to be the case 
by several empirical studies using the importance of legal protection measures as 
an inverse measure of outgoing spillovers, thus implying that legal protection 
methods limit outgoing spillovers rather than inducing them (see Bönte and Keil-
bach, 2005; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Belderbos et al., 2004).  
                                              
112 Arrow (1962b) already noted that the appropriability conditions play an important role for the inno-
vation activities of firms. 
113 The protection effect can only outweigh the disclosure effect if knowledge spillovers are defined as 
the disclosure of freely usable knowledge. If they are defined as the disclosure of knowledge in gen-
eral, patent protection is always increasing knowledge spillovers. I would argue that firms at the re-
ceiving end of the knowledge transfer are likely to favour the first definition. Similarly 
De Bondt (1996) writes “ spillovers only refer to the useful part of the information that has been ex-
changed.” (De Bondt, 1996: 4) 
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The requirements to disclose (novel) knowledge when using legal protection 
methods is usually seen as a disincentive for adopting a strategy that is based on 
legal protection (Laursen and Salter, 2005; Levin et al., 1987; Arora et al., 2005; 
Arundel and Kabla, 1998; Hussinger, 2006). The reason for this may be that the 
patent system fails to exclude others from using the disclosed knowledge. The 
famous Mansfield et al. (1981) study shows that 60% of all patented innovations 
in their sample were imitated within 4 years.  
Then again, Bessen (2005) cites some studies that shows that firms do not as-
sign much value to the information disclosed in patents, raising doubts that sig-
nificant knowledge spillovers arise from patents. In an early work on the topic 
Malchup and Penrose (1950) write that “only unconsealable inventions are pat-
ented” (Malchup and Penrose, 1950: 27), indirectly saying that the knowledge 
disclosed in patent applications would also have spilled out through different 
channels. Cohen et al. (2002) stress that the information disclosed in patents is 
not very valuable because of the lag between publication of the patent and appli-
cation for the patent. By the time the patent is published the disclosed knowledge 
has usually become outdated. Before the patent is in force, the knowledge is 
rather secret.114  
Strategic protection methods are used by firms without any legal basis and con-
sequently without any requirements to disclose knowledge. Because of that, 
“firms that do not wish to disclose information can forgo patenting and use se-
crecy to protect their investment in innovation” (Arundel, 2001: 612). The effect 
of strategic protection methods on knowledge flows has been mostly analysed 
with respect to secrecy. Secrecy is - as the word already implies - the non-
disclosure of knowledge. Atallah (2004) theoretical model is an example that 
uses this feature of secrecy. In his model the use of secrecy increases the cost of 
rivals by limiting knowledge spillovers. Empirical models analysing the co-
operation decision of firms also assume that strategic protection methods limit 
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outgoing knowledge spillovers (e.g. Belderbos et al., 2004; Cassiman and Veuge-
lers, 2002; Bönte and Keilbach, 2005; Schmidt, 2005b). Strategic protection 
methods other than secrecy, however, do not (exclusively) rely on keeping 
knowledge secret, but on being first with the introduction of a novel product or 
process, reaping first mover benefits or by designing an innovation in a complex 
way that hinders competitors to reengineer them. These help to appropriate the 
returns of an innovation (Levin et al., 1987), but discloses knowledge.115  
The view that secrecy decreases knowledge spillovers has been challenged by a 
number of authors. Liebeskind (1997) shows, that keeping inventions and knowl-
edge secret is very hard and costly. Levin et al. (1987) see a problem for keeping 
product related knowledge secret, because the product has to be advertised and 
put into the hands of the customers (and thus potentially also in the hands of their 
competitors) in order to earn money with it. By putting the product on the mar-
ket, the knowledge embodied is disclosed and cannot be kept secret any 
longer.116 Kultti et al. (2002) state that there will always be some spillovers, even 
if firms try to keep innovations secret. Their view is indirectly supported by stud-
ies that assume that methods to protect inventions and to prohibit knowledge 
flows are never perfect.  
Secrecy might also be an imperfect method to appropriate knowledge if the 
knowledge itself is of a specific kind. Cohen and Walsh (2000) for example ar-
gue that more generic knowledge makes secrecy “less effective as an appropri-
ability strategy” (Cohen and Walsh, 2000: 10). 
                                                                                                                                    
114 Note, this was a peculiarity of the US patent system until 2001, the European Patent Office publishes 
the patent application a short time after it was received. 
115 Some doubts remain whether first-mover advantages are beneficial, because smart followers might 
imitate the original innovation quite fast. This can of course only be done because knowledge be-
comes available outside the firms boundaries if a protection method based on lead-time advantages is 
chosen (see Sofka and Schmidt, 2004 for an overview of first-mover advantages and disadvantages). 
116 One has to distinguish between invention and innovation here. An invention might very well be kept 
secret until it becomes an innovation, i.e. is introduced into the market (see Arundel, 2001: 613). 
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Hypotheses 
The hypothesis I derive form the review of the literature in this subsection are 
the following: 
H1: Patent protection is used to prevent knowledge spillovers. Thus, an in-
crease in the usage of patent protection methods in an industry does increase the 
perceived importance of the lack of technological knowledge as a hampering fac-
tor for innovation117. 
H2: Protection by secrecy does moderate knowledge spillovers. Thus, an in-
crease in the usage of secrecy in an industry does increase the perceived impor-
tance of the lack of technological knowledge as a hampering factor for innova-
tion. 
As far as hypothesis 1 is concerned, it is not unlikely that the protection effect 
of patents might outweigh the disclosure effect since the firm developing an in-
novation will usually try to reduce the spillovers to others in order to increase 
their rent, even if they choose patents instead of strategic protection. 
6.4.2 Estimation of the Effects of Patents and Secrecy on Knowledge 
Spillovers 
My focus in this section is to assess the impact of the usage of different protec-
tion methods in a particular industry on the perceived importance of a lack of 
information on technologies for innovation activities of firms in that industry. 
Two basic assumptions guide my approach: First, the importance of a lack of 
technological knowledge is higher (lower) if knowledge spillovers are lower 
(higher). Second, the level of knowledge spillovers is determined by the protec-
tion method used, i.e. patents or secrecy. 
                                              
117 The importance of a lack of technological knowledge as a hampering factor for innovation activities 
will be used in the empirical model of this subsection as our measure of spillovers or rather the lack 
of spillovers. For this reason it is included in the hypothesis.  
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The following figure summarizes the empirical model I have in mind. It repre-
sents the arguments from the literature that patents and secrecy differ with re-
spect to the disclosure requirements, i.e. that patents have both a disclosure and 
an appropriability effect while secrecy only has an appropriability effect. I also 
include the demand for knowledge in the analytical model. It is certainly a factor 
that influences the importance firms assign to knowledge spillovers. Firms that 
need a lot of knowledge, because of their size, technology or specific innovation 
and R&D activities will be more likely to run into problems with acquiring 
knowledge for their innovation processes118. 
                                              
118 For some empirical evidence on this issue see the study by Rammer et al. (2005b) on SMEs. 
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Figure 6-2 Expected Effects of Different Types of Protection Methods on 
Knowledge Spillovers 
Source: Own illustration. 
The set-up chosen poses some measurement issues: The first one concerns the 
measure of knowledge spillovers a firm receives: By looking at obstacles to the 
innovation activities of firms relying on external knowledge (at the receiving end 
of the knowledge spillover) I am not able to measure a lack of “actual” spill-
overs, but rather a lack of “perceived” spillovers. These two types of spillovers 
are likely to be very different. While the former is a measure of the amount of 
knowledge in an industry that is not generated or not available, the lack of per-
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ceived spillovers, is the amount of knowledge not apprehended (or deemed not 
accessible) by firms. In my opinion, the lack of perceived spillovers should be 
higher than the lack of actual spillovers. 
Since the knowledge spillovers I am interested in do not arise within a single 
firm, but between firms, 119 I will investigate the impact of the usage of protec-
tion methods by firms in an industry (excluding the firm in question) on the im-
portance of the lack of technological knowledge as hampering factor at a given 
firm. This is not without problems, as the importance of this obstacle to innova-
tion activities will not only be influenced by the use of protection methods but 
also by certain firm characteristics that are related to the demand for knowledge, 
the ability to generate knowledge in-house and the firms ability to access external 
knowledge. The latter is usually referred to as “absorptive capacity” (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989; 1990; Daghfous, 2004; Zahra and George, 2002). I will include 
variables for these three concepts in my estimation model, but cannot control for 
these aspects in full. In particular the demand for knowledge is hard to measure 
and can thus only be approximated. 
A third issue is that the appropriability and disclosure effect of patents do not 
coincide in time for a single patent. The appropriability effects sets in when the 
application is filed (“first to file” rule in European patent law) and the disclosure 
effect when the application is published (1.5 years after filing). Since I do not 
analyse single patents but the overall effect of the importance of patents on 
knowledge spillovers, this problem is partially mitigated for my study. What is 
more, I am interested in the overall effect of the usage of patents in an industry 
during a three year period and not on the effect of a single patent. 
                                              
119 This is probably one reason, why according to Laursen and Salter (2005) most studies in this field 
have been conducted on the industry level. 
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Data and Estimation Strategy 
In this subsection I use firm-level data from the fourth Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS IV), which was carried out in 2005 and examined innovation activi-
ties during the period 2002 - 2004. In Germany, the CIS IV survey was con-
ducted by the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) and Frauenhofer 
Institute for System- und Innovationresearch (Fh-ISI) on behalf of the German 
Federal Ministry of Education and Research (bmbf). It is part of a larger effort to 
gather data on the innovation behaviour of German firms in industry and services 
through annual innovation surveys called the Mannheim Innovation Panel 
(MIP).120 Even though the survey is conducted annually in Germany and set-up 
as a panel, I only analyze cross-sectional data, mainly because the questions 
needed to construct my variables are not included every year. Most other studies 
using the innovation survey121 only use firms with innovation activities. For my 
study, however, the data needed is available for almost all firms in the sample, 
i.e. I analyze about 3,900 firms from industry and services with 5 or more em-
ployees. 
The independent variable is representing the importance of the lack of informa-
tion on technology as a hampering factor for innovation (hemm_tech_info). It is 
directly derived from a question on the hampering factors firms experienced in 
their innovation activities during the period 2002-2004. In this question firms 
were asked to rate the importance of 14 different hampering factors on a 4 point-
likert scale ranging from 0 (not relevant) to 3 (very important). Because of this 
natural ordering of the responses to this question, I use the ordered probit proce-
dure, which will be described in more detail below, for estimating my empirical 
model. It is noteworthy, that the question does not ask specifically for a lack of 
external information on technology. Assuming that firms which lack technologi-
                                              
120 For a more detailed description of the MIP survey see chapter 4. 
121A list of studies conducted with the Mannheim Innovation Panel can be found at 
http://www.zew.de/de/publikationen/innovationserhebungen/wissaufsaetze.php3. 
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cal information internally would either invest in overcoming that lack or try to 
fill the void by looking for information beyond their own boundaries, I argue that 
the question mainly captures the external lack of information. I also argue that if 
they cannot invest in overcoming the lack of technological knowledge them-
selves, they would rather see the lack of finance as a hampering factor, which 
was also listed in that question, than the lack of information. 
The four key explanatory variables - representing the importance of patent pro-
tection and protection by secrecy in an industry122 - were constructed using a 
question on the importance of patents, registration of design patterns, industrial 
designs, trademarks, copyrights, secrecy, complexity of design, and lead-time 
advantages on competitors:123  
Patent protection (pat_ind) is represented by the industry (NACE 2) average of 
the importance of patents for protecting innovations or inventions, rescaled be-
tween one (highly important) and zero (not important at all). The same measure 
is also included at the sector level (manufacturing vs. services) to control for in-
tra-industry spillover effects (pat_sector).124  
Protection by Secrecy (secr_ind) is constructed as the industry (NACE 2) mean 
of the importance of secrecy for protecting innovations or inventions, rescaled 
                                              
122 To reduce a possible endogeneity, I calculated these two measures for each firm separately, i.e. the 
industry average was calculated without the firm in question. It thus represents the average over all 
other firms in the industry. 
123 The question in the German questionnaire differs from the standard CIS IV question on intellectual 
property rights by not only asking for the usage of different methods, but for the importance of the 
measure. The question in the German questionnaire is: “During the period 2002-2004 did your enter-
prise use any of the following intellectual property protection methods? If so: Please indicate the im-
portance of these methods for protecting innovations and inventions of your enterprise.” Each method 
was rated on a 4 point likert-scale from 0 (not used) to 3 (highly important). 
124 The industry average is calculated for each firm individually by subtracting a firms own evaluation of 
patents or secrecy from the industry total and dividing this sum by the total number of firms in the in-
dustry minus one (see also footnote 123). Similarly, the sector average is calculated by subtracting 
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between one (highly important) and zero (not important at all). The same meas-
ure is also included at the sector level (manufacturing vs. services) to control for 
inter-industry spillover effects (secr_sector).125 
As it turns out the industry-level measures of the importance of patent protec-
tion and protection by secrecy are highly correlated (Spearman Correlation coef-
ficient: .88), not only at the industry level but also at the level of the individual 
firm, indicating that firms use both methods together, as already proposed by 
Cohen and Walsh (2000) and Arora (1997). Because of that, they cannot be in-
cluded in the same regression equation. In order to be able to investigate differ-
ences between the effect of patent protection methods and secrecy with respect to 
knowledge spillovers nonetheless, I calculated the relative importance of patents 
and secrecy in an industry as the share of enterprises that indicated that secrecy is 
more important than patents (rel_secr_ind) and the share of enterprises that indi-
cated that patents are more important than secrecy protection (rel_pat_ind)126. At 
the firm level 19% of all enterprises indicated that secrecy is more important than 
patent protection, 67% assigned equal importance and 14% rated patents as more 
important. 
In addition to these core variables a number of control variables were added at 
the right hand-side of the model. These variables are meant to control for charac-
teristics and capabilities of a given firm that are assumed to influence its ability 
to use external sources of knowledge and could thus increase the likelihood that a 
firm perceives the lack of information on technologies as an obstacle to innova-
tion. To give an example, if a firm has little absorptive capacities, it is usually not 
able to access and use the knowledge available outside its boundaries, not be-
                                                                                                                                    
the industry evaluation (without the firm) form the total in the sector and dividing this sum by the 
number of firms in all industries but the firms.  
125 See footnote 124. 
126 In order to control for inter-industry effects the equation used to estimate that model also contains a 
variable for the importance of patent protection and secrecy in the sector (manufacturing or services) 
of the firm (prot_sector). 
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cause knowledge is not there or because it is protected by appropriability mecha-
nisms, but simply because it is unable to understand, assimilate or use it. 
Four variables are included to represent the absorptive capacity of a firm (see 
Daghfous, 2004; Schmidt, 2005a for reviews on the determinants of absorptive 
capacity). The R&D intensity (R&D_int), calculated as the share of R&D spend-
ing of turnover, and the squared R&D intensity to allow for a non-linear effect 
(R&D_int2), a dummy indicating that the firm undertakes R&D continuously 
(R&D_con)127, and the share of employees with higher education degrees of total 
employees (grads). The R&D related measures also represent firms’ ability to 
generate knowledge in-house through own R&D and their demand for knowl-
edge, if one assumes that the more R&D a firm does the more knowledge it 
needs. 
The demand for knowledge is also represented by the innovativeness of the 
firm. In a study on hampering factors for small and medium sized enterprises 
(SME) Rammer et al. (2005b) report that in 2002 the share of SMEs reporting 
obstacles to innovation is higher for firms which are more deeply involved in 
innovation activities. The authors argue that intensively innovating firms are 
more likely to report the existence of obstacles than less innovative firms because 
their projects are more complex and they undertake more projects at the same 
time, which can also be interpreted as a higher demand for knowledge. To con-
trol for this I include two dummy variables, one indicating whether the firm has 
introduced a product innovation that was new to its market (mneu) and one indi-
cating whether the firm has introduced a process innovation (pz) between 2002 
and 2004. 
As an additional control for the effect that some firms might in general have a 
higher probability to be (subjectively) more hampered by obstacles to their inno-
vation activities than others my models include a dummy variable that takes the 
                                              
127 The R&D intensity and the variable continuous R&D is constructed using a question that was only 
asked for firms which did report innovation activities. For firms without any innovation activities I 
set these variables to zero. 
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value one if the firm indicates that at least one of the 13 other obstacles to inno-
vation was at least of medium importance (bed_hemm). 
The analysis of the data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel has revealed that 
East and West German firms still differ considerable with respect to their innova-
tion activities (see e.g. Rammer et al., 2005a; Sofka and Schmidt, 2004). A 
dummy variable, which takes the value one if the firm is from the Neue Länder is 
thus also included in my model (east). In addition to that, two variables for the 
size of the firm were included, the log of the number of employees (lnempl) and 
a squared term (lnempl2). 
To ensure that the two industry-level variables for the protection methods do 
not just pick up any industry specific effects, I included three industry group 
dummies for medium-low-tech manufacturing (NACE 23; 25-28; 351) high-tech 
manufacturing (NACE 244, 30, 32, 33, 353), and high-tech services (NACE 64, 
72, 73), with other manufacturing and services (NACE 10-29 (exc. 244) , 31, 34, 
35-37 (excl. 353), 40+41, 45, 50-52, 55, 60-63, 65-67, 70, 71, 74, 75, 90, 92) be-
ing the reference group.128 
The average firm in my sample has about 710 employees. Over 20% of the em-
ployees of these firms are highly educated. More than 30% of the firms do R&D 
continuously and spend on average 3% of their turnover on R&D activities. 24% 
have introduced product innovations that were new to their market between 2002 
and 2004, and 42% introduced process innovations. Almost half of the firms 
have experienced the lack of technological information as a hampering factor for 
their innovation activities, 38% said it was only somewhat important, about 10% 
it was an important hampering factor, and around 1% indicated it was very im-
portant. 32% of all my enterprises are from East Germany. The share of high-
                                              
128 The inclusion of more detailed industry dummies would certainly have benefited our analysis, but 
most other industry dummies I tried to include were correlated with other right hand side variables I 
wanted to keep. Most notably was the correlation between the industry dummies and the variable for 
continuous R&D. 
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tech manufacturing firms in the sample is 9% and the share of high-tech services 
is 7%.129 
Since the responses to my dependent variable are in natural order from 0 to 3, I 
will use an ordered probit estimation procedure, which outperforms other models 
(e.g. multinominal probit and simple OLS) in this case (Greene, 2003, Kennedy, 
1998). The model is similar to the regular binominal model in the sense that the 
observed variable is assumed to be related to an underlying continuous measure 
that is unobservable. Because this latent variable can take more than two values 
(as is the case in the probit model) several parameters or boundary values have to 
be estimated using a maximum likelihood procedure. 
The formal model in my case looks like this: 
 
* 'y Xβ ε= +   
 
where y* is the unobserved variable and X is the vector of all the independent 
variables described above. The boundary parameters (μ) for a change in the de-
pendent variable hemm_tech_info can then be estimated according to the follow-
ing formula: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
129 A table with additional descriptive statistics can be found in the appendix on page 208. 
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6.4.3 Results of the Empirical Model 
The results from the ordered probit regressions indicate that both patent protec-
tion and protection through secrecy increase the perceived lack of information on 
technology as a hampering factor for innovation activities significantly.130 How-
ever, only the industry-level variables are significant. This indicates that the use 
of protection methods by other firms from a firm’s own industry hampers its in-
novation activities more than the use of protection methods by firms in other in-
dustries. Consequently, hypothesis 1 and 2 can only be confirmed for the indus-
try-level of protection. Furthermore, the estimations suggest, that the appropri-
ability effect of patents outweighs the disclosure effect in an industry. If this 
were not the case, the coefficient on patent protection should have been either 
negative or not significant, as is the case for the importance of patent protection 
in all industries in a firm’s sector beside its own. Since both coefficients for the 
industry-level measure, that for patent protection and that for secrecy are positive 
and significant there is evidence that they both reduce knowledge spillovers, i.e. 
the amount of valuable and usable knowledge available to others in an industry. 
Both mechanisms can be seen as a way to hinder the innovation activities of 
competitors and other firms in the same industry and appropriate the returns from 
inventions and innovations through limiting the availability of useful knowledge 
outside ones own boundaries. Due to the high correlation between the secrecy 
and patent variable they cannot be included separately in a single equation. In 
order to test whether the effect of patents is significantly different from secrecy, I 
estimate the effect of the share of firms in an industry indicating that patents are 
more important than secrecy and the share of firms indicating the opposite is true 
on my dependent variable. The results in the last column (3) of Table 6-1 show 
                                              
130 To test the robustness of the results, I ran the same regressions with slightly modified measures for 
patent protection and secrecy. I used two dummies indicating if the respective appropriability mecha-
nisms were at least of medium importance. In both cases the results did not change. 
 128 
that both variables are not significant, providing further evidence that both pro-
tection methods influence the innovation activities of firms similarly.131 
The insignificance of the sector-level variables is surprising. One interpretation 
of this result is that firms’ innovation activities rely more on knowledge from a 
firms own industry and less on knowledge from other industries. Then again, 
some empirical studies have found intra-industry spillovers of particular rele-
vance for firms’ innovation behavior and performance (e.g. Inkmann, 2000; 
Steurs, 1995). An alternative explanation is more technical, maybe my measure 
of protection at the sector level is too broadly defined and should rather than in-
clude all industries outside a firms own industry only include industries with 
which the firm is closely related, e.g. through input-output relations or similar 
technologies. A third explanation is that firms protect knowledge that is relevant 
for the innovation activities of a firm in the same industry only, but not for firms 
in other industries. If this were the case patents and secrecy would reduce knowl-
edge flows between firms, but would only have a constraining effect on the inno-
vation activities of firms within an industry and not across industry boundaries. 
This is the most likely explanation since I know from the significance of the im-
portance of protection methods in a firm’s own industry that some fraction of the 
knowledge a firm produces is protected. 
 
                                              
131 Joint significance of the two variables could also be rejected. 
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Table 6-1 Regression Results of Ordered Probit Estimations (Dependent Vari-
able: Importance of Lack of Information on Technologies as an 
Obstacle to Innovation) 
 Variables Patents (1) 
Secrecy 
(2) 
Patents + 
Secrecy (3) 
Importance of _____ protection (industry level) 0.261** 0.349**  
  (0.149) (0.176)  
Importance of _____ protection (sector level) 0.134 0.208  
  (0.236) (0.396)  
Share of firms indicating that patents > secrecy (industry level)   0.289 
    (0.496) 
Share of firms indicating that secrecy > patents (industry level)   0.706 
    (0.434) 
Importance of protection by secrecy + patents (sector level)   0.177 
    (0.298) 
Share of employees with higher education degree in % -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D intensity 0.174 0.176 0.245 
  (0.268) (0.266) (0.266) 
R&D intensity, squared -0.069 -0.068 -0.084 
  (0.105) (0.104) (0.106) 
Continuous in-house R&D -0.096* -0.099* -0.090* 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
Importance of other hampering factors 3.186*** 3.184*** 3.184*** 
  (0.315) (0.315) (0.315) 
Market novelty (dummy) 0.004 0.003 0.006 
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Process Innovation (dummy) 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.110*** 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Number of employees, log 0.055 0.054 0.053 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Number of employees, log, squared -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
East Germany (dummy) -0.159*** -0.156*** -0.155*** 
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Industry Groups (dummy) YES YES YES 
Observations 3,403 3,403 3,403 
Loglikelihood -3019.98 -3019.64 -3020.05 
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses 
Source: Own Calculations. 
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My control variables offer some interesting insights as well. Only one of the 
proxies for absorptive capacity is highly significant and has the expected sign. 
The more absorptive capacity a firms has in the form of highly educated employ-
ees the less likely it is that this firm perceives the lack of information on tech-
nologies as an obstacle to innovation, i.e. the more likely it is to receive knowl-
edge spillovers. The negative and slightly significant coefficient of the continu-
ous in-house R&D activities provides further evidence that higher absorptive ca-
pacity increases the ability to access knowledge and thus mitigates the problem 
of a lack of information on technology. 
The lack of significance for the R&D intensity variables can be explained by 
differing effects of R&D on absorptive capacity and the demand for knowledge. 
R&D is not only conducted in order to build absorptive capacities, which would 
decrease the importance of the obstacle, but also to generate innovations. If firms 
invest heavily in the development of innovations, their knowledge requirements 
are higher if they invest only a small fraction of their turnover in R&D. At the 
same time their own research generates ideas and opens their mind to technologi-
cal opportunities, for which additional knowledge is required. These new projects 
are likely to be more of an explorative nature, which require more complex and 
not readily available knowledge than exploitive projects. As a result of the higher 
knowledge requirements the likelihood that these firms run into the problem of a 
lack of technological innovation is higher as well. To summarize this point, firms 
with a larger share of R&D expenditure per turnover, see a whole range of tech-
nological opportunities and thus perceive the lack of information to be more 
relevant than firms which have a low share and as a result a more narrow field of 
view with respect to technological opportunities. These “perception” effects 
clearly works in the opposite direction as the effects of absorptive capacity on 
knowledge spillovers discussed in the previous sections and as my results for 
R&D activities suggest, cancel each other out (partially). For continuous R&D 
activities the same arguments can be brought forward. My estimation results 
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suggest, however, that for continuous R&D activities the effect on absorptive 
capacity is stronger than the perception effect. 
The variable for other obstacles is highly significant, indicating that the obsta-
cles to innovation are highly related to each other. I think that the inclusion of 
this variable controls for this baseline effect. 
Process innovators are significantly more hampered in their innovation activi-
ties than non-innovators, while innovators with market novelties are not. This is 
surprising, since usually it is assumed that process innovations are based on in-
ternal knowledge and learning by doing while product innovations and in particu-
lar market novelties require more external knowledge. My results suggest the 
opposite, however 
Size matters for the perception of the importance of information on technolo-
gies as an obstacle to innovation, as expected. However, the relationship between 
size and the obstacle is not a linear one, but is inverse U-shaped. The turning 
point is at about 90 employees for equation one, 95 employees for equation two 
and 200 employees for equation three. For smaller firms it might be a less impor-
tant obstacle, because they just follow a small number of (innovation) projects at 
the same time (Rammer et al., 2005b) or focus on technologies where they have 
all the knowledge required to bring inventions to markets. They rather lack the 
marketing knowledge and financial means to introduce innovations. Large firms, 
on the opposite, have many projects going on at the same time and require lots of 
knowledge. They nonetheless assign less importance to the lack of information as 
medium sized firms. A reason for this might be that they have the capability, re-
sources and established channels to gather the external knowledge needed in their 
innovation processes and are thus not hindered as much in their innovation ac-
tivities as medium-sized firms. 
Finally, East German firms assign a lower importance to the lack of informa-
tion on technology, than West German firms. The difference is only marginally 
significant and only in two out of three equations, however. The difference might 
stem from the fact that East German firms are more likely to adopt a follower 
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strategy in their innovation activities (see Sofka and Schmidt, 2004). If they rely 
on a follower strategy the lack of information becomes less of a problem, because 
all the information required for imitating a new product or process has to be 
available before it can be imitated. Their strategy is more one of exploiting avail-
able knowledge instead of exploring new opportunities. As a result they adopt a 
more narrow innovation approach and decreases the amount of external knowl-
edge required. 
6.4.4 Conclusions and Implications for the Next Steps of the Analysis 
In this subsection I looked at the influence of the usage of patent protection and 
protection by secrecy in an industry on knowledge spillovers. Since knowledge 
spillovers cannot be measured directly I investigated the effects of protection on 
the lack of knowledge spillovers, i.e. technological knowledge. I treated the two 
appropriability mechanisms separately, because their basic set-up is quite differ-
ent, while patents have a build-in requirement to disclose knowledge and provide 
a legal basis for the protection of knowledge, secrecy relies on non-disclosure, 
but is not defendable in court. My findings indicate that both patents and secrecy 
decrease knowledge spillovers to other firms in an industry and consequently 
pose obstacles to their innovation activities. Because of that I am able to con-
clude, that the appropriability effect outweighs the disclosure effect of patents 
within an industry.  
As a consequence of this finding, I will weight the total amount of knowledge 
produced with the combined importance of patent protection and protection by 
secrecy at the industry level below, instead of using separate weights for the two 
different types of protection methods. A separation in the following analysis 
would have required to split-up the total R&D expenditure or rather the pool of 
potential outgoing spillovers into a part that is protected by secrecy and a part 
that is protected by patents which is not possible given the data I have. 
I do not find a significant effect of protection methods used in other industries 
on the lack of information on technologies a firm is faced with, which is a sur-
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prising result. I will follow the third explanation for this finding from above, 
which is that firms use protection methods to reduce knowledge flows between 
firms, but those restrictions only have a constraining effect on the innovation ac-
tivities of firms within an industry and not across industry boundaries. This indi-
cates that some fraction of the knowledge a firm produces is indeed protected. I 
will thus weight not only the intra-industry spillover pool, but also the inter-
industry-spillover pool with the importance of patents and secrecy. 
A caveat of this method is that I have not only have to assume that the influence 
of protection on knowledge flows is constant over time but also that the impor-
tance of patents and secrecy for protecting a firms innovation does not differ 
(significantly) over time. 
6.5 The Construction of the Potential Incoming Spillover Pools at the 
Industry-Level and the Realized Outgoing Spillover Pool at the 
Firm-Level 
In this section I will construct the potential incoming spillover pools at the in-
dustry level and the realized outgoing spillover pool at the firm level. The differ-
ence between the two concepts is that the realized outgoing spillover pool at the 
firm level is the knowledge stock of a firm weighted by the importance of patents 
and secrecy as indicated by the individual firms, while the potential incoming 
spillover pool at the industry level is constructed by weighting the knowledge 
stock of each industry, with the average importance of patents and secrecy at the 
industry level. The potential incoming spillovers at the industry level will be used 
in the next step of the analysis to construct the realized incoming spillover pools 
(see below and Figure 6-1) for knowledge from a firm’s own industry and from 
other industries, which equals the sum of the potential incoming spillovers of all 
other industries. Similar to the construction of the knowledge stocks above the 
average importance of patents and secrecy in each industry will be calculated 
without the answer of the firm in question and without the answer of the industry 
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of the firm in question, respectively, leading to different (industry-level) values 
for each firm. The scientific knowledge stock is not weighted by the importance 
of protection methods. I argue that knowledge generated in scientific institutions 
is intended for dissemination and is thus not protected (“Open Science” e.g. 
David, 2003; Cohen et al., 1998 ) or cannot be protected, because of its basic na-
ture. Nelson, 1959 writes on this topic “Although significant external economies 
are probably rare, they almost certainly exist […] in basic research” (Nelson, 
1959: 298). As a result of this assumption the potential incoming knowledge 
spillover pool for knowledge from scientific institutions is equal for all firms. It 
is estimate at 68737.657 billion Euro as mentioned above. 
The following formulas summarize the method used to construct the potential 
incoming knowledge spillover pools and the realized outgoing spillover pool: 
( * )potinter i i
i j
S K IPROT
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=∑      inter-industry spillovers 
( )( )*
1
industry firm
pot industry firm
intra stock stock
IPROT IPROTS K K
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*real firm firmout stockS K IPROT=      outgoing spillovers 
Ki   total knowledge stock in industry i 
industry
stockK   knowledge stock of the industry the firm in question is in 
firm
stockK   knowledge stock of the firm in question 
IPROTi  average importance of patents and secrecy in industry i 
industryIPROT  sum of the importance of patents and secrecy in the industry of the 
firm in question is in 
firmIPROT  sum of the importance of patents and secrecy of the firm in ques-
tion 
j   industry of the firm in question 
i  all other industries 
n   number of firms in the industry of the firm in question 
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As described in Chapter 5, Ki and industrystockK  are based on the ANBERD data for 
industries and the average length of the product-life cycle in each industry, while 
firm
stockK  is based on information on individual firms’ R&D expenditure from the 
Mannheim Innovation Panel. IPROTi and industryIPROT can be calculated for each 
industry based on answers of the 2005 Mannheim Innovation Panel survey. More 
problematic is the calculation of the measure firmIPROT  used in the equation for 
the realized outgoing spillover pools and intra-industry incoming spillover pools. 
This measure is only available for those firms that answered the respective ques-
tion in the 2001 Mannheim Innovation Panel. As a result, the sample for the con-
struction of the potential incoming intra-industry knowledge spillover pool and 
the realized outgoing spillover pools has to be reduced to those firms for which 
information on the importance of protection and secrecy is available in the 2001 
Mannheimer Innovations Panel. This reduced the sample to 2,804 observations.  
This does not mean, however, that the potential incoming spillovers at the in-
dustry level only comprises of the value of these 2,804 observations. Since the 
measure of the potential incoming knowledge spillover pool at the industry-level 
is calculated using the industry-level knowledge stock and the industry valuation 
of protection methods, it is still based on the expanded figures from the AN-
BERD database and the average product life-cycle for each industry. 
Using this method I estimate the average potential inter-industry incoming 
knowledge spillover stock at 100,371 billion Euro. This figured cannot be com-
pared directly to the total knowledge stock of all industries estimated above be-
cause it only includes industries other than the firm’s own, while the total knowl-
edge stock is the sum over all industries. As expected the potential inter-industry 
incoming spillover are lowest for the vehicles and automobile industry (NACE 
34, 35), the chemical industry (NACE 24), the electronics industry (NACE 32) 
and the mechanical engineering industry (NACE 29). These industries are very 
R&D intensive and are known to generate a lot of spillovers for other industries 
(see e.g. Rammer, 2003 for the chemical industry). For all other industries the 
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potential inter-industry incoming spillover pools are fairly equal and are valued 
between 100,000 and 104,000 billion Euros (see Table 6-2). 
Table 6-2 Estimate Potential Inter-Industry Knowledge Spillover Pools in 2002 
and the Average Importance of Patents and Secrecy in 2002-2004 
NACE 2 
Average Importance of Patents 
and Secrecy in 2002-2004 at the 
industry level 
Potential Inter-Industry 
Knowledge Spillover Pools 
in 2002 
15 0.106 103,125 
16 0.125 103,832 
17 0.128 103,386 
18 0.046 103,832 
19 0.077 103,934 
20 0.161 103,821 
21 0.134 103,609 
22 0.077 103,825 
23 0.313 103,722 
24 0.443 86,720 
25 0.295 101,727 
26 0.194 102,413 
27 0.221 102,800 
28 0.194 101,803 
29 0.386 93,770 
30 0.273 101,682 
31 0.358 100,574 
32 0.416 92,976 
33 0.429 99,861 
34 0.337 76,724 
35 0.363 95,357 
36 0.181 103,367 
37 0.077 103,930 
40 0.066 103,384 
45 0.084 103,461 
50 0.081 103,340 
60 0.036 101,419 
65 0.067 103,873 
72 0.228 101,738 
73 0.438 102,418 
74 0.123 102,080 
Source: Own Calculations. 
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Averages for the pools of potential intra-industry knowledge spillover at the in-
dustry level and realized outgoing spillovers at the firm level could also be calcu-
lated. I do not present them here, however, because they are only partially inter-
pretable, due to the fact that they are only available for the restricted sample and 
not for the whole economy as the potential inter-industry incoming knowledge 
spillover pool. Since the sample that will be used to estimate the empirical model 
on the relationship between R&D co-operation and knowledge spillover uses a 
sample that is further restricted to innovating firms and firms for which a meas-
ure of absorptive capacity can be generated (see below), they are not of interest 
here anyway. Descriptive statistics on the sample used for the final empirical 
model on the effect of realized knowledge spillovers on the likelihood of co-
operating on R&D and innovation will be presented in subsection 7.2.2 and the 
appendix. 
The realized outgoing knowledge spillover pool at the firm will be used directly 
in the estimation of the model on the determinants of R&D co-operation (see 
subsection 7.2.2). For the potential intra-industry, inter-industry and scientific 
knowledge spillover pools further calculations are necessary to arrive at the real-
ized knowledge spillover pools I am interested in. These calculations will be 
done following the following section. 
6.6 Absorptive Capacity as the Determining Factor of Realized 
Incoming Knowledge Spillovers132 
Since Cohen and Levinthal (1989; 1990) published their seminal work on “ab-
sorptive capacity”, a lot of empirical and theoretical work has been devoted to 
analyzing the absorptive capacity of firms. However, the use of the concept of 
absorptive capacity has not been limited to the firm level, it ranges from the level 
of the individual to that of entire nations (see Van Den Bosch et al., 2003; 
Narula, 2004). These levels are intertwined, as a nation’s absorptive capacity de-
                                              
132 This section largely builds on Schmidt (2005a). 
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pends on that of its organizations and the absorptive capacity of an organization 
depends on that of its individuals (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The absorptive 
capacity concept has proven to be flexible enough to be used not only for differ-
ent units of analysis but also in many fields of research, e.g. industrial organiza-
tion, strategic management, international business and technology management 
(see Zahra and George, 2002 for an overview). Despite this wide application of 
the concept and various modifications of its specific features133, absorptive ca-
pacity has been used in most cases as a firm’s ability to “identify, assimilate and 
exploit knowledge from the environment” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990: 569). 
The empirical operationalization of the concept has not been that focused, 
though, mainly because it is hard to construct good measures of absorptive ca-
pacity from the available information.134 One reason for this is the lack of a pa-
per trail for the acquisition of external knowledge which could be tracked and 
used by researchers. A solution to this problem is the use of surveys. Surveys can 
and have been used for research on absorptive capacity at the firm level. Even 
with surveys, however, researchers are not able to measure absorptive capacity 
directly because it is - despite its relatively simple definition - a fuzzy concept; 
practically no one can give a straightforward indication of his or her level of ab-
sorptive capacity. Using surveys thus requires developing an empirical concept 
of absorptive capacity. Popular proxies that have been used to capture absorptive 
capacity in recent empirical studies on the innovation and co-operation behavior 
of firms include R&D budgets, -stocks, and -intensities (Belderbos et al., 2004; 
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Oltra and Flor, 2003; Stock et al., 2001), follow-
ing up on the arguments presented by Cohen and Levinthal (1989). Other proxies 
and measures (primarily used by researchers from the field of business admini-
stration) include organizational structure and practices, like incentive systems 
                                              
133 Zahra and George (2002), for example, cite Mowery and Oxley (1995), who define absorptive capac-
ity as a set of skills needed to deal with tacit knowledge.  
134 Among others Becker and Peters state: “The empirical measurement of absorptive capacities of firms 
is difficult.” (Becker and Peters, 2000: 11). 
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and human resource and knowledge management (Lenox and King, 2004; Van 
Den Bosch et al., 1999; Vinding, 2000) and “production line performance in 
terms of labour productivity and conformance quality” (Mukherjee et al., 2000: 
157). 
The lack of a direct empirical measure of absorptive capacity has not only 
caused some problems with the comparability of research results135; it has also 
led to little research “on the process by which absorptive capacity is developed” 
(Lane et al., 2002: 5). This research shortage on the determinants of absorptive 
capacity was stressed not only by Lane et al., 2002), who reviewed about 180 
papers citing Cohen and Levinthal (1998, 1990), but also by Veugelers (1997). 
She writes that “More work is needed to identify specific firm characteristics 
generating this absorptive capacity” (Veugelers, 1997: 314). Mahnke et al. 
(2005) also state that there is a lack of empirical literature on how a firm can in-
crease its absorptive capacity. 
In this section I will try to fill the gap by empirically analyzing the determinants 
of absorptive capacity of innovative firms. In order to be able to construct a more 
direct measure of absorptive capacity than previous studies, I propose a focus on 
the results of absorptive capacity instead of on the inputs that are assumed to 
build absorptive capacity. Using data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel I am 
able to assess whether firms’ innovations incorporate or are based on knowledge 
obtained from external partners. I argue that firms that introduce innovations, 
which are based on external knowledge, necessarily have the ability to exploit 
knowledge from external sources, thus evincing absorptive capacities. I am there-
fore able to investigate this component directly and separately from the other two 
components of absorptive capacity (identification and assimilation of knowl-
                                              
135 Zahara and George highlight this problem by writing: “ … it is unclear if these measures [of absorp-
tive capacity] converge to capture similar attributes of the same construct, …” (Zahra and George, 
2002: 186). 
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edge)136. However, a firm which is able to exploit external knowledge usually 
also has the ability to identify and assimilate it. Focusing on the ability to exploit 
external knowledge should allow us to rudimentarily distinguish between exter-
nal knowledge that is useful and useless. This part of the study also contributes to 
the existing literature by including measures for the existence of human resource 
and knowledge management and the organization of knowledge sharing within a 
firm. I also analyze the differences among these and other measures with respect 
to exploiting knowledge from within a firm’s industry, knowledge from outside 
its industry and knowledge generated by research institutes in order to be able to 
arrive at different levels of absorptive capacity for the different external knowl-
edge pools. 
6.6.1 Related Literature on the Components and Determinants of 
Absorptive Capacity for Different Types of Knowledge  
In this subsection I will review the literature on absorptive capacity relevant for 
my study.137 I will first take a closer look at the definitions of absorptive capac-
ity, in particular with respect to the three components of absorptive capacity 
(identification, assimilation and exploitation). Afterwards I will focus on the de-
terminants of absorptive capacity found in the literature and then discuss some of 
the findings for the acquisition and exploitation of different kinds of knowledge. 
The whole review is restricted to the application of the absorptive capacity con-
cept at the firm level. 
Components of Absorptive Capacity 
Absorptive capacity at the firm level is relatively simple to define. Essentially, 
it is a firm’s ability to deal with external knowledge. According to the highly in-
                                              
136 Zahra and George (2002) argue: “Substantial differences exist among these dimensions, which allow 
them to coexist and be measured and validated independently.” (Zahra and George, 2002: 199), 
when talking about the three dimensions of absorptive capacity.  
137 Other reviews have been compiled by Daghfous (2004), Van Den Bosch et al. (2003) and Zahra and 
George (2002). 
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fluential definition offered by Cohen and Levinthal (1989), it is firms’ ability to 
“identify, assimilate and exploit knowledge from the environment” (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989: 569). Other authors have used some modifications of the con-
cept (see Zahra and George, 2002 for an overview) but have still retained the no-
tion that absorptive capacity is not a one-dimensional concept, consisting rather 
of various skills and dimensions. Lane and Lubatkin (1998) for example use the 
three components proposed by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) for their study on the 
prerequisites of a firm’s ability to learn from another. Van Den 
Bosch et al. (2003) also suggest defining absorptive capacity as having three 
components “the ability to recognize the value of external knowledge, assimilate 
it, and apply it to commercial ends.” (Van Den Bosch et al., 2003: 280). 
There has been some discussion about whether there are more than three com-
ponents of absorptive capacity. For instance, Zahra and George, 2002) expand 
the concept by introducing an additional component -- transformation of knowl-
edge -- which is “a firm’s capability to develop and refine the routines that facili-
tate combining existing knowledge and the newly acquired and assimilated 
knowledge” (Zahra and George, 2002: 190). However, they do retain the other 
three components. This additional component is potentially worth considering for 
analysis, as it explicates an aspect of the process of knowledge usage that has 
been implicitly assumed by other authors. In order for external knowledge to be 
exploited effectively, it has to be transformed in order to be used by various ac-
tors within the enterprise. Then again, it can be argued that the transformation 
dimension need not be made explicit, as it is an integral part of the “exploitation” 
component. 
Moving away from the ability-based concept of Cohen and Levinthal, Van Den 
Bosch et al. (1999) analyze absorptive capacity along the dimensions of effi-
ciency, scope and flexibility. This does not replace the ability-based definition 
but rather supplements it. Efficiency, for example, is defined as the costs and 
economies of scale associated with a certain level of identification, assimilation, 
and exploitation of external knowledge. 
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Determinants of Absorptive Capacity138 
The application of the absorptive capacity concept in various fields and at vari-
ous levels of analysis has led to the identification of a whole array of factors 
which are assumed to influence absorptive capacity. Most of these determinants 
come from theoretical considerations and empirical studies on the usage and 
management of knowledge in R&D and innovation processes. These factors can 
be assigned to the following three groups139: 
a) R&D activities 
Cohen and Levinthal, 1989 focus mainly on the role of R&D expenditures in 
building absorptive capacity and point to the dual role R&D plays in the innova-
tion process of firms: building absorptive capacity and generating new knowl-
edge and innovations. Many other scholars have thus used R&D-related meas-
ures and approaches to model absorptive capacity at the firm level.140 Among 
them are: 
o R&D expenditure: R&D intensity (R&D expenditure/total sales) 
(Stock et al., 2001; Rocha, 1999; Cantner and Pyka, 1998) and level 
of R&D investment (Leahy and Neary, 2004; Grünfeld, 2003)  
o Continuous R&D activities (Oltra and Flor, 2003; Becker and Peters, 
2000) 
o Existence of an R&D lab (Becker and Peters, 2000; Veugelers, 1997) 
                                              
138 Daghfous, 2004 gives an overview on the determinants of the components of absorptive capacity. 
139 There is a fourth group of determinants that will not be discussed in this study. It includes networks 
and alliances with external partners and the knowledge environment in general (see, for example, 
Caloghirou et al., 2004; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Lim, 2004). Our focus is on internal factors 
only. 
140 Lane and Lubatkin (1998) offer one of the few studies that calls the use of measures of absorptive 
capacity based on R&D spending into question.  
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b) Related prior knowledge and individuals’ skills 
In their 1990 paper Cohen and Levinthal expand the concept and argue that ab-
sorptive capacity is path-dependent because experience and prior knowledge fa-
cilitate the use of new knowledge. As a consequence, absorptive capacity is cu-
mulative. This cumulative nature of absorptive capacity has not been taken into 
account by many empirical studies but has been extensively discussed in the lit-
erature on knowledge and spillovers141, which are closely related to absorptive 
capacity. 
The cumulative nature of knowledge may also be related to another determinant 
of absorptive capacity: employees’ level of education. The more education and 
training an employee receives, the higher his or her individual ability to assimi-
late and use new knowledge will be. As firms’ absorptive capacities depend on 
those of their employees, the general level of education, experience and training 
their employees have a positive influence on firms’ level of absorptive capacity. 
Rothwell and Dodgson (1991) found that (small) firms need well-educated tech-
nicians, engineers and technological specialists to access knowledge from outside 
their boundaries. Frenz et al. (2004) take this into account in their analysis by 
including the share of scientists and engineers in total employees as well as train-
ing expenditures in their model of absorptive capacity. 
In this context the presence of so-called “gatekeepers” play an important role in 
determining absorptive capacity. Vinding (2000) submits that gatekeepers, whose 
role is to create a language which can be understood by different departments, 
improve a firm’s absorptive capacity through knowledge sharing. 
Gradwell (2003) stresses that gatekeepers’ intermediary role involves screening 
the environment for knowledge and transforming the relevant knowledge so it 
can be understood by other employees. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) also intro-
                                              
141 Some of this literature is cited in Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Daghfous (2004). 
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duce two types of gatekeepers, acting either as a “boundary spanner” within the 
firm or as an interface between the firm and its environment.  
c) Organizational structure and human resource management practices 
A firm’s absorptive capacity is not the simple sum of its employees’ abilities. 
According to Cohen and Levinthal (1990), it depends on the ability of an organi-
zation as a whole to stimulate and organize the transfer of knowledge across de-
partments, functions, and individuals. This aspect of absorptive capacity has been 
incorporated into many studies: It has been shown that the absorptive capacity of 
a firm is determined by its expertise in stimulating and organizing knowledge 
sharing (Van Den Bosch et al., 1999) and the similarity of any two cooperating 
firms’ systems for doing so (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Daghfous (2004) review 
yields that the organizational structure of a firm and cross-functional communica-
tion have been found to improve absorptive capacity if they lead to improved 
knowledge sharing among departments and individuals within a firm (see also 
Welsch et al., 2001; Van Den Bosch et al., 1999, 2003; Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998). In addition, according to Daghfous (2004), organizational culture has a 
positive influence on the level of absorptive capacity if it provides incentives for 
knowledge diffusion through the empowerment of employees and managers. 
Gradwell (2003) points to the strong influence of close networks and relation-
ships within firms in stimulating the transfer of tacit knowledge. 
Closely related to organizational structure and knowledge sharing is human re-
source and knowledge management. To name a few examples, forming work-
groups made up of actors from different departments, stimulating job rotation, 
managing proposals submitted by employees and encouraging employees to read 
and monitor relevant literature and developments can certainly help facilitate the 
flow of knowledge (Mahnke et al., 2005; Jones and Craven, 2001; Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1994). Human resource management can also help to stimulate learn-
ing through reward systems and training (Mahnke et al., 2005; Daghfous, 2004) 
These actions lead to higher individual absorptive capacities and, consequently, 
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to a higher capacity of the organization as a whole. Williamson (1967) argues 
that information gets lost or at least distorted if it is transferred through different 
layers of hierarchy. Thus, direct contact among employees from different de-
partments, units and the like should lead to a more efficient transfer of knowl-
edge and a subsequently higher absorptive capacity. 
The structure of an organization and the tools and incentives it employs to 
stimulate knowledge exchange and learning are usually determined by the man-
agement of the firm. However, its role in building absorptive capacity goes be-
yond setting the organizational structure and culture. Lenox and King (2004) 
show, for example, that managers need to take part in the sharing and provision 
of knowledge to build absorptive capacity. This knowledge sharing can occur in 
the form of internal seminars or promotional brochures. 
The determinants from all three groups have largely been treated as independ-
ent of each other. Nonetheless, it is feasible to assume that they are at least to 
some degree interrelated. Moreover, most of the determinants are complements 
rather than substitutes. As a firm’s ultimate goal is to put acquired knowledge to 
good use -- i.e. turn it into new and innovative products and processes -- it has to 
ensure that all three components of absorptive capacity are built up and not just a 
single one. To give an example: A firm employing gatekeepers, which bring 
relevant knowledge into the firm, but lacking a system to provide that knowledge 
to those who can apply it to commercial ends obviously has the ability to identify 
relevant knowledge but cannot exploit it. It would thus fall into the category of 
firms with absorptive capacities but would fail to realize any advantages from 
this. Hence, its aim should be to build all of the components of absorptive capac-
ity instead of a single one and invest accordingly in more than just one of the de-
terminants described above. 
The review of the literature leads us to formulate the following hypothesis, 
which will be tested empirically below: 
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H1: R&D activities are not the only building blocks of absorptive capacity. The 
organization and stimulation of knowledge transfer within a firm as well as the 
employment of qualified personnel play a critical role in determining the absorp-
tive capacity of firms.  
Absorptive Capacity for Different Types of Knowledge 
The determinants of absorptive capacity discussed above focus on the firm at 
the receiving end of the knowledge exchange and how its structure and activities 
increase or decrease absorptive capacity. This is, however, only one side of the 
coin. Lane and Lubatkin (1998) make the case that a firm might not be able to 
learn equally from each external firm, arguing that certain characteristics of the 
“student-firm”, i.e. the firm absorbing the knowledge, and of the “teacher-firm” -
- the firm providing the knowledge to be transmitted -- have to be similar in order 
for the student-firm to be able to learn. According to these authors, the ability to 
learn from an external partner (“teacher”) depends, among other things, on “the 
specific type of new knowledge offered by the teacher.” (Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998: 462). Dussauge et al. (2000) as well as Cohen and Levinthal (1990) con-
clude that a firm is better able to acquire and use external knowledge from areas 
it has some prior experience or related knowledge in (path-dependency of ab-
sorptive capacity). Becker and Peters (2000) and Nelson and Wolff (1997) argue 
that firms need higher absorptive capacities for scientific knowledge than for 
other types of knowledge. Mangematin and Nesta (1999) confirm this result. 
They find that higher absorptive capacities increase the ability to use more fun-
damental (as opposed to applied) external knowledge and firms with higher ab-
sorptive capacity have more contacts with research institutes than firms with 
lower absorptive capacities. 
All these findings suggest that there are different absorptive capacities or vary-
ing levels of absorptive capacity required for different kinds of knowledge, one 
distinction being between science-based knowledge and knowledge from the pri-
vate sector. 
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My second hypothesis for the empirical part of this section is thus: 
H2: Different kinds of knowledge are associated with different absorptive ca-
pacities. 
6.6.2 Data, Construction of the Variables and Empirical Model 
To test the hypotheses mentioned above, I use data from the German innovation 
survey, the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP).142 For my analysis I use the 2003 
survey, in which data was collected on the innovation behaviour of enterprises 
during the three-year period 2000-2002. About 4,500 firms in manufacturing and 
services responded to the survey by providing information on their innovation 
activities. Almost 2,000 enterprises indicated that they had introduced at least 
one product or process innovation in the reference period. I restrict my analysis 
to firms which introduced innovations between 2000 and 2002 because most of 
the questions I use to construct my variables are only available for innovating 
firms, in particular the questions used to construct the dependent variables. 
The 2003 MIP questionnaire provides data with which I can analyze the factors 
influencing the absorptive capacities of firms. I construct a measure of absorptive 
capacity using questions regarding impulses from external actors143 used by 
firms to develop innovative products and processes.144 I argue that successfully 
using such external sources of innovation is a rather direct measure of the exploi-
tation component of absorptive capacity. A firm which is able to pick up im-
pulses from external parties and turn them into innovations is certainly able to 
exploit external knowledge and thus possesses absorptive capacities. 
                                              
142 For a more detailed description of the MIP survey see chapter 4. 
143 Separate questions regarding impulses from customers, competitors, research institutes and universi-
ties and suppliers were asked. 
144 The questions were phrased as follows: “Were any of the innovations introduced by your enterprise 
during the three-year period 2000-2002 triggered by new research results?”; “Were any of the in-
novations introduced by your enterprise during the three-year period 2000-2002 triggered by com-
petitors’ innovations?” , etc.  
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The firms are also asked to indicate which industries (for suppliers and custom-
ers) provided these innovative impulses during the reference period. I use this 
information to construct different measures of absorptive capacity for intra- and 
inter-industry knowledge. To test the hypothesis that knowledge stemming from 
research institutions and universities requires specific absorptive capacities, I also 
included a measure of “exploitive absorptive capacities”145 for knowledge from 
research institutes and universities used for developing product and/or process 
innovations. 
The dependent dummy variables are constructed in the following way: 
• Absorptive capacity (Absorp) 
One, if one of the absorptive capacities below equals one. 
• Absorptive capacity for intra-industry knowledge (Absorp_intra) 
One, if at least one of the firm’s innovations (in the period 2000-2002) has 
been developed and successfully implemented because of impulses from 
customers, suppliers or competitors from the firm’s industry. 
• Absorptive capacity for inter-industry knowledge (Absorp_inter) 
One, if at least one of the firm’s innovations (in the period 2000-2002) has 
been developed and successfully implemented because of impulses from 
customers or suppliers from industries other than its own. 
• Absorptive capacity for scientific knowledge (Absorp_science)146 
One, if at least one of the firm’s innovations (in the period 2000-2002) has 
been developed and successfully implemented because of impulses from 
universities or other public research institutes. 
                                              
145 The term “exploitive absorptive capacity” refers to the ability of firms to exploit external knowledge 
for their innovation activities. 
146 I use the term “scientific absorptive capacity” for this concept in the remainder of the study. 
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The literature review yielded three main groups of determinants for ab-
sorptive capacity. In order to analyze their influence on my dependent vari-
ables I included the following independent variables in my model:147 
• R&D activities 
I measure the R&D activities of firms along two dimensions: the continu-
ity (continuous vs. occasional) of their R&D engagements and their R&D 
spending as a share of total turnover. With the first measure (R&Dcon) I try 
to capture the path dependence of absorptive capacity, as firms which are 
continuously involved in R&D activities should have developed skills and 
experience in their specific fields of research. For firms which engage in 
R&D only occasionally the amount of related prior knowledge can be as-
sumed to be limited or at least less than that of firms performing R&D con-
tinuously. I thus expect that firms with continuous R&D are more likely to 
have absorptive capacities than other firms. 
R&D intensity (R&D_int), measured as share of R&D expenditure in total 
turnover, is to a large degree a measure of the scope of a firm’s R&D com-
mitment. I assume the absorptive capacity of firms to be higher the more 
they spend on R&D in a given year. I also include R&D intensity as a 
squared term (R&D_int2). This variable is included because I think that a 
firm which approaches the technological frontier, thereby researching at the 
forefront of its field, is no longer able to learn substantially from external 
parties. Hence, a larger part of R&D spending is targeted at knowledge gen-
eration rather than to improving absorptive capacity. In essence, I think that 
R&D intensity does not necessarily influence absorptive capacity linearly, 
but might rather exhibit a non-linear effect such that firms with very high 
R&D intensities are less dependent on external impulses with respect to 
their innovation activities. 
                                              
147 Exact definitions of the variables can be found in Table A-8 and Table A-9 in the appendix. 
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• Related prior knowledge and individuals’ skills 
The existence of related prior knowledge within firms is hard to opera-
tionalize with the data at hand, as I cannot determine in which specific field 
each firm does its research and possesses previously accumulated skills and 
experience. This determinant will thus only be represented by the aforemen-
tioned variable for continuous R&D (R&Dcon). 
Employee skill level can be fairly easily measured by the amount of em-
ployees with higher education degrees as a share of total employees (grads). 
• Organizational structure and human resource management practices 
The literature provides evidence that the organization of knowledge trans-
fer inside a firm has a positive influence on absorptive capacity. In order to 
be able to test my first hypothesis of this section I included several indica-
tors of the way knowledge exchange is organized within a firm. These can 
be divided into two groups: measures intended to stimulate innovation ac-
tivities and individuals’ involvement in knowledge sharing, and collabora-
tion between different departments. Both groups can be seen as determi-
nants of absorptive capacity. While the former provides information on a 
firm’s willingness and efforts to increase knowledge transfer and exploita-
tion (incentives), the latter is a better measure of the actual knowledge trans-
fer occurring between departments (organization); from my point of view, 
this is the more important determinant of absorptive capacity. I thus include 
a single indicator of the importance of measures meant to stimulate the in-
volvement of individuals in knowledge sharing (stim_index)148 and seven 
variables focusing on different means of collaboration between departments. 
                                              
148 This index is the result of a principal components factor analysis of the importance of nine different 
methods of stimulating innovation and knowledge transfer. See Table A-8 in the appendix for a 
full list of the methods considered. The methods could not be included separately in the estimation 
since they were highly correlated with each other and with some of collaboration variables. The 
results of the factor analysis are presented in the appendix. 
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Two different aspects of collaboration will be investigated: hierarchical and 
sporadic information provision (mostly involving managers) as well as 
broad information provision (involving all employees). The former com-
prises joint development of innovation strategies (col_jointstrat), regular 
meetings of department heads to discuss innovation-related topics 
(col_heads), seminars and workshops for innovation projects involving sev-
eral departments (col_seminar), mutual support of other departments with 
innovation-related problems (col_mutsup) and temporary exchange of per-
sonnel between departments for innovation projects (col_exchange). The 
latter is represented by informal contact among employees (col_infor), open 
communication of ideas and concepts between departments (col_opencom). 
• Control variables 
A number of control variables are included, most importantly two meas-
ures of size: number of employees (ln_emp) and number of employees, 
squared (ln_emp2). These two variables are meant to capture differences in 
absorptive capacity among small and large firms. Small firms might not 
have the same means and opportunities to exploit external knowledge, sim-
ply because they cannot risk betting on the wrong horse. Larger firms, on 
the other hand, often have multiple innovation projects running at the same 
time and can thus potentially exploit external knowledge better.  
An additional dummy variable is included indicating whether a firm is 
situated in Eastern Germany (east), as Eastern German firms’ innovation 
behaviour still differs significantly from that of Western German firms.149 It 
is thus reasonable to assume that absorptive capacity also differs between 
the two regions. 
                                              
149 See, for example, Rammer et al. (2004) or  Sofka and Schmidt (2004).  
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To control for industry influences that are not picked up by other variables 
in the model, I include six industry group dummies150, with “other manu-
facturing” being the reference group. 
The construction of the dependent variables has two noteworthy implications 
for the empirical set-up: First, I am not able to observe the level of absorptive 
capacity directly, but rather only the existence of absorptive capacity. I argue that 
I will nonetheless be able to at least get a proxy for the level of absorptive capac-
ity by estimating a probit model and using the predicted values as an indication 
of the level of absorptive capacity. The predicted value will technically give us 
the probability with which a given firm exploits external knowledge. My argu-
ment is that in order for that probability to be high, absorptive capacity of that 
firm has to be high. The second implication is that the interdependence among 
the three measures of absorptive capacity for the different types of knowledge 
have to be consider. Since I am allowing firms to have more than one type of ab-
sorptive capacity, I have to assume that their possession of one has an influence 
on the others. What is more, it is reasonable to assume that the determinants of 
absorptive capacity -- R&D expenditure, for example -- contribute to the accu-
mulation of absorptive capacity for knowledge from universities and businesses 
alike. This is especially true if the usage and exploitation of different kinds of 
external knowledge requires the same or very similar competencies and experi-
ence. In order to take this interdependence into account in the empirical model, a 
trivariate probit model will be estimated, i.e. a simultaneous system of three 
equations, instead of three separate probits.151 This will lead to an increase of the 
the validity of my estimates.  
                                              
150 See Table A-9  in the appendix for details. 
151 See Greene (2003) on “multivariate probit models”. 
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The full empirical set-up then looks like this: 
First a probit model for absorptive capacity in general estimated: 
´*Absorp X uβ= +  with 1 * 0
0
i
i
if Absorp
Absorp
otherwise
>⎧= ⎨⎩
 
where X  is the column vector representing the independent variables outlined 
above. 
In the next step I estimate the following trivariate probit model for the three dif-
ferent types of absorptive capacity: 
* '
1 1_Absorp inter Xβ ε= +     with      
*1 _ 0
_
0
i
i
if Absorp inter
Absorp inter
otherwise
⎧ >= ⎨⎩
 
* '
2 2_Absorp intra Xβ ε= +     with     
*1 _ 0
_
0
i
i
if Absorp intra
Absorp intra
otherwise
⎧ >= ⎨⎩
 
* '
3 3_Absorp science Xβ ε= +  with  
*1 _ 0
_
0
i
i
if Absorp science
Absorp science
otherwise
⎧ >= ⎨⎩
 
where the pair-wise correlation of the error terms is not equal to zero: 
1 2 1( , )Cov ε ε ρ=  ; 1 3 2( , )Cov ε ε ρ= ; 2 3 3( , )Cov ε ε ρ=  
This model can be solved by employing a maximum-likelihood procedure. To 
evaluate the likelihood of a certain outcome, the probability of an observation has 
to be calculated using a trivariate normal probability density function which takes 
into account 1 2 3 1 2 3, , , , ,andε ε ε ρ ρ ρ . This poses some problems: It has been shown 
that standard numerical calculation techniques cannot be used if the normal den-
sity function is of an order higher than two.152 A way to solve this problem in-
volves using simulation techniques. One, which is now implemented in many 
statistical packages, is the so-called “GHK-Simulator (Geweke-Hajivassiliou-
                                              
152 See Glasgow (2001) for a discussion of the topic. 
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Keane-Simulator)” for multivariate normal distributions153. For my model esti-
mation I use a procedure developed by Antoine Terracol for the STATA statisti-
cal software package (triprobit), which relies on the GHK simulation proce-
dure.154 
For the model estimation I am able to use 1,650 which indicated that they had 
carried out innovation activities during the three-year period 2000-2002. 
Of the 1,650 observations, 1,177 (71%) have at least one type of absorptive ca-
pacity. 575 have at least intra-industry, 956 at least inter-industry and 248 at least 
scientific absorptive capacity.155 For those firms that only show one type of ab-
sorptive capacity I find a similar distribution. Just 47 firms, or 2.7% of the enter-
prises in my sample, have only scientific absorptive capacity, while 156 and 463 
have only intra-industry and inter-industry absorptive capacities, respectively. 91 
of the firms have all three types. The fairly large number of firms having more 
than one type of absorptive capacity (43% of all firms with absorptive capacity) 
provides further evidence that the manners in which the three types of absorptive 
capacity are accumulated are somewhat related and a trivariate probit estimation 
procedure should be used. 
As far as the independent variables are concerned, I find only very few differ-
ences between the sample mean and the mean of firms with absorptive capacities. 
Notable exceptions are the share of employees with higher education, which is 
about two percentage points higher for firms with absorptive capacity, and the 
R&D intensity, which is one percentage point higher for the latter group. Addi-
tionally, the share of firms with continuous R&D is six percentage points higher 
for firms with absorptive capacity. The index for stimulating knowledge ex-
                                              
153 Other simulators could also be used. Hajivassiliou et al. (1996) review eleven simulators and find that 
the GHK is the most reliable method for multivariate normal distributions. 
154 The method is known to be sensitive to the number of observations draw in each iteration. I thus 
tested several different settings. The results only change as far as the size of the coefficients is 
concerned, the significance levels and qualitative results stay the same. The model presented be-
low uses 220 draws instead of the default number of draws which is 25. 
155 Additional descriptive statistics can be found in Table A-10 the appendix.  
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change and innovation activities is also significantly higher for firms with ab-
sorptive capacity, but only by two percentage points. 
Within the group of firms with at least one type of absorptive capacity, the 
same variables make a difference between those with scientific absorptive capac-
ity and the other two types. Here, the differences are more pronounced. Firms 
with scientific absorptive capacity have an average share of employees with 
higher education of 42% and an R&D intensity of 14.8%. For the mean firm with 
intra-industry absorptive capacity the numbers read 28% and 7.7% and for the 
average firm with inter-industry absorptive capacity they are 30% and 8.7%. 
6.6.3 Results 
The results of the estimation are presented inTable 6-3. Let us first turn to the 
standard probit estimation of firms’ absorptive capacities (equation 1). 
A first striking result is that continuous R&D is significant and positive, while 
R&D intensity, which is widely used in the related literature as a proxy for ab-
sorptive capacity, is not. This indicates that continuous R&D engagement (and 
not necessarily the level of R&D expenditure) is relevant to absorptive capacity. 
A firm’s current156 expenditure on R&D is usually not primarily targeted at 
building absorptive capacity but rather at accumulating new knowledge and de-
veloping new products and processes, which might explain my findings. The re-
sults suggest that a firm’s current R&D expenditure does not make an ad hoc 
contribution to the assembly of absorptive capacity; instead, it helps to develop 
the skills and knowledge necessary to source external knowledge over time. In 
this sense, absorptive capacity is cumulative. I will argue below that current 
R&D expenditure can also immediately contribute to exploitive absorptive ca-
pacities, but only for specific types of knowledge. 
Another explanation for the insignificance of the R&D intensity variables is 
that firms with higher R&D intensities have a lower demand for external knowl-
                                              
156 In order to reduce a possible endogeneity bias, I use R&D intensity in the year 2001 instead of that of 
2002. 
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edge than firms with lower R&D intensities. The more R&D is done in-house, 
the more knowledge is generated internally and the less external knowledge is 
required. It is also quite likely that firms with large in-house knowledge pools 
would generate more impulses and ideas from within and use less external im-
pulses and ideas for their innovations. In that case firms would have the capacity 
and capability to use external knowledge in their innovation processes, but sim-
ply do not need to do it.157 If this negative effect on demand for external ideas 
and knowledge dominates the effect of R&D on absorptive capacity, the R&D 
intensity would still have a positive effect on absorptive capacity, but it would 
not show in my estimations. 
                                              
157 They might also not want to do it, if the sourcing of external knowledge is connected with certain 
costs. 
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Table 6-3 Coefficients of Probit and Trivariate Probit Estimation on the  
Determinants of Absorptive Capacity 
Variable 
Absorptive  
Capacity  
(1) 
 
Intra-industry 
Absorp. Cap. 
 (2) 
Inter-industry  
Absorp. Cap. 
(3) 
Scientific 
Absorp. Cap. 
(4) 
R&D activities:    
R&D_int 0.004   -0.002 0.007* 0.014 *** 
 (0.004)   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  
R&D_int2 -0.00001   0.000005 -0.000028* -0.00005 *** 
 (0.00001)   (0.000014) (0.000014) (0.00002)  
R&Dcon 0.306 ***  0.127* 0.222*** 0.451 *** 
 (0.078)   (0.076) (0.073) (0.089)  
Skills/Size:        
Grads 0.003 **  0.001 0.002 0.010 *** 
 (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
ln_emp -0.199 **  -0.134* -0.079 -0.099  
 (0.090)   (0.079) (0.076) (0.087)  
ln_emp2 0.023 ***  0.021*** 0.010 0.012  
 (0.008)   (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  
Collaboration/ Stimulation:    
col_infor 0.159 **  0.218*** 0.113 0.096  
 (0.076)   (0.072) (0.144) (0.088)  
col_opencom 0.030   0.102 -0.074 -0.238 ** 
 (0.086)   (0.081) (0.078) (0.098)  
col_jointstrat -0.105   -0.138* -0.022 -0.050  
 (0.085)   (0.080) (0.080) (0.100)  
col_mutsup 0.090   -0.180** 0.122 -0.089  
 (0.084)   (0.079) (0.077) (0.096)  
col_heads -0.010   0.031 -0.032 -0.123  
 (0.080)   (0.076) (0.075) (0.096)  
col_exchange -0.275 *  -0.092 -0.127 0.117  
 (0.150)   (0.147) (0.140) (0.160)  
col_seminar -0.009   -0.341*** 0.013 0.243 ** 
 (0.116)   (0.110) (0.105) (0.220)  
stim_index 0.683 ***  0.293* 0.602*** 0.798 ** 
 (0.173)   (0.170) (0.166) (0.205)  
Observations 1,650     1,650    
X^2  132.73     347.89    
Ald.-Nelson Pseudo R^2 0.137     0.231    
Rho    (2,3): 0.27 *** (3,4): 0.19*** (2,4): 0.11 ** 
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Robust SEs in parentheses. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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To investigate whether the results are driven by the choice of measure of R&D 
intensity, I estimate several additional model specifications. The results, which 
are reported in column 1 of Table 6-4, show that, regardless of the measure used 
for R&D intensity and the inclusion or exclusion of one of the two R&D-related 
variables, the coefficients of R&D intensity remain insignificant and continuous 
R&D remains highly significant, providing further evidence that current R&D 
intensity does not immediately determine the ability of firms to exploit external 
knowledge.158 
Table 6-4 Coefficients of Five Different Probit and Trivariate Probit Estimations 
on the Determinants of Absorptive Capacity159 
Variable 
Absorptive  
Capacity 
 
Intra-industry  
Absorp. Capacity 
Inter-industry  
Absorp. Capacity 
Scientific 
Absorp. Cap. 
Model 1: R&Dcon + R&D_int 
R&D_int 0.004   -0.002  0.007* 0.014 *** 
R&D_int2 -0.00001   0.000005  -0.00003* -0.00005 *** 
R&Dcon 0.306 ***  0.127* 0.222*** 0.451 *** 
Model 2: R&Dcon + R&D_int_empl 
R&D_int_empl 0.130   0.211  0.629  1.343 ** 
R&D_int_empl2 -0.167   -0.862  -0.625  -0.708  
R&Dcon 0.318 ***  0.135* 0.255*** 0.504 *** 
Model 3: R&Dcon  
R&Dcon 0.320 ***  0.121  0.245*** 0.504 *** 
Model 4: R&D_int 
R&D_int 0.007   -0.001  0.009** 0.017 *** 
R&D_int2 -0.00002   0.00001  -0.00003** -0.0001 *** 
Model 5: R&D_int_empl 
R&D_int_empl -0.229   0.085  0.378  0.950  
R&D_int_empl2 0.680   -0.682  -0.276  -0.153  
Source: Own calculations. 
A large body of literature has pointed to the positive influence of collaboration 
and stimulation of knowledge sharing on absorptive capacity, as described above. 
My results do not totally contradict these findings but raise some doubts about 
their importance in exploiting external knowledge. Like other studies I find that 
                                              
158 The joint significance of the two R&D intensity variables can always be rejected. 
159 The models all include the full set of independent variables not related to R&D as well as the vari-
ables shown. The full estimation results are available upon request. 
 159 
collaboration between departments has an impact on absorptive capacity, lending 
support to the first hypothesis in this section. However, only informal contacts 
have a positive and significant effect on absorptive capacity. The variables repre-
senting hierarchical information provision are not or only very marginally sig-
nificant. This suggests that it is more important to create a culture and organiza-
tion that leads to informal knowledge transfer rather than a culture in which in-
formation provision is more centralized. One reason for this might be that the 
diffusion of new knowledge is faster and less prone to distortions through infor-
mal networks compared to formal systems (see Williamson, 1967). The insignifi-
cance of the other variables is puzzling still, as one would expect that every 
knowledge exchange regardless of the method used is helping firms to exploit 
external knowledge. 
The measure for methods that try to stimulate employee participation in innova-
tion activities is positively associated with absorptive capacity. This suggests that 
it is not only necessary to increase the knowledge flows between actors inside the 
firm (mainly through informal contacts), but also to leverage the knowledge of 
each individual in the innovation process. Almost all the stimulation methods 
included in the factor analysis are aimed at the involvement of the employees and 
mangers in the innovation process. These findings confirm, that a firm’s absorp-
tive capacity is related to that of its employees. 
Further evidence for this result is provided by the importance of higher educa-
tion for exploitive absorptive capacity. As expected, the share of employees with 
higher education positively influences the ability of firms to exploit externally 
available knowledge. This is also true for continuous R&D activities, which I use 
as an indicator of related prior knowledge. The results confirm other studies’ 
findings that both indicators influence firms’ absorptive capacities. My interpre-
tation is that both the related prior knowledge of individuals -- gained through 
education -- and that of firms, which they have developed through steady R&D 
investment, positively influences the ability to exploit external knowledge. The 
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positive influence might have something to do with the fact that this related prior 
knowledge is also necessary to identify and assimilate external knowledge. 
I find a significant U-shaped effect of the number of employees on the likeli-
hood that firms have exploitive absorptive capacity. This is surprising, as one 
would expect the number of employees to always have a positive effect on firms’ 
absorptive capacities: Individuals’ absorptive capacity is, after all, part of the 
firms. Because the U in question (turning point: 75 employees) is very flat, this 
finding should not be over-interpreted, however. One explanation for the U-
shaped relationship might be that very small firms depend more on external 
knowledge than medium-sized ones. After the turning point of 75 employees is 
reached, the expected size effect sets in, i.e. every additional employee increases 
the ability of firms to exploit external knowledge. The demand effect suggested 
by the insignificance of the R&D intensity (see above), might also be able to ex-
plain the U-shaped relationship between the number of employees and absorptive 
capacity. Very small firms need external knowledge to further exploit their (only) 
inventions and innovations or to get new ideas for applications of their existing 
knowledge. After they have reached a certain size (and gained some experience 
in the market), they are more likely to focus on the exploitation and commerciali-
zation of their innovations and internal knowledge, rather than look for new ideas 
outside their boundaries. This seems to lower the demand for external knowledge 
by medium size enterprises. If their internal “potential” has been exploited they 
have to use more external knowledge to grow further. 
In essence, the estimations support the hypothesis that not only R&D is relevant 
for the ability to exploit external knowledge. Besides R&D, highly skilled labor 
as well as knowledge management tools that stimulate the involvement of em-
ployees in innovation projects seem to be important. However, only informal 
contacts, and not as hypothesized almost all collaboration methods, influence the 
ability to exploit external knowledge positively. 
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The estimation results provide evidence supporting the second hypothesis of 
this section, as they clearly show that the ability to exploit different types of ex-
ternal knowledge is influenced differently by the factors considered.160 Most pro-
nounced is the difference between the exploitation of scientific knowledge and 
knowledge from the business sector. They particularly differ with respect to 
R&D variables. As mentioned above, there are differences between the effects of 
R&D intensity on the three different types of absorptive capacity. For scientific 
knowledge I find a highly significant effect of current R&D intensity; no such 
effect is evident for the other two types of knowledge. Firms that spend a large 
amount of turnover on research are usually in greater need of external knowledge 
and are thus more likely to exploit that knowledge. Additionally, as the share in-
creases they become more and more similar to public research institutes and uni-
versities. The more similar firms are, the better they can learn from each other, as 
Lane and Lubatkin, 1998) argue. Their ability to exploit knowledge learned from 
similar partners also increases, as my results suggest. This similarity argument 
cannot be made for the other two types of actors providing knowledge, which 
might explain why I do not find significant signs for intra-industry absorptive 
capacity and only marginally significant signs for inter-industry absorptive ca-
pacity. In the long run, however, R&D seems to be relevant for inter-industry 
knowledge as well, as the positive effect of continuous R&D suggests. For intra-
industry knowledge this variable is also significant, but only slightly. 
Again, the robustness of the findings is tested by including different measures 
of R&D intensity in the estimations. The results remain quite similar to those for 
the original model. For scientific absorptive capacity the only more pronounced 
change I find is the significance of the squared R&D intensity when using the 
share of R&D employees instead of the share of R&D expenditure. This can be 
explained by the values the two variables can take. While the R&D intensity 
                                              
160 Note, the test for the interdependence of the three equations in the trivariate probit shows that the 
equations are, in fact, not independent, as all Rhos are positive and significant at least at the 95% 
confidence level. 
 162 
based on expenditure is not constrained to the interval [0;1]161, that which is 
based on employees is. If firms with R&D_int greater than one are dropped, I get 
the same result as for R&D_int_empl. For intra-industry absorptive capacity the 
results differ more than for the other two types. The prominent role of continuous 
R&D can at least be confirmed in all models. 
The results for the three types of absorptive capacity differ not only with re-
spect to R&D-related variables; differences with respect to the extent of collabo-
ration among departments also show. These factors are only significant for intra-
industry and scientific absorptive capacity. This is surprising, as one would ex-
pect the exploitation of inter-industry knowledge to be influenced by collabora-
tion among departments as well. I argue that the exploitation of inter-industry 
knowledge for innovations might require less collaboration because a large 
amount of that knowledge is embodied in products from suppliers and each em-
ployee can take the knowledge needed for his or her innovation activities directly 
from the product. The insignificance and negative significance of some collabo-
ration variables in the equations for intra-industry and scientific knowledge point 
to the fact that collaboration among departments, as beneficial as it might be for 
certain enterprise activities, does not necessarily contribute to exploitive absorp-
tive capacity. On the contrary, a firm has to choose how it organizes collabora-
tion with respect to the knowledge it wants to absorb and balance the need to ex-
ploit external knowledge with its other needs and goals. 
Intra-industry absorptive capacity, for example, is negatively influenced by mu-
tual support among departments. The latter reduces the probability of intra-
industry knowledge being successfully exploited in innovations, suggesting that 
this method does not fit the type of knowledge to be exploited. Mutual support 
with innovation-related problems is likely to be associated with significant diffi-
culties if different departments are configured distinctly or use procedures not 
                                              
161 Note, some firms in the sample out-spend their turnover in financing R&D. They are all from 
NACE 73, “Research and Development”. For firms in that field it is not unusual to have R&D in-
tensities above one. 
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known to others outside of the department, leading to an increase in costs and 
necessary efforts without leveraging the exploitation of external knowledge. 
Seminars involving actors from different departments and the development of 
joint innovation strategies also influence the likelihood that a firm exploits intra-
industry knowledge negatively. The method best suited to exploiting intra-
industry knowledge is to generate informal contact among employees. This sug-
gests that it is especially beneficial to spread knowledge throughout the whole 
firm rather than distribute it through formal and more targeted mechanisms. One 
reason for this might be that knowledge from a firm’s own industry can easily be 
understood by everyone within the firm. Broad dissemination should thus in-
crease the potential use of information for innovation activities. For scientific 
knowledge the opposite is true: It cannot be easily understood and processed by 
all actors in the company but has to be “translated” into a form that is usable by 
everyone in the firm. The positive influence of seminars and workshops in the 
equation for scientific knowledge supports the notion that more translated 
knowledge implies a higher probability that it can be integrated into the existing 
knowledge base and utilized in the innovation process. This underscores the role 
of gatekeepers in the process of building absorptive capacity. In contrast, broad 
knowledge diffusion reduces the probability of scientific knowledge being ex-
ploited. This method is not beneficial since only very few actors inside the firm 
are able to profit from a more widespread dissemination of knowledge and con-
siderable (opportunity) costs might be involved. 
Stimulating employees to get involved in the innovation process as well as 
knowledge acquisition and distribution is of great importance in determining ab-
sorptive capacity for all three kinds of knowledge, as the estimation results sug-
gest. The explanation is straightforward: The more knowledge is screened and 
the higher the incentives are to use acquired knowledge in the innovation proc-
ess, the higher the potential to exploit external knowledge. 
The differences between the three types of absorptive capacity are not limited 
to the collaboration and R&D variables, however. While I find a positive and 
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significant coefficient for the share of employees with higher education in the 
scientific knowledge equation, it is insignificant in the other two equations. Natu-
rally, one would assume that it is easier for employees who have attended univer-
sity to use knowledge from this domain. They know how to use the knowledge as 
well as how and where to get it. The level of education does not significantly in-
fluence the ability to exploit intra- and inter-industry knowledge. For intra-
industry absorptive capacity, size is more important. As in the case of absorptive 
capacities in general, a U-shaped relationship between the number of employees 
and intra-industry absorptive capacity is found (turning point: 25 employees). For 
inter-industry absorptive capacity neither the share of high-skilled labour nor size 
matters. The differences with respect to high-skilled labour can be explained by 
varying requirements for the exploitation of external knowledge. One can argue 
that in order to exploit knowledge from a firm’s own industry, experience is 
more relevant than a high level of education. Even without a large share of highly 
educated personnel, firms should be able to exploit knowledge from within their 
own industries. On the other hand, the exploitation of very sophisticated methods 
and knowledge produced by public research institutes certainly require a similar 
kind of advanced training in a particular field. To absorb inter-industry knowl-
edge more general skills in structuring problems and gathering information on 
previously unknown subjects might be more important than the initial education 
level of firms’ employees. 
The positive and significant effect of the dummy for Eastern Germany for intra-
industry absorptive capacity is in line with what Sofka and Schmidt, 2004 find 
analysing first-mover and follower strategies for German firms: Eastern German 
firms are more often followers than leaders. Eastern German firms are thus more 
dependent on innovation and knowledge from their market rivals and are conse-
quently more focused on exploiting knowledge from their own industry than 
West German firms. 
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6.7 Construction of the Realized Incoming Spillover Pool at the Firm-
Level 
The differences in the determinants for intra-industry, inter-industry and scien-
tific absorptive capacity are striking and provide further evidence that a differen-
tiated approach like the one chosen for this study is warranted. 
In order to arrive at the firm specific realized incoming spillover pools the po-
tential intra-industry, inter-industry and scientific knowledge spillover pools will 
be multiplied by the estimated levels of absorptive, i.e. the predicted value of the 
trivariat probit estimations of the previous section162, for the three different kinds 
of knowledge. This calculation is only possible for firms for which the potential 
incoming knowledge spillover pools could be constructed (as argued in subsec-
tion 6.5 this pool is available for 2,804 observations) and which had answered the 
2003 innovation survey used to estimate the model in the previous section (1,650 
observations). As a result I obtain estimates of the realized incoming-spillover 
pools for intra-industry, inter-industry and scientific knowledge for 718 firms. 
                                              
162 The predicted values are between zero and one, since they represent the probability of a given firm to 
have exploited external knowledge for their innovation process.  
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7 The Relationship between Knowledge Flows and R&D Co-
operation – A Multivariate Analysis 
This chapter starts out by reviewing the literature on R&D co-operation mo-
tives other than knowledge spillovers. Particular attention will be given to em-
pirical evidence on firms’ motives for R&D and innovation co-operation. The 
following sections will, however, not be restricted to a literature review but form 
the core part of my analysis. I will estimate the impact of knowledge spillover on 
the likelihood of R&D co-operation. First, as a benchmark model an empirical 
model similar to the one by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) will be estimated 
using data from the MIP survey and the “standard” measures of knowledge spill-
overs as suggested by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002). The results of this model 
will then be compared to the outcome of an empirical model based on the knowl-
edge spillover measures constructed in the previous sections. 
7.1 Motives and Determinants of R&D Co-operation: Going Beyond 
Knowledge Spillovers 
In chapter 2 the motives for co-operation related to knowledge spillovers were 
reviewed. The generation or prevention of knowledge spillovers are, however not 
the only motives that firms have to cooperate on R&D and innovation with other 
actors in the economy. I will discuss additional motives under three headings: 
strategic motives, motives related to changes in the business environment and 
framework conditions, and motives related to firm characteristics.163 The as-
signment of a motive into a certain category of motives is not always clear-cut as 
some motives are certainly related to each other and can thus be included in sev-
eral groups. Of course, a co-operative agreement on R&D and innovation activi-
                                              
163 The review will serve as a basis for identifying control variables for the empirical models to be esti-
mated below. It is not intended to be exhaustive and will focus on the empirical evidence on motives 
and determinants of firms’ co-operation activities. 
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ties with other firms or institutes can be driven by many different motives from 
all types and groups of motives. 
That motives beyond knowledge spillovers are important for analysing the 
R&D co-operation behaviour of firms is illustrated by the following figure, 
which is based on a data of more than 8,500 firms in selected service and manu-
facturing industries from four German Bundesländer. 
Figure 7-1 Reasons for R&D Co-operations – Results for Four German Bunde-
sländer 
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Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, 2004: 17 (translated from German). 
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Motives and Determinants of R&D Co-operation Related to Strategic 
Considerations164 
An overview of what are called “strategic” motives for R&D co-operation has 
been compiled by Hagedoorn (1993)165. The results of his literature review are 
presented in Table 7-1. Some of the motives in his table can be directly related to 
knowledge spillovers, like the first set of all three groups of motives listed in the 
table. The other motives he identifies are by and large, the sharing of cost and 
risk, the strengthening of the innovation process and gaining access to new mar-
kets at home or abroad. In the empirical part of his paper he uses information on 
co-operative R&D agreements published in newspaper and magazines to show 
that the motives to cooperate on R&D vary by industry. However, a finding 
common across all the industries he surveys (manufacturing and services) is that 
access to complementary knowledge, access to markets and the reduction of the 
innovation time span are the three most important motives for firms to conduct 
joined R&D.  
                                              
164 A basic motive for R&D co-operation is of course to generate financial or strategic benefits (e.g. 
Stuart, 1998). It is not discussed here, because all activities of profit-oriented firms are usually 
driven by this motive and not only the R&D co-operation behaviour. 
165 Other overviews of the (empirical) evidence on R&D co-operation motives has been compiled by 
Caloghirou et al. (2003) and Piga and Vivarelli (2003). 
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Table 7-1 An overview of Motives for (Strategic) Inter-Firm Technology 
Co-operation166 
I Motives related to basic and applied research and some general charac-
teristics of technological development: 
- Increased complexity and intersectoral nature of new technologies, cross-
fertilization of scientific disciplines and fields of technology, monitoring of 
evolution of technologies, technological synergies, access to scientific knowl-
edge or to complementary technology  
- Reduction, minimizing and sharing of uncertainty in R&D 
- Reduction and sharing of costs of R&D 
II Motives related to concrete innovation processes 
- Capturing of partner's tacit knowledge of technology, technology transfer, 
technological leapfrogging 
- Shortening of product life cycle, reducing the period between innovation and 
market introduction 
III Motives related to market access and search for opportunities 
- Monitoring of environmental changes and opportunities 
- Internationalization, globalization and entry to foreign markets 
- New products and markets, market entry, expansion of product range 
Source: Hagedoorn, 1993: 373 (shortened). 
Sakakibara (1997) supports the view that the sharing of costs and risks167 are 
two basic motives for co-operation. She argues that firms try to reduce their own 
project costs by cooperating with external partners. Since expensive projects usu-
ally also bear a high risk for the firms undertaking them cost and risk sharing as a 
                                              
166 Hagedoorn (1993) provides many references for all these motives in the original paper. These will 
not be included in the review here, which focuses on more recent evidence. 
167 See also Banerjee and Lin (2001). 
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motive for co-operation might be related to each other168. The increasing com-
plexity and cost of research projects further enhances the role of these motives 
(see also Bayona et al., 2001). Tether (2002) found analyzing data from the sec-
ond Community Innovation Survey (CIS II) that the growing complexity of tech-
nological innovations has indeed led to more cooperative behaviour in the UK. 
His study already points to the second group of motives for co-operation (frame-
work conditions and changing environments), which will be discussed below. 
Competition in the product markets is seen a factor influencing the R&D co-
operation decision of firms by Negassi (2004). He cites Vickers (1985) to make 
his point that “R&D alliances are also competitive strategies to gain market 
share, innovative edge, or to build entry barriers” (Negassi, 2004: 366). He ar-
gues that many empirical researchers have overlooked the impact of market share 
on the R&D co-operative behaviour. The mechanism he proposes is that firms 
with higher market shares are more attractive co-operation partners than firms 
with little market share and are thus more often involved in cooperative agree-
ments. He does not find support for this hypothesis in the empirical part for his 
study and amends his argument: Firms with small market shares will have an 
incentive to cooperate in order to speed up the growth of their market share. Con-
trastingly, Link and Bauer (1987) find evidence that market power is the main 
factor influencing firms’ R&D co-operation decision and that the likelihood for 
co-operating increases with market power. 
Hernan et al. (2003) analyse a similar topic. They look at the effect of the con-
centration of an industry on the R&D co-operation behaviour and find that the – 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index for four-digit sectors does not significantly influ-
ence a firm’s participation in research joint ventures. Kaiser and Licht (1998) 
find no significant impact of the number of competitors in a firms sector on the 
                                              
168 Contrastingly Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and Schmidt (2005b) show that cost and risk have 
opposite effects on the likelihood of firms to cooperate: While risk-sharing has a negative effect, cost-
sharing has a positive effect.  
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decision to cooperate with firms in the same industry, but a significant positive 
effect for co-operation with firms from other industries. 
Miotti and Sachwald (2003) confirms the role of opportunity seeking and mar-
ket access in a firm’s R&D co-operation decision. Their main findings are that 
technology seeking is the major motive for R&D co-operation with most partners 
and firms co-operate in R&D in order to be able to access new (foreign) markets. 
Bayona et al. (2001) in a study of over 1,600 Spanish firms, does not find a sig-
nificant effect for the R&D co-operation motive market access, though. 
Another strategic motive, not mentioned in Hagedoorn (1993) table has been 
identified by Lhuillery and Galia (2006). One of his conclusions analysing 
French CIS 1 and CIS 2 data is that “[…] co-operation failures cannot be consid-
ered independent from the decision to collaborate in R&D […]” (Lhuillery and 
Galia, 2006: Abstract). They do not explain the mechanisms behind this argu-
ment, but their finding that the characteristics of firms which have a high prob-
ability of cooperating are similar to those of firms that have a small probability to 
fail in innovation activities is some evidence that firms take the potential partners 
“strength” into account. Their findings should be considered with care, however. 
They just compare the characteristics of two groups of firms without testing for 
causality between failure and the likelihood of cooperating. 
Motives and Determinants for R&D Co-operation Related to Framework 
Conditions and Changes in Firms’ Business Environment 
The increase in technological partnering among firms is very often attributed to 
changes in the framework conditions for business and innovation activities (e.g. 
Hagedoorn and Schankenraad, 1989, Rocha, 1999, Chesnais, 1988). These 
framework conditions include new technological developments, the increasing 
complexity of technologies, shorter product life-cycles, increased international 
competition and the rising costs of innovation activities (Ragnitz et al., 2003; 
Hagedoorn, 2002; Kaiser, 2002a; Caloghirou et al., 2003; Tether, 2002).  
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Duysters and Hagedoorn (2000) proposes that the above mentioned factors lead 
to a situation where a single firm cannot “monitor all the technological develop-
ments that are important for their core market” (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 2000: 
85). They argue that in these situations R&D co-operation is an effective way to 
monitor a wide range of technological developments, a motive included under 
the strategic motives by Hagedoorn and related to spillovers. Gilsing and Lem-
mens, 2005 proposes that in dynamic environments exploration of outside oppor-
tunities becomes crucial and that R&D co-operation or networking may be one 
way to organise the search process. Bayona et al. (2001) propose that the com-
plexity of a technology is a motive for firms to cooperate on R&D and innova-
tion activities. This argument is based on the finding that co-operation is more 
widespread in industries characterised by complex technologies. 
Overby (2005) looks at the R&D co-operation behaviour of two large players 
(“3”, Vodafone) in the market for mobile internet services to analyse the effect of 
the industry-life cycle on incentives to cooperate. He finds that partner selection 
criteria change over the industry life-cycle. In the exploratory stage, firms may 
choose to ally with weak partners, in terms of resource endowments, in the de-
velopment stage they ally with both weak and strong partners, and in the maturity 
stage of the industry it seems to be optimal to ally with strong partners. 
The framework conditions for cooperative R&D include public support policies 
adopted by national authorities and the European Union, which have encouraged 
the formation of co-operations in R&D and innovation projects (see for data on 
Germany: Fier et al., 2005). Miotti and Sachwald (2003) use data from the 
French CIS II innovation survey to analyse the impact of public funding and 
R&D co-operation with different partners. They find a positive effect of R&D 
subsidies on all types of co-operations except for co-operation with vertically 
related firms. In contrast Belderbos et al. (2004) find no effect of public funding 
for horizontal co-operation and a positive effect for vertical and public-private 
R&D co-operation in their empirical study using CIS I and II data. 
Abramovsky et al. (2005) confirm the central role of public support for R&D co-
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operation. They find that the recipients of public support are more likely to coop-
erate than firms without public support in France, Germany, the UK and Spain. 
Negassi (2004) shows that if a firm has received public support for its innovation 
activities it is more likely to cooperate in all but one of their nine different model 
specifications. Busom and Fernandez-Ribas (2004) find a positive effect of par-
ticipation in national R&D programs on the likelihood of cooperating in their 
estimations using data from the Spanish innovation survey of 1999. The effect is 
particularly strong for public-private partnerships. 
Motives and Determinants for R&D Co-operation Related to Firm 
Characteristics 
An example of an empirical study that models the link between R&D co-
operation and firm characteristics in addition to knowledge spillovers is 
Negassi (2004). Using firm level data on French firms he investigates the role of 
size (measured as total sales), R&D intensity, market share, receipt of public 
funding and several spillover measures on the total budget firms spend on R&D 
co-operation. He finds that firms are spending more on R&D co-operation (an 
indication of their valuation of co-operative agreements) if they are larger and if 
they have a higher R&D intensity. 
Dachs et al. (2004) argue in their literature review that large firms are more 
likely to have the resources to actively look for partners for their innovation pro-
jects and are thus more likely to cooperate than small firms. Large firms also 
have a higher incentive to cooperate with external partners simply because they 
focus on their core business and have to acquire complementary knowledge and 
services from outside their own boundaries (Gerybadze, 2004). If they reduce the 
number of employees in the course of focusing on their core business, the posi-
tive effect of size might become mitigated and not show up in empirical estima-
tions. Fritsch and Lukas (2001) present another argument for the influence of 
size. They argue that if “there exists a given probability for co-operation per unit 
of economic activity” (Fritsch and Lukas, 2001: 300) then large firms should be 
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more likely to conduct co-operative R&D than small firms with less economic 
activity. The majority of empirical studies finds a positive effect of firm size on 
the likelihood of cooperating in R&D(e.g. Röller et al., 2001, Link and Bauer, 
1987 and Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002 (inverse u-shaped)). 
Dachs et al. (2004) argue that the export orientation of firms matters for their 
R&D co-operation decision. They do not find empirical evidence for this hy-
pothesis, however. Busom and Fernandez-Ribas (2004) support this view as they 
do not find empirical evidence for a link between export intensity, measured as 
the share of exports over total sales, and the likelihood of cooperating in R&D, 
however. The mechanism they propose is that exporting firms have access to a 
larger variety and number of potential co-operation partners (e.g. international 
firms) than non-exporting firms and are thus more likely to cooperate. 
R&D intensity (share of R&D in total turnover or share of R&D employment of 
total employment), the total amount spend on R&D activities or a dummy vari-
able for continuous R&D activities is usually included in empirical studies on the 
determinants and motives of R&D co-operative behaviour of firms to control for 
absorptive capacity (see e.g. Bönte and Keilbach, 2005; Fritsch and Lukas, 
2001). In addition to representing a firms ability to source external knowledge 
these indicators can also been seen as a measure of the need of firms for external 
knowledge (Fritsch and Lukas, 2001). The empirical evidence on the link be-
tween R&D measures and R&D co-operation is mixed, however. While some 
studies find a positive effect of R&D activities on the likelihood of cooperating 
on R&D activities (Fritsch and Lukas, 2001; Bönte and Keilbach, 2005 – con-
tinuous R&D; Fontana et al., 2005), others do not (Abramovsky et al., 2005 – 
negative effect for France; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002 – 2-step results; 
Rocha, 1999).169  
As far as the industry of the firm is concerned, Dachs et al. (2004) argue that 
the industry structure, with respect to intensity of competition, technological in-
                                              
169 See Fritsch and Lukas (2001): 301(Footnote 13) for more references. 
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tensity, and appropriability conditions of the respective industry influences a 
firm’s R&D co-operation decision. These findings point to a fundamental prob-
lem of the empirical evidence on the effect of industry on R&D co-operation, i.e. 
empirical models usually include industry dummies to account for factors that are 
industry specific, but cannot include separate variables for specific industry char-
acteristics in their model. What the industry dummies measure thus depends on 
the specific specification of the empirical model170. Usually the empirical studies 
do find an effect of the industry dummies. In the model of Belderbos et al. (2004) 
for example, the service sector dummy is significant and positive for horizontal 
and vertical co-operations. Fritsch and Lukas (2001) show that the industry af-
fects the number of R&D co-operations a firm joins. Tether (2002) finds that low 
technology firms in services are less likely to cooperate than firms from other 
industry groups. Descriptive statistics from the CIS for the member states of the 
European Union also show significant differences in the share of firms involved 
in R&D co-operation in each industry (European Commission, 2004b).  
Motives and Determinants for R&D Co-operation with Different Partners 
Firms can cooperate with various partners as the overview of different types of 
R&D partnerships in subsection 2.5.1 has already shown. This has lead some 
empirical researchers to investigate the motives for specific types of R&D part-
nerships. Bönte and Keilbach (2005) analyse differences in the motives and de-
terminants of informal versus formal R&D co-operations. Kaiser (2002a) looks at 
the difference between co-operative agreements with horizontally and vertically 
related firms. Dachs et al. (2004), Belderbos et al. (2004), 
Abramovsky et al. (2005) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) also investigate 
the relationship between several co-operation motives and the likelihood of co-
operating with customers and suppliers. They go beyond the study by 
Kaiser (2002a), however, and add co-operation with universities and research 
                                              
170 The reference category, i.e. the industry dummy left out, is also different for different empirical mod-
els, making a comparison across different estimations even harder. 
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institutions as an additional type of R&D co-operation. The link between indus-
try and science has been at the centre of attention of the studies by Veugelers and 
Cassiman (2005), Fontana et al. (2005), Fontana et al. (2003), 
Schartinger et al. (2001) and several others. These later studies do not compare 
differences in motives for different types of partners, but point to specific skills 
required and different motives for R&D co-operation with “scientific” partners. 
Hagedoorn (1995) classifies the partners for R&D co-operation by industry and 
shows that leading firms in their industry are more likely to cooperate with exter-
nal partners from other industries. Overby (2005) looks at the resource endow-
ment of the partners and finds that the motives for co-operating with strongly 
endowed and weakly endowed partners differ. For co-operation with suppliers 
and clients Miotti and Sachwald (2003) find: the main motives are “to pool com-
plimentary resources and access more market information” (Miotti and 
Sachwald, 2003: 1496). 
A general conclusion from all these studies is that the importance of a certain 
motives differs for different types of co-operation. This finding is robust to dif-
ferent types of measurement of the R&D co-operation variable and different 
econometric specification and methods, ranging from simple OLS regressions to 
nested logit approaches. 
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7.2 Estimating the Impact of Knowledge Spillovers on the R&D Co-
operation Decision of Firms  
The main focus of my analysis is on the impact of spillovers on the R&D co-
operation decisions of firms. Just including a variables for knowledge spillovers 
in the empirical model used to estimate this impact would be to short-sighted, 
given the large number of motives and determinants for R&D co-operation be-
sides knowledge spillovers. Ideally I should control for all the other motives of 
R&D co-operation identified in the previous section, due to a lack of data and in 
order not to make the analysis to complex, I will not include measures of all de-
terminants and motives, but only a selection. The following subsections will pro-
vide an overview of the motives and determinants included and their expected 
effect on the likelihood of cooperating on R&D and innovation activities. The 
empirical concepts and data used to construct the variables representing each mo-
tive or determinant will also be described. 
7.2.1  The Model of Cassiman and Veugelers – Benchmark Case171 
The model of Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) which has inspired many empiri-
cal papers on the link between knowledge spillovers and R&D co-operation will 
serve as the benchmark for my study172. It has been chosen as the role-model for 
the estimation of a benchmark case, with which the findings of my subsequent 
study can be compared, both for its high profile in the scientific community and 
because it uses a dataset similar to my own (CIS II), making it easily applicable 
to new CIS IV data from Germany, which is used to estimate the benchmark 
model here. Furthermore some of the construct for the variables I will include in 
my focal model to control for motives for R&D co-operation other than knowl-
                                              
171 This subsection largely builds on Schmidt (2005b). 
172 The main goal is not to compare our results with those of Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), but to 
estimate a model with German data, that is set up as the Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) model and 
compare the results with the results from the model using our own spillover measures. 
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edge spillovers, will be based on those proposed by Cassiman and Veugelers 
(2002). 
The Setup of the Empirical Model 
The Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) model cannot be replicated in full, because 
some of the questions used for the construction of the variables by Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) have changed from CIS II to CIS IV and because of multi-
colliniarity between the cost and risk-sharing variable.173 The main structure, the 
construction of all the spillover variables and the variables indicating if a firm 
has cooperated or not is retained, however, despite some shortcoming of the 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) model. Their empirical model can and has been 
criticized for not adequately representing the industry of the firm in the empirical 
model, for the choice of instruments for the 2-stage instrumental variable estima-
tion (see below) and for including the variable for legal protection methods at the 
industry level, rather than at the firm level, like the measure for strategic protec-
tion methods. 
The following figure provides an overview of the empirical model proposed by 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) to estimate the likelihood that a firm is involved 
in at least one external R&D co-operation.174 It includes the type of motive (e.g. 
cost/risk-sharing) and the indicator used to represent the motive in my empirical 
estimation on the effect of knowledge spillovers on R&D co-operation. 
                                              
173 An additional variable (dummy) was included to control for differences in the innovation behaviour 
of Éast and West German firms. It has been well documented that over a decade after reunification, 
East and West German firms still differ in their innovation behaviour (see  e.g. Rammer et al., 2005a) 
and innovation strategies (Sofka and Schmidt, 2004). In Table A-12 in the Appendix the way I con-
structed our measures is compared to that of Cassiman and Veugelers (2002). 
174 The exact formulation of the question is given in the appendix. I only considered R&D co-operation 
with external partners, i.e. suppliers, customers, competitors, commercial laboratories/R&D enter-
prises, universities, or government or private non-profit research institutes. R&D co-operation within 
other firms within a firms enterprise group are excluded from the analysis. 
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Figure 7-2 Potential Factors Influencing a Firm’s Decision to have at Least one 
R&D Co-operation with External Partners 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
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tivities was used. Firms were given four categories to choose from, ranging from 
not used (0) to highly important (3). To construct the incoming spillover variable 
only two of the twelve sources the firms were asked to rate are used, namely pro-
fessional conferences, meetings and journals as one source and exhibitions and 
fairs as the other. The scores for these sources are summed up and divided by the 
maximum sum of scores possible (6) to rescale the firm-specific measure be-
tween zero (not used) and one (highly important). 
Appropriability: To construct an inverse measure of outgoing spillovers infor-
mation on the importance of strategic methods to protect innovations and inven-
tions is used. Like the variable for incoming spillovers, this is only a proxy of the 
level of outgoing spillovers. The question asked the firms to rate the importance 
of protection methods for innovations, ranging from not used (0) to highly impor-
tant (3). To obtain the appropriability variable the scores for all the strategic 
methods (secrecy, complexity of design and lead time) are summed up and di-
vided and the total is divided by the maximum sum possible (9) to rescale the 
firm-specific measure between zero (not relevant) and one (highly important). 
Legal Protection: Additionally, the level of outgoing spillovers is proxied by 
the level of legal protection, which is constructed according to the method used 
for appropriability and using formal protection methods (patents, patterns, trade-
marks, copyrights) instead of strategic methods. The legal protection methods are 
treated separately since their effect on outgoing spillovers is not as distinct as that 
of strategic protection methods. Legal protection methods require firms to dis-
close some of their knowledge and thus generate a special kind of outgoing spill-
overs (see section 6.4.). This variable was included in the model developed by 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) as an industry-level variable (2digit NACE) by 
taking the mean of the individual scores in the industry.  
Since the spillover measures used by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) do not in-
corporate the absorptive capacity of a firm their model includes a dummy vari-
                                                                                                                                    
175 For details on the construction of the variables using the German CIS IV data see Table A-12.  
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able which takes the value one if a firm does R&D continuously, to control for 
the absorptive capacity of a firm. They follow Cohen and Levinthal (1989), who 
argue that R&D activities not only generate new knowledge but also enhance a 
firm’s ability to “identify, assimilate and exploit knowledge from the environ-
ment” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989: 569) and thus raises its ability to profit from 
external sources in general and co-operation in particular. 
The motives not directly related to knowledge flows are also investigated in 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) empirical model. The importance of risk and 
cost as obstacles to innovation activities is a fairly direct measure of the impor-
tance of the cost- and risk-sharing motive for R&D co-operation, and is hence 
part of the empirical model. The more firms are hampered by a lack of finance 
for innovation activities or by excessive risk involved in potential innovative ac-
tivities, the more they will be willing to share the risk with others. Complemen-
tary knowledge as a motive for R&D co-operation is represented in their empiri-
cal model by the importance of the lack of appropriate knowledge as an obstacle 
to innovation. This is not a direct measure of the need for complementary knowl-
edge it nonetheless reflects the need of firms to get access to knowledge which 
they themselves do not possess and can thus be used as a proxy. 
The size of a firm and its industry are not the same kind of motives as the other 
motives in their model. They nonetheless influence the decision to cooperate in 
R&D and are thus included in the model. The size of a firm (measured in terms 
of the number of employees) should positively influence the likelihood of a firm 
being involved in at least one R&D co-operation (see section 7.1).  
Specific features of certain industries – such as the number of enterprises -- not 
captured by the other variables in my empirical model are likely to have an influ-
ence on the probability of cooperating in R&D as well. If an industry is highly 
concentrated, for example, there are less potential co-operation partners. Addi-
tionally, innovation activities in some industries intrinsically require more exter-
nal knowledge than others and should thus evince a higher probability of co-
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operation (for other reasons why the industry might influence the co-operation 
decision see section 7.1). 
Descriptive statistics on the variables constructed using the German CIS IV 
data reveal that firms involved in R&D co-operations in the years 2002-2004 are 
significantly different from those that did not cooperate.176 Cooperating firms are 
on average more than five times larger than non-cooperating firms (1634 com-
pared to 280 employees). Firms involved in R&D co-operation also assign a 
higher importance to incoming and outgoing spillovers than non co-operating 
firms. Among the 534 (31% of the sample) co-operating firms 78% conduct 
R&D continuously, while only 35% of the non-cooperating firms (69% of the 
sample) have continuous R&D activities. Access to complementarity is equally 
important for both types of firms. An interesting insight from the descriptive sta-
tistics is that the share of East German firms in the sample of co-operating firms 
(about 36%) is higher than in the sample of non-cooperating firms (about 30%). 
An explanation might be that East German firms have a stronger need to cooper-
ate on R&D because they lack the channels and resources to develop innovations 
on their own. Equally surprising is that co-operating firms assign a significantly 
higher importance to constraints to their innovation activities than non-
cooperating firms. Following the arguments presented for the endogeniety of this 
variable below, one could have expected that co-operating firms have less prob-
lems with respect high costs and high risk of their innovation projects, because 
they are able to share costs with their research partners. 
Based on the discussion above the formal empirical model looks like this: 
´* coopi i iCooperation X uβ= +  
with  
1 * 0
0
i
i
if Cooperation
Cooperation
otherwise
>⎧= ⎨⎩  
where 
coop
iX  is the column vector representing the variables presented above. 
                                              
176 See Table A-13 in the Appendix for detailed descriptive statistics. 
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In this specification all variables are treated as exogenous. As Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002), Lopez (2004), Schmidt (2005b) and Abramovsky et al. (2005) 
have argued, this might not be the case for some of the variables included in the 
model. Usually the spillover measures, the measures for cost and risk sharing 
(treated as exogenous in Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and those for R&D ac-
tivities are thus treated as endogenous: 
If a firm perceives the cost and risk of a planned innovation project to be pro-
hibitively high, it might be inclined to cooperate with another firm in order to 
overcome these constraints on their innovation activities. However, actually co-
operating with external partners also reduces the risk and cost of projects for an 
individual firm, which indicates that the variable (constraint) may be endoge-
nous. 
Similar arguments can be made with respect to the endogeneity of the variables 
used to capture the importance of external sources of innovation and the impor-
tance of strategic protection methods. Both influence the decision to cooperate 
and are at the same time influenced by the co-operation behaviour of firms. A 
firm which is co-operating in order to obtain knowledge from external sources is 
very likely to assign a higher importance to external sources than a non-
cooperating firm. The same is true for strategic protection methods for innova-
tion. The perceived importance of strategic protection methods is likely to in-
crease with co-operation, since the firm faces the problem that despite interacting 
with a partner more closely than without co-operation, the partners should not be 
able to access knowledge beyond those supposed to be exchanged through the 
co-operative agreement. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) also argue in favour of 
endogenising the importance of strategic protection methods, because this firm-
level measure is subject to measurement errors which can be corrected using a 
two-step procedure. 
Besides cost and risk and the spillover measures, the dummy variable for con-
tinuous R&D activities is assume to be endogenous, based on evidence from 
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Veugelers (1997) and Colombo and Gerrone (1996).177 To take the endogeneity 
of these variables into account, the simple model has been augmented and a two-
step procedure introduced. In the first step the endogenous variables are re-
gressed on all the exogenous variables along with some additional instruments. 
The instruments used in the first stage are the industry level of all the endoge-
nous variables, the export intensity (exports/turnover) of a firm and its research 
focus on basic or applied research, measured as the relative importance of 
knowledge from public institutions compared to knowledge from suppliers and 
customers.178  
The predicted values of the endogenous variables calculated from the first step 
OLS regressions179 are then used in the second stage regressions in order to find 
the determinants of R&D co-operation. 
Since the independent variable of the 2nd step equation is binary (at least on co-
operation Yes-No), the 2nd step was estimated using a probit estimation proce-
dure. According to Greene (1981), the standard errors of the second-stage coeffi-
cients would be biased if the two-step method were applied. In order to correct 
for this bias, the standard errors for the second stage are bootstraped. 
The full model for the specification with the endogenous variables takes the fol-
lowing form: 
? ? ? ? ´
0 1 2 3 4* _ _
coop
ii i ii i iCooperation Spill in Approp RD con Constraint X rα α α α α β= + + + + + +  
with 
1 * 0
0
i
i
if Cooperation
Cooperation
otherwise
>⎧= ⎨⎩  
                                              
177 Note that most of the studies propose an effect of co-operation on R&D intensity and R&D budgets 
not on the longitudinal aspect of R&D activities though. 
178 The validity of these instruments can be challenged. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) argue, however, 
that “It is unlikely that many of these instruments are truly exogenous. Nevertheless, for the purpose 
of our investigation (uncovering the relation between co-operation and spillovers), they will be as-
sumed to be exogenous.” (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002: 1174). 
TP179 PT Angrist, J. and B. Krueger (2001) argue that it is best to use OLS regressions in the first stage even if 
the dependent variable is binary or censored. 
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The first-step regression equations: 
' '
0_
coop
i i i iSpill in Z X vχ χ δ= + + +  
' '
0
coop
i i i iApprop Z X eλ λ σ= + + +  
' '
0_
coop
i i i iRD con Z X kη η ϑ= + + +  
' '
0
coop
i i i iConstraint Z X lς ς τ= + + +  
where coopiX  is the column vector representing the exogenous explanatory vari-
ables of the 2nd step equation. iZ is the column vector of the instruments used in 
the first step regressions and ? ? ? ?_ , , _ ,i ii iSpill in Approp RD con Constraint  represent 
the predicted values calculated from the three first-step OLS regressions for in-
coming spillovers, appropriability, and continuous R&D activities, respectively. 
Results of Estimation of the Cassiman and Veugelers Model for Germany 
The results of both the single step and the two-step estimation of the Cassiman 
and Veugelers (2002) with data from the German part of the Community Innova-
tion survey IV, which contains information on the innovation behaviour of firms 
in the three year period 2002-2004 are reported in Table 6-2. 
Regardless of the estimation procedure applied, the incoming spillover variable 
is positive and highly significant. This is clear evidence that the R&D co-
operation decision of firms is motivated by the need to generate knowledge in-
flows for their innovation activities. In the two stage estimation I also obtain a 
positive and significant effect of complementarities. This indicates that firms try 
to generate knowledge inflows which are complementing their existing in-house 
knowledge. For the measures of outgoing spillovers, i.e. appropriability and the 
level of legal protection at the industry level, I obtain mixed results: In the single 
step procedure appropriability is positive and significant, while it is negative and 
significant when applying the two stage procedure. Given that the second inverse 
measure of outgoing spillovers is negative and significant in both cases, I think it 
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is fair to conclude, that the prevention of outgoing spillovers is a motive for R&D 
co-operation.  
Another motive for which I find support in both equations is continuous R&D 
activities. If interpreted as a measure of absorptive capacity, this indicates that 
firms which are better able to “identify, assimilate and exploit knowledge from 
the environment” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990: 569) are more likely to cooperate, 
again stressing the fact that knowledge spillovers are the most important drivers 
of R&D co-operation. The variable for R&D activities can also be interpreted as 
an indicator of how much value firms place on innovation and R&D activities. At 
first sight it seems tautological that firms involved in R&D on a continuous basis, 
are more likely to cooperate in R&D. The opposite could, however, also be the 
case: The more R&D a firm does in-house the less dependent it becomes on ex-
ternal knowledge since it is able to produce the knowledge needed for its innova-
tion activities itself. My results show that this effect is not very strong or at least 
it is outweighed by the positive effect of doing R&D on the willingness and abil-
ity to work together on R&D activities with external partners. This increased 
willingness to conduct research with external partners might come from a 
broader R&D approach or a larger set of technological opportunities the firm sees 
or actually tries to exploit. That cost and risk sharing are a motive for R&D co-
operation is also confirmed. 
For all other variables, I cannot provide a clear cut conclusion, since the effects 
differ between the two empirical methods applied and depend on the endogeniety 
structure chosen. 
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Table 7-2 Coefficients of Probit Estimations of the Probability to have at Least 
one R&D Co-operation between 2002 and 2004 
  Simple Probit 2- Step Procedure 
Incoming Spillovers (I) 0.539 *** 3.621 *** 
  (0.157) (0.966) 
Appropriability (I) 0.676 *** -3.535 *** 
  (0.115) (1.132) 
Legal Protection (industry level) -1.591 ** -1.122 * 
  (0.642) (0.745) 
Continuous R&D Activities (I) 0.708 *** 3.851 *** 
  (0.082) (0.565) 
Size -0.194 ** -0.061 ZZ 
  (0.097) (0.145) 
Size, squared 0.032 *** 0.019 ZZ 
  (0.010) (0.014) 
Constraints (I) 0.452 *** 3.195 *** 
  (0.136) (0.976) 
Complementarities 0.187 0.781 *** 
  (0.152) (0.347) 
East Germany 0.320 *** -0.069 
 (0.078) 0.099 
Industry–level of Co-operation 2.801 *** 0.598 
 (0.378) (0.506) 
Constant -2.307 *** -5.244 *** 
 (0.300) (0.981) 
Observations 1,720 1,720 
X^2 407.89 358.46 
Loglikelihood -813.294 -812.124 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10% 
zzz jointly significant at 1%; zz jointly significant at 5%; z jointly significant at 10% 
(I) Instrumented in the second stage;  
Robust standard errors in parentheses (bootstrapped with 250 draws to correct for bias induced 
by the two-step procedure). 
Source: Own calculations. 
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7.2.2 Estimating the Impact of Knowledge Spillovers on R&D Co-
operation decisions of Firms with the Constructed Spillover 
Variables 
This part of my study deals with the estimation of the link between the spillover 
measures for realized incoming and outgoing spillovers constructed in the previ-
ous chapters and a firm’s likelihood of cooperating on R&D. I will not only dis-
tinguish between incoming and outgoing spillover, like I have done in the previ-
ous section, but also between realized intra-industry and extra-industry incoming 
spillovers, which is the combination of scientific spillover pools and inter-
industry spillover pools. Due to the high correlation between realized scientific 
incoming spillover and inter-industry spillovers180 I cannot further differentiate 
the extra-industry spillovers. 
The Setup of the Empirical Model 
The structure of the model and the methodology used is very similar to that of 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002). I address some of the shortcomings of the 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) model though and will go beyond their model by 
including addition variables in order to control for a wider range of motives. The 
data base for the variables other than the spillover measures will be the German 
CIS IV survey which has been described and mentioned in the previous chapters 
and sections. 
My empirical model is set-up as follows181: 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value one if a firm has 
cooperated with at least one external partner on their innovation activities. 182  
                                              
180 The correlation coefficient between the two variables is at 0.7041 and highly significant. 
181 A detailed description of the construction of the variables included in this model can be found in 
Table A-12 in the appendix. 
182 The exact formulation of the question is given in Table A- 15 the appendix. I only considered R&D 
co-operation with external partners, i.e. suppliers, customers, competitors, commercial laborato-
ries/R&D enterprises, universities, or government or private non-profit research institutes. R&D co-
operation within other firms within a firms enterprise group are excluded from the analysis. 
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Suppliers, customers, competitors, commercial laboratories/R&D enterprises, 
universities, or government or private non-profit research institutes are consid-
ered as external partners. 
The spillover variables included are the realized incoming and outgoing spill-
over variables constructed in the previous chapters. In addition to that I estimate 
a model where I spilt up the incoming spillovers into spillovers from a firm’s 
own industry and spillovers from other industries plus spillovers from scientific 
sources, like research institutes and universities. All my spillover measures are 
assumed to be exogenous because they are constructed using the past innovation 
expenditure of firms, which is not influenced by the current co-operation behav-
iour I want to explain. Since my spillover measures already include the absorp-
tive capacity of the firm, I do not add an additional variable for absorptive capac-
ity, like the R&D intensity or a dummy for continuous R&D activities. 
In order to control for motives for R&D co-operation beyond knowledge spill-
overs, I include a dummy variable which is one if the firm has received any form 
of financial public support for its innovation activities during the years 2002 to 
2004. As the literature review above has shown a positive effect of public sup-
port on the likelihood to cooperate can be expected. 
While the public support variable belongs into the group of motives related to 
framework conditions, the number of main competitors a firm has, the impor-
tance of cost- and risk as a hampering factor for innovation activities and the 
need for complementary knowledge belong to the group of strategic motives. The 
number of main competitors can be taken directly from the Mannheim Innova-
tion Panel survey, which included a question on this topic. It serves as a proxy 
for the intensity of competition in the firms market. The other two strategic mo-
tives for R&D co-operation are taken from a question on hampering factors and 
are constructed in exactly the same way as in the benchmark model. The variable 
representing cost- and risk-sharing motives is assumed to be endogenous in this 
model, for the reasons discussed in the previous subsection. 
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The group of co-operation motives related to firms’ characteristics is repre-
sented by five variables. I include the size of the firm measured as the total num-
ber of employees both directly (in natural logarithm) and as a squared term, to 
allow for a non-linear effect of size on the likelihood of cooperating. Another 
firm characteristic I control for is firms’ location in East or West Germany. A 
major shortcoming of the Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) model is its treatment 
of the industry. I will address this issue and include dummies for industry groups 
instead of using the industry-level of R&D co-operation to control for industry 
differences that are not picked up by the other variables included in the model. 
Following Dachs et al. (2004) and Busom and Fernandez-Ribas (2004) I also 
include the export orientation of a firm in my model. Instead of the export inten-
sity, measured as the share of exports of total turnover I use a dummy variable, 
which is one if the firm had any exports between 2002 and 2004. A final motive 
related to firm characteristics is firms’ age. 
Analogous to the benchmark case I use an instrumental variable maximum like-
lihood probit estimation procedure to control for the endogeneity of the con-
straint variable. The instruments used in the first step are the average importance 
of all hampering factors to innovation activities between 2002 and 2004 (except 
constraints, complementarities and lack of technological information) and the 
total value of a firm’s tangible assets. The first instrument can be interpreted as a 
measure of uncertainty which influences the level of risk a firm has to take when 
developing an innovation. The total value of tangible assets is seen as a measure 
of the financial situation of the firm and should influence the valuation of costs 
as an obstacle to innovation.183 In order to control for the endogeniety bias in-
duced by the two step procedure bootstrapped standard errors will be reported. 
I will first estimate a model which only distinguishes between realized outgoing 
and realized incoming spillovers, which are the sum of realized inter-industry, 
intra-industry and scientific spillovers. This analysis will be supplemented by an 
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estimation where I split-up the realized incoming spillovers into realized intra-
industry spillovers and realized extra-industry spillovers, which include realized 
spillovers from scientific institutions and inter-industry spillovers. 
Some Descriptive Statistics184 
The descriptive statistics for my sample of 556 firms, for which all the variables 
mentioned above are available185, provide some interesting insight. A first obser-
vation is that the sample is almost evenly split between firms that were involved 
in at least one R&D co-operation between 2002 and 2004 (45% with R&D co-
operation, 55% without). The R&D co-operating firms are thus clearly overrepre-
sented in my sample as the expanded figure for the whole population of enter-
prises in Germany is at around 24%. 
For the realized spillover variables I find significant differences between co-
operating and non-cooperating firms, except for outgoing spillovers. Even though 
the average value for outgoing spillovers is 51.4 for firms involved in R&D co-
operation and 28.9 for firms without, this difference is not statistically signifi-
cant. For all intra- and inter-industry spillovers I find significant differences. In 
both cases the average values for cooperating firms is almost double that for non-
cooperating firms.  
For the variables controlling for other motives than knowledge spillovers, I find 
significant differences for all variables except for the complementarities variable 
and the other manufacturing industry dummy. Most striking are the differences 
for funding and the size of the firm: 79.4% of all firms involved in R&D co-
                                                                                                                                    
183 Wald-tests with 90%-confidence levels show that the instruments are exogenous for both estimations. 
Furthermore, the Anderson canonial correlation LR-test confirms that the instruments are valid. 
184 More detailed descriptive statistics are provided in Table A-16 in the Appendix. 
185 Throughout the empirical part of this study I had to reduce the number of observations. The reasons 
are manifold and include item-non-response, questions only asked for a subgroup of firms (innovat-
ing and co-operating) and the usage of different surveys which are associated with unit-non-response. 
Because the selection bias, if it existed, were caused by many different reasons an effective control 
for it cannot be designed. 
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operation get public funding for their innovation activities. The corresponding 
figure for non-cooperating firms is 23.1%. The average size of co-operating firms 
is four times (2,058 employees) that of non-cooperating firms (507 employees). 
For the distribution across industries I find that the share of high-tech firms from 
both the service and the manufacturing sector is higher in the group of firms in-
volved in R&D co-operation than in the group of non-cooperating firms. 
The only two variables (besides industry dummies) for which I find significant 
higher values in the group of non-cooperating firms, are the number of main 
competitors and the age of the firms I investigate. That the co-operating firms are 
younger on average can be interpreted in the sense that younger firms lack the 
necessary resources to develop and commercialize innovations on their own and 
thus cooperate with external partners. The fact that the number of main competi-
tors is higher for non-cooperating firms than for co-operating firms, can be inter-
preted in light of the literature that proposes a dampening impact of co-operation 
on competition. The finding should not be over interpreted, however, since de-
scriptive statistics are not able to provide any insight on causality. 
To summarize, the descriptive statistics provide further evidence that my ex-
pectations about the positive influence of knowledge spillovers on R&D co-
operation is warranted. 
Results of Instrumental Variable Probit Estimations 
The results of the instrumental variable probit estimations (IV-Probit) are re-
ported in Table 7-3 below. 
A first striking result is that the variable for outgoing spillovers is insignificant. 
Contrary to my first hypothesis H1a - “The level of realized outgoing knowledge 
spillovers has a positive effect on the probability that firms will cooperate on 
R&D and innovation activities.” (page 64) – the level of outgoing spillovers does 
neither positively nor negatively influence a firm’s decision to cooperate on 
R&D. This is an even more surprising result, given that in the benchmark case, 
 193 
outgoing spillovers had a significant positive influence186 on the co-operation 
decision in the two step estimation. Taking everything together, the mixed results 
in the benchmark case and the insignificance in this model, hypothesis H1a has 
to be rejected. The amount of knowledge produced by a firm and not protected 
by patents or secrecy does not seem to play a role in the firm’s decision to coop-
erate with external partners, at least not directly. It may have an indirect influ-
ence through its effect on absorptive capacity, which influences the level of real-
ized incoming spillovers. What is more, the amount of knowledge spilling out is 
a potential incoming spillover for others, which as I will see below influences the 
co-operation decision positively.187  
I find support for my hypothesis H1b – “The level of realized incoming knowl-
edge spillovers has a positive effect on the probability that firms will cooperate 
on R&D and innovation activities.” (page 64). In column (1) of Table 7-3 the 
results for the empirical model with one measure for incoming and outgoing 
spillovers each, show that incoming spillover have a positive and significant ef-
fect on firms’ R&D co-operation decisions. This finding is robust to different 
assumptions about the endogeniety structure, different model specifications and 
different measures of incoming spillovers, as the benchmark results and the re-
sults of the IV-Probit estimation indicate.  
Due to the high correlation between realized spillovers from scientific institutes 
and realized spillovers from firms in other industries I could only include one 
measure for extra-industry spillovers and not one for inter-industry and scientific 
knowledge each as originally intended. Nonetheless I am able to extend the exist-
ing literature and investigate the difference between spillovers from a firm’s own 
                                              
186 Note that a negative coefficient on the measures of outgoing spillovers in the benchmark case as an 
indicator of a positive effect of the amount of knowledge spilling out, since they measure the amount 
of knowledge protected and appropriated by firms.  
187 This argument suggests that realized incoming and realized outgoing spillovers are highly correlated. 
The lag structure chosen and the distinction between potential and realized knowledge spillovers ob-
viously solved this potential problem, as the correlation coefficient between the two measures is in-
significant and only -0.0195. 
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industry versus realized knowledge spillovers from outside sources. I find that 
extra-industry spillovers are motives for firms to form R&D partnerships, while 
intra-industry spillovers are not, confirming my second hypothesis – “Realized 
Incoming knowledge spillovers from different sources influence a firm’s decision 
to cooperate on R&D and innovation activities differently.” (p. 64). 
The insignificance of intra-industry realized knowledge spillovers is particu-
larly surprising. An explanation could be, that two opposing forces are at work 
which cancel each other out. Firms that realize a lot of incoming spillovers from 
their own industry might be less likely to cooperate, because they can generate 
incoming intra-industry knowledge spillovers without having to cooperate and 
incurring the cost of doing that. This argument builds on the RBV of the firm 
which proposes that firms cooperate in order to access valuable re-
sources/knowledge held by other firms. According to the classic industrial or-
ganisation theory, however, a high level of knowledge spillovers should increase 
the likelihood of cooperating on R&D, because firms have an incentive to inter-
nalize the spillover through co-operation. My findings should not be over inter-
preted but can be seen as a first indication that both effects are present and in my 
case offset each other for intra-industry spillovers. 
For extra-industry spillovers this is not the case. Here I find the same effect as 
for the realized incoming spillover variable, i.e. a positive and significant effect 
on the probability of cooperating in R&D. An explanation could be that the 
knowledge acquired from sources outside a firm’s own industry is different from 
knowledge acquired from within the industry. The argument presented above that 
high spillovers alleviate the willingness to cooperate might not be valid for inter-
industry and scientific knowledge. In order to use this external knowledge effi-
ciently it might be cheaper to cooperate than to incorporate it into ones own 
products or processes without the help of the producer of the knowledge. Co-
operating may be a cheap and efficient way to transfer the knowledge from one 
industry to another if the technological distance between the partners is large. 
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In the section on absorptive capacity above I have already established that dif-
ferent absorptive capacities are necessary for knowledge from science and firms 
form other industries. This difference was already taken into account in the con-
struction of the spillover measure, thus the difference between the effects of the 
two spillover measures cannot exclusively come from the different levels of ab-
sorptive capacity.  
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Table 7-3 Results of Instrumental Variable Probit Estimations on the Determi-
nants of R&D Co-operation between 2002 and 2004 
 
Model with incoming 
and outgoing spill-
overs 
(1) 
Model with intra-
industry and extra-
industry incoming and 
outgoing spillovers 
(2) 
Realized Outgoing Spillover -0.00006 -0.00006 
 (0.0007) (0.0003) 
Realized Incoming Spillovers 0.00003**  
 (0.00001)  
Realized Intra-Industry Spillovers  0.00004 
  (0.00004) 
Realized Extra-Industry Spillovers  0.00002** 
  (0.000009) 
Other Motives:   
Public funding (dummy) 1.271*** 1.273*** 
 (0.165) (0.163) 
Number of main competitors -0.109 -0.108 
 (0.104) (0.080) 
Complementarities 0.050 0.047 
 (0.322) (0.273) 
Constraints (I) 1.616*** 1.630*** 
 (0.454) (0.419) 
Exports 0.410** 0.411** 
 (0.322) (0.187) 
Size (number of employees) 0.182 ZZZ 0.184 ZZZ 
 (0.218) (0.187) 
Size, squared (number of employ-
ees) -0.001
 ZZZ -0.001 ZZZ 
 0.020 (0.019) 
Age in years -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.003) 
East Germany (dummy) -0.092 -0.094 
 (0.151) (0.174) 
Number of observations 586 586 
X^2 245.41 293.83 
Log Likelihood -253.652 -251.077 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; ZZZ  jointly significant at 1% level;  
(I) Instrumented variable;  
Bootstrapped Standard Errors in parentheses;  
Constant and Six Industry included. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Only some of the variables controlling for motives beyond knowledge spill-
overs are significant: My results highlight the role of public funding as a motive 
for R&D co-operation. The coefficient is positive and highly significant as ex-
pect. This is not surprising as more and more R&D funding programs of the 
German government and the European Union are directed at collaborative R&D. 
I also confirm many empirical studies that find that the sharing of costs and risks 
is a motive for firms to forge R&D partnerships with external partners, a finding 
consistent with the benchmark case. Furthermore I show that exporting firms are 
more likely to cooperate than non-exporting firms. These exporting firms seem to 
try to counter the pressure to develop highly-innovative and complex products 
and processes for the foreign markets in an ever shorter time, by forming co-
operative agreements with external patterns. Finally, the size of a firm has an in-
verse U-shaped influence on the R&D co-operation decision in my IV-Probit re-
gression. In the benchmark case this influence turns out to be U-shaped. The 
turning points calculated from the obtained coefficients lay outside of the cover-
age of my sample in both cases. For the benchmark case the turning point is at 
4.8 employees and for the IV-Probit case at 9*1039 . A scatter plot of the parabola 
further reveals that the relationship between size and the likelihood of cooperat-
ing is almost linear in the interval of my observations for the IV-Probit estima-
tion. In summary, the benchmark case and the IV-Probit case confirm that the 
probability of cooperating increases with firm size. 
l 
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8 Summary and Conclusion 
The preceding empirical study has both answered questions on the role of 
knowledge spillovers in firms’ R&D co-operation decisions and raised new ques-
tions which should be addressed in future studies. In this chapter I will summa-
rize the main findings of my study and provide suggestions for future research. 
The starting point for the analysis was the observation that more and more 
firms are moving to an innovation strategy that includes R&D and innovation 
partnerships with a variety of external partners and that access to knowledge is 
one of the key reasons for this change in strategy. A literature review of both 
theoretical and empirical work on R&D co-operations underscored this observa-
tion. Many researchers from various fields have shown that knowledge spillovers 
pose an incentive to form R&D co-operations. On the theoretical side, I reviewed 
the industrial organization literature, the transaction cost literature and the litera-
ture ascribed to the resource based view of the firm. Even though they differ in 
their interpretation of the phenomenon of R&D co-operation among firms, these 
three strands of literature propose a positive relationship between knowledge 
spillovers and R&D co-operation. On the empirical side, this positive effect has 
been confirmed by many studies using the Community Innovation Surveys in 
different countries and other databases. 
These findings lead us to formulate the following three main hypotheses: 
H1a: The level of realized outgoing knowledge spillovers has a positive effect 
on the probability that firms will cooperate on R&D and innovation activities. 
H1b: The level of realized incoming knowledge spillovers has a positive effect 
on the probability that firms will cooperate on R&D and innovation activities. 
H2: Realized Incoming knowledge spillovers from different sources influence a 
firm’s decision to cooperate on R&D and innovation activities differently. 
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In order to test these hypotheses empirically I took two main steps, the con-
struction of realized knowledge spillover pools and the estimation of their impact 
on firms’ R&D co-operation decisions using data on the innovation activities and 
co-operation behaviour from the Mannheim Innovation Panel surveys of 2001, 
2003 and 2005 and information on firms’ R&D expenditures from the MIP sur-
veys from 1996 to 2002. Information on the R&D expenditure of industries in 
Germany comes from the ANBERD database of the OECD. 
The first step was to construct adequate measures of realized knowledge spill-
over pools, which consisted of: 
o Construction of the knowledge stock of individual firms, industries and 
scientific institutions 
o Determination of the impact of patents and secrecy on knowledge flows 
o Estimation of the level of firms’ absorptive capacities 
The construction of the knowledge stocks followed given conventions in so far 
as I took the total amount spent on R&D activities as a proxy for the knowledge 
generated in an industry. In order to add up the flow of R&D expenditure to a 
total stock of R&D expenditure I used the perpetual inventory method. I ex-
tended the existing literature by using the inverse of the average product life-
cycle as the depreciation rate instead of arbitrary assumptions of 10% or 15% 
depreciation rates. 
In order to determine how much of the total knowledge produced by the firm 
(knowledge stock) is actually available outside the firm’s boundaries I tried to 
determine the influence of patents and secrecy on knowledge spillovers. My hy-
pothesis that both types of protection method hinder knowledge flows was con-
firmed. An estimation of the actual level of knowledge protection could not be 
generated, however. In order to be able to proceed with the study anyway, I as-
sumed that the importance of patents and secrecy is an indirect measure for the 
level of knowledge protected from spilling over to other firms. I further assumed 
that knowledge generated in public research institutions is not protected from 
 200 
spilling over into the public domain. The products of this exercise were the po-
tential knowledge spillover pools, i.e. the knowledge that is produced which 
spills out and can potentially be used by other firms in an economy, for a firm’s 
knowledge (outgoing) and intra-industry, inter-industry and scientific knowledge 
(incoming), respectively. 
In order to arrive at the knowledge spillover pools a firm actually uses (“real-
ized incoming spillover pools”) I weighted the potential incoming knowledge 
spillover pools with firms’ ability to acquire and make use of external knowl-
edge, i.e. its absorptive capacity. In that part of the study I extended the existing 
literature by empirically confirming my hypothesis that different types of knowl-
edge require different types of absorptive capacity. As in the case of patents and 
secrecy, I was faced with the problem of constructing a measure of the level of 
absorptive capacity. I ended up using the predicted likelihood (based on my mul-
tivariate analysis) that a firm has absorptive capacities of a certain type as a 
proxy, to construct levels of absorptive capacity for three different types of 
knowledge: knowledge from a firm’s own industry, sources outside a firm’s own 
industry and scientific sources. 
In the second step of my analysis the realized knowledge spillover pools were 
included in an empirical model that tries to explain what factors affect the likeli-
hood that a firm will cooperate in R&D and innovation activities and how. Of the 
three hypotheses above only two could be confirmed, namely hypothesis 1b and 
2. I found evidence that incoming spillovers are a main determinant of R&D co-
operation among firms and between firms and research institutions. Splitting up 
the incoming spillovers into knowledge spillovers from a firm’s own industry 
and from other industries I find that only extra-industry spillovers have a positive 
effect on the likelihood of cooperating in R&D. 
Even though I had a wealth of data at hand and extended the existing literature 
in several directions, I was not able to address all the questions and solve all the 
problems the research on R&D co-operation and knowledge spillovers has posed. 
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One of the main limatitions for which this study could be criticised is that I am 
not able to distinguish between firms that do not want to cooperate and those that 
are not able to cooperate due to their own specific situation or due to a lack of 
suitable partners. This issue is not only relevant for the decision to co-operation, 
but also for the analysis of absorptive capacity and knowledge spillovers in gen-
eral. To give an example, if the firm is a technology leader at the frontier of its 
industry, it does not rely on access to knowledge held by other firms in the indus-
try, but rather generates knowledge spillovers to other, less advanced firms. It 
does not have to use a lot of knowledge spillovers to be successful. My data does 
not allow us to distinguish between those firms that do not want and those firms 
that cannot co-operate, future surveys could take this into account. A first step in 
that direction has already made by the research on networks, where each partner 
in the network (and its assets and knowledge stocks) is known and can be com-
pared to firms outside the network. 
One issue I did not address is the relationship between knowledge flows within 
the co-operative agreement versus those between the R&D partnership members 
and non-members or versus knowledge spillovers in an economy in general. A 
topic related to the discussion of endogenous and exogenous spillovers in the 
non-tournament literature. For a more detailed analysis of the link between 
knowledge flows and R&D co-operation this differentiation should be taken into 
account. A question that has to be answered in this domain is whether R&D co-
operation merely helps to internalize spillovers that would have happened any-
way or if R&D co-operations lead to additional knowledge spillovers both among 
members and between member and non-members. Whether the latter additional-
ity existed, is specifically relevant for public policy, as one goal of funding re-
search partnerships is to generate more spillovers than without R&D co-
operation. By constructing the realized knowledge spillover pools the way I did 
above I implicitly focused on knowledge spillovers within an economy without 
looking at the knowledge transfer between partners of a R&D agreement. 
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My main approach was to conduct a cross-sectional analysis, with some built-in 
lag structure, in so far that the knowledge stocks were constructed for the begin-
ning of my observation period. A panel data analysis would have allowed us to 
look, among other things, at the influence of knowledge spillovers on the lifespan 
of R&D co-operations.  
The findings of my study are, however, not only of interest to academic re-
searchers, but also those working in the world of business may also find them 
informative. The last section in which I investigate the determinants of R&D co-
operation, hold little news for practitioners, because I do not look at the success 
of R&D co-operation or problems related to stability and costs, topics which 
would be of interest for managers. Instead I take stock of firms’ behaviour. 
I can give some practical advice on absorptive capacities, however. I have 
clearly shown that the stimulation of knowledge transfer among a firm’s employ-
ees is a prerequisite for absorbing and exploiting external knowledge. What is 
more, I identify different determinants for different types of absorptive capacity, 
some of them not related to R&D activities. On these grounds I can suggest that 
managers should take into account which type of knowledge their firm needs 
most and set up their knowledge management systems accordingly. Some further 
implications for practitioners come out of the discussion of patents and secrecy 
as ways of reducing knowledge flows. I find that the use of patents and secrecy 
has the strongest impact on the innovation activities within a firm’s own industry, 
but no significant impact in other industries. This gives firms an opportunity to 
follow a mixed strategy. They are able to protect their knowledge from their 
competitors in their own industry, while still allowing firms in other industries to 
use it. These innovation strategies with respect to other industries may help firms 
to profit from the use of their knowledge in other industries. 
I am certain that through knowledge spillovers among economists, practitioners 
and policymakers and co-operation on academic research and (paper) develop-
ment the remaining questions will be answered in detail. 
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Appendix 
Question on R&D and Innovation Co-operation from the CIS IV survey: 
6.2 During the three years 2002 to 2004, did your enterprise cooperate on any 
of your innovation activities with other enterprises or institutions? Innovation co-
operation is active participation with other enterprises or non-commercial insti-
tutions on innovation activities. Both partners do not need to commercially bene-
fit. Exclude pure contracting out of work with no active co-operation. 
Yes  ?       No  ?   
6.3 Please indicate the type of co-operation partner and location       
 (Tick all that apply)  
Type of co-operation partner Germany
Other 
Europe 
USA 
Other 
Coun-
tries 
A. Other enterprises within your en-
terprise group 
    
B. Suppliers of equipment, materials, 
components, or software 
    
C. Clients or customers     
D. Competitors or other enterprises in 
your sector 
    
E. Consultants, commercial labs, or 
private R&D institutes 
    
F. Universities or other higher educa-
tion institutions 
    
G. Government or public research 
institutes 
    
Source: Eurostat (2004). 
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Appendix to Chapter 5 The Construction of the Potential Outgoing Spillover 
Pools/Knowledge Stocks at the Industry and Firm-Level 
Table A-1 Intramural R&D Expenditure in Industry and Services in Billion (cur-
rent) Euros form 1995 to 2002 
NACE 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
15 187.644 179.317 173.328 170.403 188.667 190.564 238.863 250.979
16 29.655 22.751 16.873 21.332 29.144 29.437 36.898 38.770
17 139.583 145.080 153.388 150.362 173.328 172.792 191.627 188.351
18 14.827 21.980 30.678 29.669 33.745 33.641 37.308 36.670
19 7.158 6.650 6.136 4.545 3.579 3.568 3.957 3.889
20 30.166 27.974 26.076 25.955 26.076 25.898 24.683 21.896
21 78.228 68.543 60.332 69.158 80.273 79.727 75.984 67.405
22 26.076 25.280 24.542 24.428 24.542 24.375 23.231 20.608
23 65.957 69.945 75.671 61.580 47.550 50.000 56.000 50.000
24 4847.0475078.800 5429.4095820.0355694.258 6030.000 5920.000 5940.000
25 393.695 431.459 481.637 432.042 616.107 610.000 612.000 600.000
26 275.586 268.129 265.872 274.564 335.407 410.000 389.000 290.000
27 269.962 270.186 276.097 266.467 259.225 253.834 284.947 277.264
28 386.025 404.507 432.553 469.136 516.916 506.166 568.208 552.887
29 3062.1273088.631 3190.9733451.7813403.159 3380.000 3763.000 3820.000
30 1052.239 846.645 673.371 643.796 633.491 653.351 727.122 704.283
31 1942.3981367.045 876.866 930.2111021.050 1053.060 1171.964 1135.152
32 2707.2913004.036 3276.3593394.8143642.443 3756.633 4180.805 4049.484
33 1616.1941549.299 1499.6191552.7071664.766 1716.956 1910.822 1850.803
34 5723.9136280.709 6991.9167976.7579420.04210530.000 10660.00011000.000
35 2527.8282690.326 2918.9652663.2272560.550 2800.000 1846.000 2490.000
36 155.433 144.768 136.515 196.459 171.283 175.290 165.444 155.712
37 5.113 4.564 4.090 5.548 4.602 4.710 4.445 4.184
40-41 114.018 102.77 91.521 82.829 106.86 110.000 58.000 60.000
45 74.137 83.341 93.055 90.499 87.942 80.000 54.000 50.000
50-52 33.234 35.791 38.347 84.619 130.891 143.577 156.264 236.213
60-63 187.133 192.463 197.793 304.487 411.181 410.000 822.000 820.000
65-67 27.098 17.384 7.669 10.226 12.782 14.472 16.162 24.431
72 111.973 304.219 496.464 681.041 865.617 860.603 895.878 875.969
73 182.531 300.640 418.748 639.882 861.016 880.000 891.116 871.313
74 388.582 390.116 391.65 419.260 446.869 372.497 462.491 452.213
Source: Own calculation based on OECD (2003) and Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissen-
schaft-Wissenschaftsstatistik (2005). 
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Table A-2 Gross domestic R&D expenditure (GERD) by Government and 
Higher Education Institutes in Billion (current) Euros from 1995 
to 2002 in Germany 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
GERD  13643.7 13957.5 13949.1 14314.9 14568.2 15019.0 15188.9 15463.0
Source: Own calculation based on OECD (2003). 
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Appendix to Section 6.4 The Effects of Patents and Secrecy on Knowledge 
Spillovers 
Table A-3 Variables included in the Model on the Relationship between Patents 
and Secrecy and Knowledge Spillovers  
Variable Type Construction 
Hemm_tech_info ordered Variable that takes a value between 0 and 1 according to 
the following scheme: The lack of information on technol-
ogy as an obstacle to innovation was not relevant (0), of 
minor importance (1), important (2), or very important (3).
Pat_ind Index Importance of patent protection as a method to protect in-
ventions and innovations, rescaled between 0 (not used) to 
1 (highly important). Calculated at the industry level ex-
cluding the firm in question. 
Pat_sector Index Importance of patent protection as a method to protect in-
ventions and innovations, rescaled between 0 (not used) to 
1 (highly important). Calculated at the sector level exclud-
ing the industry of the firm in question. 
Secr_ind Index Importance of secrecy as a method to protect inventions 
and innovations, rescaled between 0 (not used) to 1 (highly 
important). Calculated at the industry level excluding the 
firm in question. 
Secr_sector Index Importance of secrecy as a method to protect inventions 
and innovations, rescaled between 0 (not used) to 1 (highly 
important). Calculated at the sector level excluding the in-
dustry of the firm in question. 
Prot_sector Index Importance of secrecy and patents as a method to protect 
inventions and innovations, rescaled between 0 (not used) 
to 1 (highly important). Calculated at the sector level ex-
cluding the industry of the firm in question. 
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Variable Type Construction 
Rel_secr_ind % Share of firms indicating that secrecy is more important 
than patents (industry level). 
Rel_pat_ind % Share of firms indicating that patents are more important 
than secrecy (industry level). 
Grads 
% Share of employees with higher education in total employ-
ees. 
R&D_int % Share of R&D expenditure in turnover, 2004 
(Zero for firms without innovation activities). 
R&D_int2 % Share of R&D expenditure in turnover, 2004, squared  
(Zero for firms without innovation activities). 
R&Dcon Dummy One, if firm was engaged in R&D activities continuously. 
bed_hemm Dummy One, if firm perceived at least one of 13 obstacles to inno-
vation as medium important. 
Mneu Dummy One, if the firm introduced at least one product innovation 
that was new to its market between 2002 and 2004. 
Pz Dummy One, if the firm introduced at least one process innovation 
between 2002 and 2004. 
Lnempl Log Natural logarithm of number of employees in 2004. 
Lnempl2 
Log Natural logarithm of number of employees in 2004, 
squared. 
East Dummy One, if a firm is located in Eastern Germany. 
bres_1 Dummy One, if a firm is from medium-low-tech manufacturing. 
bres_1 Dummy One, if a firm is from high-tech manufacturing. 
bres_2 Dummy One, if a firm is from high-tech services. 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Table A-4 Industries Included in the Model on the Relationship between Patents 
and Secrecy and Knowledge Spillovers 
Name Label NACE 
Other manufacturing and 
services 
bres_0 10-22; 24 (excl. 244); 29; 31; 34-37 
(excl. 353); 40-41; 45; 50-52; 60-67; 70-
74; 90; 92 
Medium-low-tech  
manufacturing 
bres_1 23; 25-28; 351 
High-tech manufacturing bres_2 244; 30;32; 33; 353 
High-tech services bres_3 64; 72; 73 
Source: Own illustration, classification based on the Eurostat and OECD classification for tech-
nology and knowledge intensive sectors (Eurostat, 2006). 
Table A-5 Additional Descriptive Statistics for the Sample used to Estimate the 
Effect of Patents and Secrecy on Knowledge Spillovers 
Lack of information on 
technologies is 
Number of Observations Percentage of Total 
Very important 64 1.9% 
Important 360 10.6% 
Somewhat important 1,304 38.3% 
Not relevant 1,675 49.2% 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Table A-6 Descriptive Statistics (Means) for the Sample used to Estimate the 
Effect of Patents and Secrecy on Knowledge Spillovers 
  Sample 
Firms with-
out  
lack of in-
formation 
on tech-
nologies 
Firms with 
lack  
of informa-
tion on 
technologies 
T-Test for 
mean dif-
ference 
Observations 3,403 1,675 1,728  
% of total - 49.2% 50.8%  
Importance of patent protection 
(industry level) 0.188 0.165 0.210 -7.553 
  (0.173) (0.167) (0.177)  
Importance of strategic protection
(industry level) 0.291 0.268 0.313 -7.963 
  (0.165) (0.161) (0.166)  
Importance of patent protection 
(sector level) 0.185 0.181 0.188 -2.038 
 (0.100) (0.096) (0.099)  
Importance of strategic protection 
(sector level) 0.286 0.285 0.287 -1.353 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.059)  
Share of firms indicating that  
secrecy > patents (industry level) 0.178 0.169 0.186 -6,844 
  (0.072) (0.073) (0.072)  
Share of firms indicating that  
patents > secrecy (industry level) 0.178 0.175 0.180 -3,304 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)  
Share of employees with higher 
education (in %) 20.500 20.565 20.436 0.159 
  (23.638) (24.066) (23.223)  
R&D intensity 0.033 0.026 0.040 -3.127 
  (0.126) (0.106) (0.143)  
Continuous R&D (dummy) 0.315 0.266 0.363 -6.176 
  (0.465) (0.442) (0.481)  
Importance of other hampering 
factors (dummy) 0.833 0.661 0.999 -29.221 
  (0.373) (0.474) (0.024)  
Market Novelty (dummy) 0.243 0.193 0.292 -6.778 
  (0.429) (0.395) (0.455)  
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  Sample 
Firms with-
out  
lack of in-
formation 
on tech-
nologies 
Firms with 
lack  
of informa-
tion on 
technologies 
T-Test for 
mean dif-
ference 
Process Innovator (dummy) 0.422 0.348 0.494 -7.680 
  (0.558) (0.547) (0.559)  
Number of Employees 710.304 607.238 810.208 -0.874 
  (6787.111) (6283.552) (7242.315)  
East Germany (dummy) 0.325 0.357 0.293 3.967 
  (0.468) (0.479) (0.455)  
Medium-low-tech manufacturing 0.142 0.122 0.161 -3.226 
  (0.349) (0.328) (0.368)  
High-tech manufacturing 0.088 0.066 0.109 -4.461 
  (0.284) (0.249) (0.312)  
High-tech services 0.074 0.072 0.075 -0.334 
  (0.261) (0.259) (0.264)  
Source: Own calculations. 
Table A-7 Coefficients of Ordered Probit Estimations of the Effect of Patents and 
Secrecy on Knowledge Spillovers 
  
Patents 
(1) 
Secrecy 
(2) 
Patents + 
Secrecy (3)
Importance of patent protection (industry level) 0.261**   
  (0.149)   
Importance of patent protection (sector level) 0.134   
  (0.236)   
Importance of  protection by secrecy (industry 
level)  0.349**  
   (0.176)  
Importance of protection by secrecy (sector)  0.208  
   (0.396)  
Share of firms indicating that patents > secrecy 
(industry level)   0.289 
    (0.496) 
Share of firms indicating that secrecy > patents 
(industry level)   0.706 
    (0.434) 
Importance of protection by secrecy + patents 
(sector level)   0.177 
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Patents 
(1) 
Secrecy 
(2) 
Patents + 
Secrecy (3)
    (0.298) 
Share of employees with higher education  
degree in % -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D intensity 0.174 0.176 0.245 
  (0.268) (0.266) (0.266) 
R&D intensity, squared -0.069 -0.068 -0.084 
  (0.105) (0.104) (0.106) 
Continuous in-house R&D -0.096* -0.099* -0.090* 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
Importance of other hampering factors 3.186*** 3.184*** 3.184*** 
  (0.315) (0.315) (0.315) 
Market novelty (dummy) 0.004 0.003 0.006 
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Process Innovation (dummy) 0.114*** 0.113*** 0.110*** 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Number of employees, log 0.055 0.054 0.053 
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
number of employees, log, squared -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
East Germany (dummy) -0.159*** -0.156*** -0.155***
  (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Medium-low-tech manufacturing 0.114* 0.114* 0.109* 
  (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) 
High-tech manufacturing 0.096 0.065 0.064 
  (0.075) (0.081) (0.085) 
High-tech Services 0.052 0.006 -0.014 
  (0.093) (0.098) (0.117) 
Observations 3,403 3,403 3,403 
McKelvey and Zavoina Pseudo R2 0.595 0.595 0.595 
X^2 150.99 151.80 151.86 
Loglikelihood -3019.98 -3019.64 -3020.05 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%;  
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Appendix to Section 6.6 Absorptive Capacity as the Determining Factor of 
Realized Incoming Knowledge Spillovers 
Table A-8 Variables Included in the Empirical Model of the Determinants of Ab-
sorptive Capacity 
Variable Type Construction 
Absorp Dummy One, if in the three-year period 2000-2002 at least one innovation 
of a firm was developed because of impulses from at least one of 
the following sources: customers, suppliers, competitors, univer-
sities, research institutions. 
Absorp_intra Dummy One, if in the three-year period 2000-2002 at least one innovation 
of a firm was developed and successfully implemented because 
of impulses from customers, suppliers or competitors from the 
firm’s industry (NACE 2). 
Absorp_inter Dummy One, if in the three-year period 2000-2002 at least one innovation 
of a firm was developed and successfully implemented because 
of impulses from customers or suppliers from industries other 
than its own (NACE 2). 
Absorp_science Dummy One, if in the three-year period 2000-2002 at least one innovation 
of a firm was developed and successfully implemented because 
of impulses from universities or other public research institutes. 
Grads % Share of employees with higher education in total employees. 
R&D_int % Share of R&D expenditure in turnover, 2001 
R&D_int2 % Share of R&D expenditure in turnover, 2001, squared  
R&D_int_empl % Share of R&D employees in total employees  
R&D_int_empl2 % Share of R&D employees in total employees, squared 
R&Dcon Dummy One, if firm was engaged in R&D activities continuously 
col_infor Dummy One, if informal contact among employees were highly impor-
tant. 
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Variable Type Construction 
col_jointstrat Dummy One, if joint development of innovation strategies was highly 
important. 
col_opencom Dummy One, if open communication of ideas and concepts among de-
partments was highly important. 
col_mutsup Dummy One, if mutual support of other departments with innovation-
related problems was highly important. 
col_heads Dummy One, if regular meetings of department heads to discuss innova-
tion-related topics were highly important. 
col_exchange Dummy One, if temporary exchange of personnel between departments 
for innovation projects was highly important. 
col_seminar Dummy One, if seminars and workshops for innovation projects involv-
ing several departments were highly important. 
stim_index Index Index based on a question regarding the importance (four-point 
Likert-scale: “0” not important; “4” highly important”) of nine 
different methods of simulating innovation and knowledge trans-
fer (stim1-stim9), ranging from monetary incentives for leading 
employees to incentives to develop one’s own ideas (full list 
available upon request). Result of principal component factor 
analysis suggests a single factor with an Eigenvalue greater than 
one (5.75). Factor loadings after Varimax rotation rescaled be-
tween 0 and 1. 
Lnemp Log Natural logarithm of number of employees 
Lnemp2 Log Natural logarithm of number of employees, squared 
east Dummy One, if a firm is located in Eastern Germany. 
ind_lt Dummy One, if a firm is from a low-tech industry. 
ind_mlt Dummy One, if a firm is from a medium-low-tech industry. 
ind_mht Dummy One, if a firm is from a medium-high-tech industry. 
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Variable Type Construction 
ind_ht Dummy One, if a firm is from a high-tech industry. 
serv_lt Dummy One, if a firm is from low-tech services. 
serv_ht Dummy One, if a firm is from high-tech services. 
Source: Own illustration. 
Table A-9 List of Industry Dummies Included in the Model of the Determinants 
of Absorptive Capacity 
Industry Group  NACE Code 
Other manufacturing 40, 41, 45 
Low-tech manufacturing 10-22, 36, 37 
Medium-low-tech manufacturing 23, 25-28, 351 
Medium-high-tech manufacturing 24 (exc. 244), 29, 31, 34, 35 (excl. 353) 
High-tech manufacturing 244, 30, 32, 33, 353 
Low-tech services  
(consist of knowledge-intensive market ser-
vices, knowledge-intensive financial ser-
vices and other knowledge-intensive ser-
vices) 
50, 51, 52, 55, 60-63, 65-67, 70, 71, 74, 75, 
90, 92 
High-tech services 64, 72, 73 
Note: Only those NACE codes that were present in my sample are listed in the second column. 
Source: Own illustration. Classification based on the Eurostat and OECD classification for 
technology and knowledge intensive sectors (Eurostat, 2006). 
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Table A-10 Descriptive Statistics for Variables included in the Model of the Determinants of Absorptive Capacity 
Definition Variable Sample AC a 
Intra-industry 
AC a 
Inter-industry 
AC a 
Scientific 
AC a 
Number of observations  1,650  1,177 575 956 248 
% of total    68% 33% 56% 14% 
Share of R&D expenditure in turnover, in % R&D_int 7.46  8.69* 7.70 8.66* 14.80 *** 
  (22.27)  (24.75) (23.00) (23.17) (28.50) 
Share of R&D expenditure in turnover, squared R&D_int2 551.19  687.52 587.58 611.30 1028.27 
  (5187.4)  (6004.8) (5756.2) (5243.9) (6371.9) 
Share of employees with higher education in total 
employees, in % Grads 27.70  29.57* 27.67 29.66* 42.15 *** 
  (26.83)  (27.41) (25.50) (27.54) (29.69) 
Continuous R&D activities R&Dcon 0.53  0.59*** 0.60*** 0.60*** 0.77 *** 
  (0.50)  (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.42) 
Number of employees, logarithm ln_emp 4.59  4.65 4.95*** 4.66 4.68 
  (1.89)  (1.97) (2.11) (1.97) (2.26) 
Number of employees, logarithm, squared ln_emp2 24.61  25.49* 28.93*** 25.58* 26.95 * 
  (20.52)  (21.96) (24.78) (22.03) (26.95) 
Firm located in Eastern Germany East 0.32  0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 
  (0.47)  (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) 
Index for importance of methods of stimulating 
innovation activities and knowledge transfer stim_index 0.46  0.48*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.52 *** 
  (0.23)  (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) 
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Definition Variable Sample AC a 
Intra-industry 
AC a 
Inter-industry 
AC a 
Scientific 
AC a 
Informal contact among employees  col_infor 0.47  0.50* 0.51** 0.50* 0.55 *** 
  (0.50)  (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) 
Open communication of ideas and concepts 
among departments col_opencom 0.46  0.49* 0.47 0.48* 0.47 
  (0.50)  (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Joint development of innovation strategies  col_jointstrat 0.32  0.34 0.31 0.35* 0.37 
  (0.47)  (0.47) (0.46) (0.48) (0.48) * 
Mutual support of other departments with innova-
tion-related problems  col_mutsup 0.43  0.46* 0.41 0.47** 0.46 
  (0.50)  (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) 
Regular meetings of department heads to discuss 
innovation-related topics col_heads 0.36  0.37 0.39 0.38 0.36 
  (0.48)  (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) 
Temporary exchange of personnel between de-
partments for innovation projects col_exchange 0.06  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.10 ** 
  (0.24)  (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.30) 
Seminars and workshops for innovation projects 
involving several departments  col_seminar 0.12  0.13 0.11 0.14 0.21 *** 
  (0.33)  (0.34) (0.31) (0.34) (0.40) 
AC: absorptive capacity; means, standard errors in parentheses 
a Mean is different from the sample mean at * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%  
Source: Own calculations. 
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Table A-11 Regression Results from Probit (1) and Trivariate Probit (2)-(4) Estimations of the Determinants of Absorptive Ca-
pacity 
Definition Variable 
AC 
(1) 
Intra-industry 
AC 
(2) 
Inter-industry 
AC 
(3) 
Scientific 
AC 
(4) 
Number of employees (logarithm) ln_emp -0.199** -0.134* -0.079 -0.099 
  (0.090) (0.079) (0.076) (0.087) 
Number of employees, squared (logarithm) ln_emp2 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.010 0.012 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Share of employees with higher education in total  
employees, in % grads 0.003*** 0.001 0.002 0.010 *** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of R&D expenditure in turnover, in % R&D_int 0.004 -0.002 0.007* 0.014 *** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Share of R&D expenditure in turnover, squared R&D_int2 -0.00001 0.000005 -0.000028* -0.00005 
  (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.000014) (0.0002) 
Continuos R&D activities  R&Dcon 0.306*** 0.127* 0.222*** 0.451 *** 
  (0.078) (0.076) (0.073) (0.089) 
Informal contacts among employees  col_infor 0.159** 0.218*** 0.113 0.096 
  (0.076) (0.072) (0.144) (0.088) 
Open communication of ideas and concepts among 
departments col_opencom 0.030 0.102 -0.074 -0.238 ** 
  (0.086) (0.081) (0.078) (0.098) 
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Definition Variable 
AC 
(1) 
Intra-industry 
AC 
(2) 
Inter-industry 
AC 
(3) 
Scientific 
AC 
(4) 
Joint development of innovation strategies col_jointstrat -0.105 -0.138* -0.022 -0.050 
  (0.085) (0.080) (0.080) (0.100) 
Mutual support of other departments with innova-
tion-related problems col_mutsup 0.090 -0.180** 0.122 -0.089 
  (0.084) (0.079) (0.077) (0.096) 
Regular meetings of department heads to discuss 
innovation-related topics  col_heads -0.010 0.031 -0.032 -0.123 
  (0.080) (0.076) (0.075) (0.096) 
Temporary exchange of personnel between depart-
ments for innovation projects  col_exchange -0.275* -0.092 -0.127 0.117 
  (0.150) (0.147) (0.140) (0.160) 
Seminars and workshops for innovation projects in-
volving several departments  col_seminar -0.009 -0.341*** 0.013 0.243 ** 
  (0.116) (0.110) (0.105) (0.220) 
Index for importance of methods of stimulating in-
novation and knowledge transfer Stim_index 0.683*** 0.293* 0.602*** 0.798 ** 
  (0.173) (0.170) (0.166) (0.205) 
Firm located in Eastern Germany  east 0.152** 0.154* 0.122* -0.050 
  (0.076) (0.072) (0.070) (0.093) 
Low-tech industries ind_lt -0.092 0.143 -0.003 -0.124 
  (0.245) (0.225) (0.078) (0.291) 
Medium-low-tech industries Ind_mlt -0.193 -0.315 0.167 -0.183 
  (0.239) (0.222) (0.205) (0.288) 
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Definition Variable 
AC 
(1) 
Intra-industry 
AC 
(2) 
Inter-industry 
AC 
(3) 
Scientific 
AC 
(4) 
Medium-high-tech industries Ind_mht -0.114 0.217 -0.005 -0.120 
  (0.237) (0.215) (0.201) (0.275) 
High-tech industries Ind_ht -0.111 0.038 0.055 -0.092 
  (0.248) (0.226) (0.211) (0.282) 
Low-tech services serv_lt -0.311 -0.177 -0.009 -0.291 
  (0.232) (0.214) (0.197) (0.277) 
High-tech services serv_ht 0.008 0.094 0.112 -0.147 
  (0.259) (0.235) (0.221) (0.295) 
Constant  0.417 -0.540* -0.305 -1.655 
   (0.316) (0.293) (0.279) (0.366) 
Observations  1,650  1,650  
X^2  132.73  347.89  
Log-likelihood    -2,663.48  
Aldrich-Nelson Pseudo R^2  0.137  0.231  
Rho   (2,3): 0.27*** (3,4): 0.19*** (2,4)0.11 ** 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
AC: exploitive absorptive capacity 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Appendix to Section 7.2 Estimating the Impact of Knowledge Spillovers on 
the R&D Co-operation  
Table A-12 Construction of Variables for the Benchmark Case on the Importance 
of Knowledge Spillovers for R&D Co-operation  
Variable Name Construction 
Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) 
model 
R&D Co-operation  Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if 
the firm cooperates on their innovation 
activities with suppliers, customers, com-
petitors, commercial laboratories/R&D 
enterprises, universities, or government or 
private non-profit research institutes be-
tween 2001 and 2003. 
No deviations 
Incoming  
Spillovers 
Sum of importance (number between 0 
(not used) and 3 (high)) of professional 
conferences, meetings and journals and of 
exhibitions and fairs as sources of innova-
tion. Rescaled between 0 (no spillovers) 
and 1 (maximum spillovers). 
Includes the impor-
tance of patent ap-
plications as a 
source of innova-
tion. 
Legal Protection 
(industry level) 
Mean of Legal Protection at the industry 
level (NACE 2). Sum of importance 
(number between 0 (not used) and 3 
(high)) of formal protection methods for 
innovations (patents, copyrights, trade-
marks, registration of design patterns). 
Rescaled between 0 (not used) and 1 
(highly used). 
No deviation 
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Variable Name Construction 
Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) 
model 
Appropriability Sum of importance (number between 0 
(not used) and 3 (high)) of strategic pro-
tection methods for innovations (secrecy, 
complexity of design and lead-time advan-
tage). Rescaled between 0 (not used) and 
1 (highly important). 
No deviation 
Constraints Importance of the following obstacles to 
innovation process (number between 3 or 
4 (high) and 0 (not relevant)): Innovation 
costs too high; Lack of availability of fi-
nance; Excessive perceived economic 
risks. Rescaled between 0 (not relevant) 
and 1 (high).  
Separate variables 
for the importance 
of cost and risk as 
an obstacle to in-
novation. Cost: 
Importance of no 
suitable financing 
available, high cost 
of innovation, pay-
back period too 
long, innovation 
cost hard to control 
as obstacles to in-
novation. Risk: 
Importance of high 
risk as an obstacle 
to innovation. 
Treated as exoge-
nous in the CV 
model. 
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Variable Name Construction 
Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) 
model 
Complementarities Importance (number between 0 (not used) 
and 3 (high)) of lack of information on 
technology as an obstacle to innovation. 
Rescaled between 0 (not important) and 1 
(very important). 
No deviation 
Size Natural log of number of employees Firm Sales in abso-
lute terms 
Size^2 Natural log of number of employees, 
squared 
Firm Sales in abso-
lute terms, squared 
East Dummy variable which takes the value 1 
if the firm is situated in East Germany 
No dummies for 
region 
Export Intensity Total exports divided by total turnover No deviation 
Basicness of R&D Sum of importance (number between 0 
(not used) and 3 (high)) of university and 
government or private non-profit research 
institutes as sources of information over 
sum of importance (number between 0 
(not used) and 3 (high)) of suppliers and 
customers as sources of information 
No deviation 
Industry level of 
variable 
Mean of the variable at the amended 2-
digit NACE level  
Original NACE 2 
Source: Own illustration. 
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Table A-13 Descriptive Statistics (Means) for the Benchmark Case on the Impor-
tance of Knowledge Spillovers for R&D Co-operation 
 
Sample 
Mean 
Firms without R&D 
co-operation be-
tween 2001-2003 
Firms with R&D 
co-operation be-
tween 2001-2003 
Observations 1720 1186 534 
% of total - 69% 31% 
Incoming Spillovers 0.485 0.459 0.544*** 
 (0.239) (0.238) (0.231) 
Appropriability 0.364 0.286 0.536 *** 
 (0.344) (0.033) (0.320) 
Legal Protection  
(industry level) 0.203 0.154 0.311*** 
 (0.255) (0.233) (0.269) 
Number of employees 701 280 1634*** 
 (6097) (1596) (10629) 
Continuous R&D activities 0.485 0.351 0.783*** 
 (0.500) (0.477) (0.413) 
Constraints 0.512 0.492 0.556*** 
 (0.287) (0.290) (0.276) 
Complementarities 0.745 0.744 0.747 
 (0.245) (0.251) (0.230) 
East Germany 0.316 0.295 0.361*** 
 (0.465) (0.456) (0.481) 
Industry-level of  
R&D co-operation 0.283 0.248 0.361*** 
 (0.151) (0.136) (0.152) 
Standard deviation in parenthesis 
Mean difference between cooperating and non-cooperating firms is significant  
at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*) 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Table A-14 Results for the First Stage OLS Regressions of the Two Stage Probit 
Estimations of the Probability of Cooperating 
 Incoming Spillovers 
Appropri-
ability 
Legal  
Protection
Continu-
ous R&D 
Con-
straints 
Incoming Spillovers  
(industry level) 1.049*** 0.272 0.381** 0.501 -0.475* 
 (0.227) (0.306) (0.214) (0.411) (0.253) 
Appropriability  
(industry level) 0.197 0.914*** 0.040 0.088 0.304 
 (0.203) (0.269) (0.186) (0.370) (0.235) 
Legal Protection  
(industry level) 0.139 -0.148 0.787*** -0.246 0.062 
 (0.119) (0.167) (0.117) (0.234) (0.141) 
Constraints  
(industry level) -0.203 0.004 0.075 -0.084 0.876*** 
 (0.136) (0.178) (0.119) (0.245) (0.147) 
Continuous R&D  
(industry level) -0.100 0.042 -0.065 0.834*** -0.167 
 (0.109) (0.159) (0.113) (0.212) (0.124) 
Basicness of R&D  0.091*** 0.069*** 0.062*** 0.189*** 0.048*** 
 (0.015) (0.031) (0.012) (0.019) (0.014) 
Export Intensity 0.030 0.196*** 0.160*** 0.324*** -0.058** 
 (0.024) (0.035) (0.026) (0.047) (0.029) 
Number of employees, 
ln -0.022* -0.044** 0.004 0.010 -0.105***
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.012) (0.023) (0.015) 
Number of employees, 
ln, squared 0.002* 0.007*** 0.004** 0.004* 0.008*** 
 (0.0012) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Complementarities -0.059** -0.048 0.018 0.109** -0.314***
 (0.023) (0.031) (0.021) (0.041) (0.028) 
East Germany 0.033*** -0.034* -0.039*** 0.017 0.001 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.011) (0.024) (0.015) 
Industry-level of  
R&D co-operation -0.150 -0.157 -0.089 -0.239 0.061 
 (0.110) (0.169) (0.118) (0.224) (0.123) 
Constant 0.123 -0.017 -0.280** -0.392** 0.751*** 
 (0.099) (0.138) (0.100) (0.194) (0.108) 
Observations 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,720 1,720 
R^2 0.093 0.189 0.284 0.277 0.161 
Source: Own Calculations.      
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Table A-15 Construction of Variables for the Model on Knowledge Spillovers 
for R&D Co-operation using the Constructed Spillover Measures  
Variable Name Construction 
R&D Co-operation  Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the firm cooper-
ates on their innovation activities with suppliers, customers, 
competitors, commercial laboratories/R&D enterprises, 
universities, or government or private non-profit research 
institutes between 2001 and 2003. 
Realized spillovers Realized spillover variables as constructed in chapters 6.7. 
Public funding Indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a firm has re-
ceived public funding for its innovation activities from the 
European Union, national authorities or state authorities. 
Number of main 
competitors 
Variable that takes the value 0 if the firm is a monopolist, 1 
if it has 1-5 main competitors, 2 if it has 6 to 15 competitors 
and 3 if it has more than 15 competitors. 
Complementarities Importance (number between 0 (not used) and 3 (high)) of 
lack of information on technology as an obstacle to innova-
tion. Rescaled between 0 (not important) and 1 (very impor-
tant). 
Constraints   Importance of the following obstacles to innovation process 
(number between 3 or 4 (high) and 0 (not relevant)): Inno-
vation costs too high; Lack of availability of finance; Ex-
cessive perceived economic risks. Rescaled between 0 (not 
relevant) and 1 (high).  
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Variable Name Construction 
Constraints_others Average importance of the following obstacles to innova-
tion organizational problems within the firm, internal oppo-
sitions, lack of qualified personel, lack of information on 
markets, uncertain demand for innovations, regulations and 
laws, difficulties in finding partners for innovation active-
ties, market dominated by established firms.Rescaled be-
tween 0 (not relevant) and 1 (high). Used as an instrument. 
Exports Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm had any 
exports between 2001 and 2003. 
Size Natural log of number of employees. 
Size^2 Natural log of number of employees, squared. 
Age Age of the firm in years. 
East Germany Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm is situ-
ated in East Germany. 
Industry dummies See Table A-9 above. 
Tangible assets Total value of tangible asstes as of 2004 in billion Euros 
Used as an instrument. 
Industry level of 
variable 
Mean of the variable at the amended 2-digit NACE level.  
Source: Own illustration. 
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Table A-16 Descriptive Statistics (Means) of the Sample used for the Model on 
Knowledge Spillovers for R&D Co-operation using the Con-
structed Spillover Measures 
 
Sample Mean 
Firms without R&D 
co-operation be-
tween 2001-2003 
Firms with R&D 
co-operation be-
tween 2001-2003
Observations 586 324 262 
% of total  55% 45% 
Realized Spillovers:    
Outgoing Spillover 38.944 28.896 51.370 
 (316.719) (277.714) (359.317) 
Incoming Spillovers 15,020.400 10,739.350 20,315.770*** 
 (11,565.02) (9,184.816) (12,019.700) 
Intra-Industry Spillovers 1,834.826 1,249.155 2,559.090*** 
 (2,836.626) (2,068.22) (3,433.529) 
Extra-Industry Spillovers 13,185.580 9,489.192 17,756.680*** 
 (10,057.48) (8,117.261) (10,355.850) 
Other Motives:    
Public funding (dummy)  0.483 0.231 0.794*** 
 (0.500) (0.422) (0.405) 
Number of main  
competitors 2.514 2.577 2.435*** 
 (0.756) (0.777) (0.723) 
Complementarities 0.260 0.258 0.262 
 (0.251) (0.257) (0.242) 
Constraints 0.515 0.464 0.579*** 
 (0.284) (0.285) (0.271) 
Exports 0.778 0.694 0.882*** 
 (0.416) (0.461) (0.324) 
Number of employees 1200.805 507.028 2058.760*** 
 (7147.123) (3341.107) (9967.023) 
Age in years 23.995 27.725 19.382* 
 (85.311) (112.923) (22.214) 
East Germany (dummy) 0.336 0.284 0.401*** 
 (0.473) (0.452) (0.491) 
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Sample Mean 
Firms without R&D 
co-operation be-
tween 2001-2003 
Firms with R&D 
co-operation be-
tween 2001-2003
Industry dummies:    
Other manufacturing 0.020 0.021 0,019 
 (0.142) (0.146) (0,137) 
Low-tech manufacturing 0.084 0.114 0,046*** 
 (0.277) (0.319) (0,210) 
Medium-low-tech  
manufacturing 0.179 0.210 0,141** 
 (0.384) (0.408) (0,349) 
Med.-high-tech  
manufacturing 0.188 0.148 0,237*** 
 (0.391) (0.356) (0,426) 
High-tech manufacturing 0.166 0.105 0,240*** 
 (0.372) (0.307) (0,428) 
Low-tech services 0.225 0.290 0,145*** 
 (0.418) (0.456) (0,353) 
High-tech services 0.138 0.111 0,172** 
 (0.345) (0.315) (0,378) 
Standard deviation in parenthesis 
Mean difference between cooperating and non-cooperating firms is significant  
at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) or 10% level (*) 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Table A-17 Results for the First Stage of the Instrumental Variable Probit Esti-
mations of the Model on Knowledge Spillovers for R&D Co-
operation using the Constructed Spillover Measures 
 
Importance of cost and 
risk sharing as an obsta-
cle to innovation activi-
ties (Constraints) 
Importance of cost and 
risk sharing as an ob-
stacle to innovation 
activities (Constraints)
Realized Spillovers:   
Outgoing Spillover 0.000002 0.000001 
 (0.000033) (0.000032) 
Incoming Spillovers 0.000003**  
 (0.000001)  
Intra-Industry Spillovers  -0.00001* 
  (0.00001) 
Extra-Industry Spillovers  0.000004** 
  (0.000001) 
Other Motives:   
Public funding (dummy)  0.066*** 0.061** 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
Number of main competitors 0.004 0.003 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Complementarities -0.084* -0.087* 
 (0.050) (0.050) 
Exports 0.025 0.024 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Size (number of employees), ln -0.050** -0.044* 
 (0.025) (0.025) 
Size (number of employees), ln, 
squared 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Age in years 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
East Germany (dummy) 0.018 0.021 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
Instruments:   
Importance of all other motives 0.639*** 0.643*** 
 (0.059) (0.058) 
Value of all tangible assets 0.000002 0.00001 
 (0.000008) (0.00001) 
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Importance of cost and 
risk sharing as an obsta-
cle to innovation activi-
ties (Constraints) 
Importance of cost and 
risk sharing as an ob-
stacle to innovation 
activities (Constraints)
Industry dummies:   
Other manufacturing -0.178** -0.242** 
 (0.077) (0.082) 
Low-tech manufacturing 0.096** 0.041 
 (0.045) (0.051) 
Medium-low-tech manufacturing 0.076** 0.025 
 (0.037) (0.043) 
High-tech manufacturing 0.014 -0.022 
 (0.034) (0.037) 
Low-tech services 0.040 -0.017 
 (0.038) (0.045) 
High-tech services 0.089** 0.023 
 (0.038) (0.047) 
Constant 0.331*** 0.363 
 (0.089) (0.090) 
Observations 586 586 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 188 
Source: Own calculations. 
                                              
188 Since the whole model is estimated using a maximum likelihood procedure, the quality indicators 
(X^2 and log-likelihood) are based on both stages and are reported in the table with the second stage 
results. 
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Table A-18 Results for the Instrumental Variable Probit Estimations of the 
Model on Knowledge Spillovers for R&D Co-operation using the 
Constructed Spillover Measures 
 
Model with incoming 
and outgoing spill-
overs 
Model with intra-industry 
and extra-industry incom-
ing and outgoing spill-
overs 
Realized Spillovers:   
Outgoing Spillover -0.00006 -0.00006 
 (0.0007) (0.0003) 
Incoming Spillovers 0.00003**  
 (0.00001)  
Intra-Industry Spillovers  0.00004 
  (0.00004) 
Extra-Industry Spillovers  0.00002 ** 
  (0.000009) 
Other Motives:   
Public funding (dummy)  1.271*** 1.273*** 
 (0.165) (0.163) 
Number of main competitors -0.109 -0.108 
 (0.104) (0.080) 
Complementarities 0.050 0.047 
 (0.322) (0.273) 
Constraints (I) 1,616*** 1.630*** 
 (0.454) (0.419) 
Exports 0.410** 0.411** 
 (0.322) (0.187) 
Size (number of employees), ln 0.182 ZZZ 0.184 ZZZ 
 (0.218) (0.187) 
Size (number of employees), ln , 
squared -0.001 
ZZZ -0.001 ZZZ 
 0.020 (0.019) 
Age in years -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.003) 
East Germany (dummy) -0.092 -0.094 
 (0.151) (0.174) 
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Model with incoming 
and outgoing spill-
overs 
Model with intra-industry 
and extra-industry incom-
ing and outgoing spill-
overs 
Industry dummies:   
Other manufacturing 0.891* 0.950* 
 (0.485) (0.539) 
Low-tech manufacturing -0.133 -0.082 
 (0.287) (0.539) 
Medium-low-tech manufacturing -0.041 0.007 
 (0.276) (0.233) 
High-tech manufacturing 0.114 0.147 
 (0.250) (0.231) 
Low-tech services 0.172 0.224 
 (0.250) (0.226) 
High-tech services 0.266 0.326 
 (0.279) (0.231) 
Constant -2.855*** -2.905*** 
 (0.762) (0,560) 
Observations 586 586 
X^2 245.41 293.83 
Log Likelihood -253.652 -251.077 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; ZZZ  jointly significant at 1% level;  
(I) Instrumented variable 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors in parentheses. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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B e r a t e n d e  T ä t i g k e i t e n  u n d  M i t g l i e d s c h a f t e n 
Projektbezogene Tätigkeiten: 
Jan 2007 – Mitglied der “National Experts on Science and 
Technology Indicators Group (NESTI)” 
OECD 
Feb 2006 –   Mitglied der “Task Force for the Preparation of the 
Community Innovation Survey 2006” 
Eurostat 
Nov 2003 – Jun  2005 Mitglied der “Oslo Manual Revision Task Force” 
    OECD/Eurostat 
Nov 2003 – Mai 2005 Mitglied der “Task Force for the Preparation of the 
4th Community Innovation Survey (CIS IV)” 
    Eurostat 
Nov 2003 – Mitglied der “Working Party on Science, Technology 
and Innovation (STI) Statistics” 
    Eurostat 
Wissenschaftliche Tätigkeiten: 
Mai 2007 Referee für  “R&D Management Journal” 
Feb 2007 Referee für die Academy of International Business 
(AIB) Konferenz, Indianapolis, 2007 
Dez 2006 Referee für „Research Policy“ 
Jun  2006  Referee für “Technovation” 
Feb 2006 Referee für die Academy of International Business 
(AIB) Konferenz, Peking, 2006 
Dez 2005    Referee für “Applied Economics Journal” 
Mai 2005 –  Dez 2005 Mitglied der Canadian Economic Association (CEA) 
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F o r s c h u n g s a u f e n t h a l t e 
Nov 2006 –  Dez 2006 Instituto Superior Técnico, IN+, Centre for Innovation, 
Technology and Policy Research 
  Empirische Analysen zu internationalen Kooperationen 
mit portugiesischen und deutschen Innovationsdaten 
Lissabon, Portugal 
Sep 2006 –  Nov 2006 Statistics Canada 
  Empirische Analysen zu Kooperationsmotiven mit kanadi-
schen Innovationsdaten 
  Ottawa, Kanada 
F r e m d s p r a c h en  u n d  C o m p u t e r k e n n t n i s s e 
Fremdsprachen: 
     Englisch 
     Verhandlungssicher 
     Spanisch 
     Grundlagen 
Software: 
     STATA 
     Expertenwissen 
     Microsoft Office 
     Expertenwissen 
E h r e n a m t l i c h e s  E n g a g e m e n t 
Sep 2003 – Sep 2006 Leiter der EC Jugendgruppe in Mannheim-
Feudenheim 
Ortsgruppe des Deutschen Jugendverbands "Entschieden 
für Christus" (EC) e.V. 
Sep 2000   Volunteer im „Pavillon der Hoffnung“ (EXPO 2000) 
    Pavillon der Hoffnung e.V. 
Aug 1997 – Aug 2001 Leiter der EC Jugendgruppe in Wassertrüdingen 
Ortsgruppe des Deutschen Jugendverbands "Entschieden  
für Christus" (EC) e.V. 
  
Mannheim, den       _______________________ 
                (Tobias Schmidt) 
 
